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NOTATIONS 
Ν = {1,2,3,...} : the set of positive integers 
R' : the set of t-tuples of real numbers (t £ N) 
ei, ег, . . . , et 6 R' : unit vectors in R'. 
For x,y e R': x > y if xfc > y* forali Jfc e {!,...,*} 
χ > y if i t > yjb for all A; 6 {1,..., t} 
[x,y] = {Ax + (1 - A)y | 0 < A < 1}, [x, y) = {Ax + (1 - A)y | 0 < A < 1} 
(x,y] = {Ax + (1 - A)y | 0 < A < 1}, (x, y) = {Ax + (1 - A)y | 0 < A < 1} 
For С С R' : 
For С С R' convex: 
For С С R' finite: 
Conv (С) 
Compr(C) 
U(C) 
Dim(C) 
Ext(C) 
Relint(C) 
\c\ 
<c> 
convex hull of С 
comprehensive hull of С 
the set of undominated elements in С 
dimension of С 
the set of extreme points of С 
relative interior of С 
number of elements of С 
the set of all partitions of С 
t — 1 dimensional unit simplex in R'. 
Let N = {1,2,... ,n} and let Xi,X2,. ·. ,Xn be arbitrary sets. 
Д ( = С о п ({е1,е2,...,е1}) С R': 
Δ, =Relint(A t). 
Χι χ Х2,ТІІСЦХІ 
xlnx2,r\,€NXi 
XiUX2,\JieNX, 
ΧΑΧ2 = {χ£Χι\χϊΧι} 
2N 
P(N) 
RN 
: Cartesian product 
intersection 
union 
power set of N 
the set of permutations of Ν 
the set of real-valued functions on N 
viii 
A
= [a-j]i2=ij=i = [au].e{i,..,m),,e{i η} 
Rank(A) 
A>Q 
0 : empty set 
: = : is defined as 
D : end of a proof 
Let N = {1 ,2, . . . , n} represent a set of players. 
real m χ η matrix with entries a, 
rank of A 
all entries of A are positive 
TUN 
TU0
N 
veTUN 
Δ . ( 5 ) 
Φ(υ) 
WTt/^ 
V 6 iVTt/^ 
C(V) 
sc(y) 
m 
CSN 
CS? 
(N,v,A)eCSN 
μ(Ν,ν,Α) 
<N,v,A) 
S/A 
SGN 
reSGN 
Е(Г) 
SECT) 
PUE{T) 
BG(m,n) 
(A,B)eBG(m,n) 
PE{A,B) 
PR(A,B) 
the set of Transferable Utility games 
the set of zero-normalized TU-games 
a TU-game 
dividend of 5 С JV in the game υ 
Shapley value of ν 
the set of Non-TYansferable Utility games 
an JVTiJ-game 
core of V 
strong core of V 
imputation set of V 
the set of communication situations 
the set of cycle-free communication situations 
a communication situation 
Myerson value of (N, v. A) 
position value of (N, v, A) 
a parti t ion of S С JV with respect to A 
the set of strategic games 
a strategic game 
Nash equilibria for Г 
strong equilibria for Г 
payoff undominated equilibria for Г 
the set of m x η bimatrix games 
an τη χ η bimatrix game 
perfect equilibria for (A, B) 
proper equilibria for (A, B) 
I X 
QS(A, В) : quasi-strong equilibria for (A, B) 
PERS(A, B) : persistent equilibria for (A, B) 
U,(A,B) : undominated strategies for player t € {1,2} 
ίη(Α,Β) 
FoTpeA
m
,qeA
n 
C(p), C(q) : carrier of ρ (q) 
PB2(p),PBi(q) : pure best replies of player 2 (1) to ρ (q) 
i?2(p), Bi(q) : best replies of player 2 (1) to ρ (q) 
For (A, B) G BG{2, n) and ρ e Δ2 
5(p) : solutions to ρ 
PS(p) : pure solutions to ρ 
CS{p) : coordination solutions to ρ 
MG(r χ s, τη χ η) : the set of г χ s multiobjective m χ η bimatrix 
games 
(А, В) € BG(r χ. s,τη γ. η) : а л г х з multiobjective m χ η bimatrix game 
PAR(A, В) : Pareto equilibria for (A, B) 
χ 
I. I N T R O D U C T I O N 
1. GAME THEORETIC MODELS 
Game theory is the mathematical theory of conflict situations that involve at least 
two persons (players) with possible diverging interests. The foundation of game theory 
was laid in 'Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele' by J. von Neumann (1928), and after 
the classical book 'Theory of games and Economic Behaviour' by J. von Neumann and 
0. Morgenstern (1944), game theory gradually developed into an important tool for 
mathematical modelling in economics and in social and political sciences. 
To specify a game one has to know the set of players, the rules according to which 
the game is played, the various actions the players can take and the objective functions 
of the players. Here, an objective function describes a player's utility (payoff) for every 
possible set of actions the players can choose. Further, one may assume that, before the 
actual play of the game starts, there is a рте-play communication round in which the 
players can discuss and negotiate what actions to take. 
In non-cooperative game theoretic models, it is assumed that the players do not have 
the possibility of making binding agreements (contracts). In particular, this assumption 
implies that the players need not stick to any 'agreement' that is reached in the pre-play 
communication round. On the contrary, in cooperative game theoretic models, binding 
agreements can b e made. 
Let us first concentrate on non-cooperative models. 
A strategic game or a game in strategic form is described by 
(i) the set of players: І = {1,2,..., n} 
(ii) the strategy (action) space for each player i € N : Xi 
(iii) the payoff (utility) function for each player t £ N : Ki : Д Χ} —• R 
In a strategic game Γ = (Χι,Χ2,.. .,X
n
,Ki,K2,-• · ,K
n
), the players simultaneously 
and independently (no binding agreements can be made) have to decide upon one strat­
egy each. If the players have chosen the strategies χχ £ Xl, ¡rj ε X2, · · · , ^п G Xn, then 
player t € JV obtains a payoff Kl(xi,X2,... , x n ) £ R. By S G ^ we denote the class of 
all games in strategic form with player set N. 
A well known example in game-theoretic literature is given in 
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EXAMPLE i . i . (Battle of the sexes) 
A man (player 1) and his wife (player 2) have to decide upon going to the theatre (Γ) 
or to a football match (F). As tradition prescribes, the man likes football more than 
theatre, and for his wife it is the other way around. However, it is important for them 
to go together. These considerations are reflected in the following payoff (bi)matrix: 
player 2 
F Τ 
player 1 F(^ ^0Λ 
T\(0,0) (1,2)) 
This can be interpreted as follows. If they both decide to go t o the football match, then 
the man's utility (payoff) is 2 and his wife's utility is 1. However, if the man decides to 
go to the football match while his wife goes to the theatre, then they are both unhappy 
and have a zero utility. The other two payoff vectors can be interpreted in a similar 
way. 
Note that pre-play communication allows the players t o coordinate their actions, and 
almost surely this will imply that they both go to the football match or both go to the 
theatre. Without pre-play communication, these outcomes are less self-evident. 
Perhaps a more natural way to model non-cooperative games is by means of the 
extensive form, describing all (time) moments at which decisions have to be made, at 
each moment, what decisions can be made, by whom and where they lead to and, finally, 
what the payoffs are at the end of each possible play. As an example one might think 
of modelling the game of chess. 
Games in extensive form can be described by means of a directed game tree with one 
starting point (the root of the tree) and several end points. At each node of the tree 
that is not an end point, one of the players has to decide upon an action, i.e. upon 
which (outgoing) edge to take. If an end point is reached, the game is over: every end 
point determines a payoff for each player. 
Further, the set of decision nodes for each player is partitioned into information sets, 
each information set being a collection of nodes a player can not distinguish between. 
Put differently, a player knows which information set has been reached if he is called 
upon to make his (next) move, but he does not know the precise node in this information 
set the play has reached at that moment. If all information sets (for all players) consist 
of one node, a game with perfect information results. 
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EXAMPLE 1.2. (A game in extensive form with perfect information) 
Consider the following situation. There are two players: player 1 and player 2. First 
player 1 has to decide whether to stop (S) or to continue (C). If he decides to stop, 
both players receive a payoff of 1. If he decides to continue, player 2 is called upon t o 
make the same decision. If player 2 decides to stop (з), he receives a payoff of 3 whereas 
player 1 gets a zero payoff. If player 2 decides to continue (c), player 1 comes in again 
and can go either left (L) or right (R). By going left (right), player 1 receives a payoff 
of 2(4) and player 2 a payoff of 4(2). 
This situation corresponds to a game in extensive form with perfect information. T h e 
game tree is represented in figure 1.1. 
FIGURE 1.1. 
This game can b e remodelled as a game in strategic form. Then, because of the si­
multaneous choice of strategies in a strategic game, a strategy of player 1 will have 
to prescribe tin action at each of this two decision nodes, - in general, at each of the 
player's information sets -, whether his second decision node is actually reached or not. 
So player 1 has four strategies: SL, SR, CL, CR. Here, e.g. the strategy CL pre­
scribes to continue at the starting node and to go left whenever the second decision 
node is reached. Player 2 has only two strategies: s and c. The corresponding payoff 
functions are represented in the following diagram: 
s с 
SL /(1,1) (1,1)\ 
SR (1,1) (1,1) 
CL (0,3) (2,4) 
С Д \ ( 0 , 3 ) (4,2)/ 
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The procedure described in the second part of example 1.2 also applies to general 
games in extensive form. Hence, one can construct a corresponding game in strategic 
form to each game in extensive form. Conversely, each game in strategic form an be 
viewed upon as a game in extensive form. This is illustrated for 'battle of sexes'. 
E X A M P L E 1.3. Consider 'battle of the sexes' of example 1.1. This game can also be 
represented by means of the game tree in figure 1.2. Here, player 2 has one information 
set consisting of two nodes because she does not know what action has been chosen by 
player 1. Further, note that one may exchange the roles of player 1 and player 2. 
FIGURE 1.2. 
The non-cooperative strategic game model can be extended to incorporate the fact 
that players can have more than one objective function. For example, in 'battle of the 
sexes', one might think of the man and his wife as having two objectives: the direct 
pleasure of enjoying the football or the theatre and the (indirect) impact of their decision 
on their future relationship. These so-called multi-objective strategic games are (briefly) 
considered in chapter IV. That chapter also discusses another possible modification of 
the strategic game model. In a game in strategic form it is assumed that all players have 
full information about the various actions all players can take, and about the objective 
functions of all players. In real-life situations this is often not the case, and (gathering) 
information about the 'state of the world', i.e. about the precise game that is being 
played, plays an important role. 
The first cooperative model we come to describe, is that of games in coalitional form 
(characteristic function form). The fact that binding agreements are allowed, is clearly 
reflected in the definition of such a game. A game in coalitional form is determined by 
(i) the set of players: N = {l,2,...,n} 
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(ii) the (chaxacteristic) function υ : 2 ^ —• R, which assigns to each coalition S £ 2N, 
i.e. to each subgroup of players that decides to cooperate, a real n u m b e r v(S). 
This number is to be interpreted as the (maximal) monetary gains t h e coalition 
can achieve, independent of what the other players do. 
Further, it is assumed that υ(β) = 0. 
Because of the interpretation in (ii), games in coalitional form are also called TU-games 
(TU = Transferable Utility): the players in a coalition use a common measure (money) 
for the gains of their coalition and hence, it is possible to distribute these gains among 
themselves. 
By TL/^ we denote the set of all TU-games with player set JV. Generally, a coalitional 
game (N, v) is identified with its characteristic function v. 
E X A M P L E 1.4. ('Lady with the bag') 
Imagine the following situation. A lady comes out of the station. She is willing t o pay 
10 dollars for carrying her bags to a hotel. There are three carriers (player 1, 2 a n d 3) 
waiting. At least two of them are needed to take all bags. This can b e modelled as a 
three-person Tt/-game υ with 
υ ( 5 ) = ί 1 0 i f | 5 | > 2 
1.0 otherwise 
A second cooperative model is that of NTU-games (NTU = Non Transferable 
Utility), where it is assumed that there is no such common measure for t h e gains as 
money. In an iVTIZ-game (N, V), a set V(S) С R s of attainable payoff vectors is 
assigned to each non-empty coalition S. An element α € ^ ( 5 ) specifies a ut i l i ty level 
a, for each player г G 5 , seperately. In general, it is assumed that all sets of a t ta inab le 
payoff vectors are comprehensive, i.e. if a payoff vector α € R 5 is a t ta inable by the 
coalition S, then also each payoff vector 6 E Rs with b < a is at tainable. T h e set of all 
NTCZ-games with player set N is denoted by NTUN. 
Note that each coalitional game ν € TUN can be viewed upon as an NTU-game 
(JV, V), by letting V(S) represent the set of all possible division rules of the worth 
v(S) 6 R among the players in the coalition S. Taking into account comprehensiveness, 
У(3)={аеЯ3\^2^<у(5)}. 
• ES 
Another class of cooperative games that can be incorporated into t h e NTU-mode\, 
is the class of bargaining games. A two-person bargaining game is defined as a pair 
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(C,d), where С С R2 is compact and comprehensive. С represents all feasible utility 
pairs t h e players can bargain on, and d g С is the disagreement point, specifying the 
uti l i ty levels for the players in case they do not reach an agreement. A bargaining 
game (C, d) corresponds to an NTU-gzme (N, V) by defining ({г}) = (—oo, d,] for all 
i 6 {1,2} a n d F ( { l , 2 } ) = C. 
In cooperative game theory the notion of superadditivity plays an important role. 
An NTU-gaxne (N, V) is called superadditive if 
V(S)x V(T)CV(SUT) 
for all S, Τ 6 2 ^ with S f l T = 0. This means that is is advantageous for any two disjoint 
coalitions to join forces. 
An implicit assumption in modelling TU- or NTU-games is the fact that there are 
n o restrictions or problems with respect to communication among the players. Each 
player is assumed to be able to negotiate directly with any other player. A game 
theoret ic model for the case that communication possibilities are restricted, is discussed 
in t h e first part of section II. 
2. SOLUTION CONCEPTS FOR GAMES 
Modelling conflict situations is one part of game theory, finding conflict resolutions 
another . Based on mathematical principles of 'rational behaviour', conflict resolutions 
or game theoretic solution concepts should tell a player how to act in any particular 
game, or, to be less demanding, how to act in special subclasses of games. 
For non-cooperative games, the most fundamental solution concept is that of a 
Nash equilibrium (Nash (1951)). A Nash equilibrium is defined to be a strategy tuple, 
consisting of one strategy for each player, for which no player can gain by unilateral 
deviation. This seems a first necessary 'stability' condition on a strategy tuple one 
could advise to the players. For, should one advise a strategy tuple that is not a Nash 
equilibrium, at least one of the players has a clear incentive to deviate from the strategy 
t h a t is recommended to him. 
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EXAMPLE 2.1. 
For 'battle of sexes' of example 1.1 there are two (pure) Nash equilibria: the strategy 
pairs (F,T) and (T,F) that result in the (payoff) outcomes (2,1) and (1,2), respectively. 
Further, by allowing also mixed strategies, i.e. by allowing the players to randomize 
between the pure strategies F ana T, one obtains a third equiUbrium in which player 1 
puts probability | on F (so | on T) and player 2 puts probability j - on F. This Nash 
equilibrium leads t o an (expected) payoff o f j - 2 - 5 + j - l ' | = f for both players. 
EXAMPLE 2.2. 
For the game of example 1.2 there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: (SL,s) 
and (SR,s), both resulting in a payoff of 1 for each player. 
However, using the explicit form of the game tree in figure 1.1, the equiUbrium (SR,s) 
seems more rational in the sense that, should the second decision node of player 1 
actually be reached, player 1 is likely t o choose R instead of L, because this will lead 
to a payoff of 4 instead of 2. This reasoning leads to the notion of subgame perfect 
equilibria for games in extensive form, as defined in section 7. 
Although Nash equilibria seem reasonable and existence has been shown for large 
classes of non-cooperative games, there remain severed problems with respect t o the 
Nash equilibrium concept. One of the problems is that there are often too many 
Nash equilibria. Several authors have tried to reduce the set of Nash equilibria by 
imposing some additional rationality conditions. This lead to several refinements of the 
Nash equilibrium concept, such as perfect equilibria (Selten (1975)), proper equilibria 
(Myerson (1978)), persistent equilibria (Kalai and Samet (1984)) and stable sets 
(Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)). 
A second problem is that Nash equilibria may yield a low inefficient payoff, as is 
seen in the game of example 2.2 and also in the famous prisoner's dilemma (cf. Luce 
and Raiffa (1957)). However, here we want to restrict to an example that illustrates a 
third flaw of the Nash equiUbrium concept. 
E X A M P L E 2.3. (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1972)) 
Consider the two-person game in strategic form that is given by 
player 2 
L R 
player 1 ^ f ^ ' " 1 ) ^M 
в v (o,2) (ο,ο) ; 
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This game has a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies: ( j T + ^B, ^L+^R). So, in 
equilibrium, player 1 chooses T(op) with probability | and B(ottom) with probability | · , 
whereas player 2 randomizes equally between ¿(eft) and .R(ight). Equilibrium behaviour 
leads to a zero payoff for both players. However, the equilibrium strategy of player 1 does 
not guarantee a payoff of zero. Should player 2 deviate from his equihbrium strategy 
and choose e.g. R against | Т + ^В, then player 1 obtains an expected payoff of — | . 
On the other hand, by choosing the strategy B, player 1 can indeed guarantee a payoff 
of zero. In this case, should one advise player 1 to choose j T + f В? 
Nevertheless, in this monograph, we concentrate on the Nash equilibrium concept 
and its various refinements, mostly within the context of bimatrix games with only two 
players and a finite number of (pure) strategies. 
Now we discuss some solution concepts for cooperative games. Assuming that the 
grand coalition N of all players will form, the central question is, in the T£7-case, how 
to divide the gains of JV among the players, and, in the NTU-case, what attainable 
payoff vector for JV to decide on. Solution concepts will prescribe (a set of) 'reasonable' 
or 'fair' outcomes for each game. 
For example, in a TU-game (JV, v) it seems reasonable to assume that an outcome 
χ S RN, with Σ
Ι
€
. Λ Γ
 х
г
 = V(N), should be such that no (sub)coalition has an incentive 
to withdraw from JV. In other words, no coalition S € 2N should be able to improve 
upon x, i.e. S í e s 1 · — v(^)· Outcomes which are 'stable' in this sense are called 
core-elements (cf. Gillies (1953)). However, core elements need not always exist, as can 
be seen in 'lady with the bag' in example 1.4. On the other hand, the core of a game, 
which consists of all core elements, can be quite large. In the context of JVTt^-games, 
core elements are considered in section 9. 
An important one-point solution concept for cooperative games was introduced by 
Shapley (1953). For TU-games (N,v), the Shapley value Φ(ι>) e R N is described in 
section 4. For the game (JV, v) of example 1.4 ('lady with the bag'), it is found that 
Φ(υ) = ( 3 | , 3 j , 3 j ) . So, according to the Shapley value, each carrier should receive an 
equal share of the gains of the grand coalition. 
Axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value function Φ : TUN —> R " have been 
provided by Shapley (1953) and Young (1985). 
Other well-known one-point solution concepts for Tt/-games are the r-value (Tijs 
(1981)) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)). The τ-value has been characterized 
axiomatically by Tijs (1987). 
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3. SUMMARY AND PLAN OF THIS MONOGRAPH 
Chapter II discusses a game theoretic approach to model and evaluate situations 
with restricted communication possibilities between the players. Rirther, this chapi­
ter provides relations between cooperative and non-cooperative models and solution 
concepts. 
Given a TL^-game and a communication graph on its players, section 4 introduces 
(exogenous) communication situations. The Myerson value and the position value are 
defined by means of the Shapley value of corresponding point games and arc games. 
Section 5 provides an axiomatic characterization of both values for the subclass of 
communication situations where the communication graph contains no cycles. Using a 
relation between the dividends of an arc game and the underlying TZ7-game, section б 
illustrates some computational results for the position value. 
A non-cooperative model for endogenous formation of communication links is described 
in section 7. Given a TU-game, what communication links between the players are 
likely to form? Using the Myerson value and the position value to evaluate each possible 
communication graph, we compare results in a rather informal way. 
Section 8 defines a non-cooperative strategic claim game to each (standard) NTU-
game. By applying the coordinated Aumann procedure to the corresponding strategic 
claim game, each iVTCZ-game is associated with another NTU-game. It is shown that 
this new game is the smallest superadditive game containing the original one. 
In section 9 it is seen how solution concepts for a superadditive ./VTtZ-game correspond 
to special types of Nash equilibria for the corresponding strategic claim game. 
Section 10 deals with possible modifications of the strategy spaces of strategic claim 
games with respect to correlation and finiteness. 
Chapter III discusses refinements of Nash equiUbria for bimatrix games. For the 
class of 2 Χ η bimatrix games, with only two (pure) strategies for one of the players, a 
method (the GC-approach) is described to determine and to relate various refinements 
in a geometric way. 
In section 11 the GC-approach is formally described and is applied to determine the set 
of Nash equilibria for any 2 χ η bimatrix game in a systematic way. 
Quasi-strong equilibria are considered in section 12, perfect and proper equilibria in 
section 13, stable sets in section 14 and persistent retracts/equilibria in section 15. 
Among other results it is found that, for 2 χ η bimatrix games, quasi-strong equilibria 
always exist, strictly perfect implies proper, persistent implies perfect, each stable set 
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consists of either one or two points and, that each persistent retract contains a stable 
set. Possible extensions of these results towards general bimatrix games are indicated. 
Section 16 recalls some well-known results about the structure of the set of Nash 
equilibria for general bimatrix games: a division into finitely many maximal Nash sub­
sets and a dimension relation for these sets. 
Introducing maximal Selten subsets, section 17 extends these results towards the set 
of perfect equilibria. It is illustrated that for other refinements, such as proper and 
persistent equilibria, similar results do not hold. 
Section 18 solves the construction problem for 2 χ η bimatrix games with a unique 
maximal Nash subset. Necessary and sufficient conditions on a (convex) set are given 
to be the unique maximal Nash subset for a 2 χ η bimatrix game. 
Section 19 addresses the general 2 χ η construction problem and provides, in a rather 
informal way, an algorithm to decide whether or not a given set of strategy pairs can 
be the set of Nash equilibria for a 2 χ η bimatrix game. 
Chapter IV discusses two modifications of the non-cooperative two-person strategic 
game model: multi-objective games and (one-shot) games with incomplete information. 
Section 20 defines Pareto equilibria for multi-objective games and provides relations 
with Nash equilibria for (strategic) trade-off games. All examples deal with games with 
only two (pure) strategies and two objectives for each player. 
Section 21 discusses various types of full information a player can have about the 'real 
state of the world'. For special classes of games, these information types are evaluated 
from the point of view of both the informed player and the uninformed player. 
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II. C O O P E R A T I O N , C O M M U N I C A T I O N A N D 
S T R A T E G I C B E H A V I O U R 
In a cooperative TU-game (JV, v) the characteristic function υ assigns to each coali­
tion 5 of players in N a. real number v(S), which is to be interpreted as the economic 
possibilities (e.g. in terms of money) present to the coalition, regardless of the actions 
of the other players. In developing the characteristic function, it is generally not as­
sumed that the players have any trouble communicating with one another, nor is the 
structure of communication channels among the players specified. Describing the pos­
sibilities with respect to communication by means of a graph, Myerson (1977) formally 
incorporated these considerations into cooperative game theory. The first part of this 
chapter (the sections 4-7) elaborates on Myerson's model of communicaiion situations 
and graph-restricted games. 
In section 4 we establish notation and define two possible solution concepts for 
communication situations: the Myerson value (cf. Myerson (1977)) and the position 
value (cf. Borm, Owen and Tijs (1990)). Considering a special subclass of communica­
tion situations, section 5 provides axiomatic characterizations for both values, whereas 
section 6 illustrates some computational results for the position value using dividends 
(cf. Harsanyi (1959) and Owen (1986)). The discussion of communication situations is 
concluded in section 7 with an application of the position value to the model of Aumann 
and Myerson (1988) which describes how, for a given T?7-game, specific communication 
graphs arise in a 'natural ' way from non-cooperative strategic behaviour of the players. 
In a different context, the second part of this chapter (the sections 8-10) also 
investigates relations between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. Section 
8 describes a way to construct a game Г( ) in strategic form to each (standard) NTU-
game (JV, V). In the so-called claim game T(V) the players are allowed to make claims 
on the coalition they want to participate and on the payoff they want to attain. 
Conversely, to construct an NTU-game to each game in strategic form we follow 
Aumann (1961) but instead of correlation only coordination of the players' actions is 
allowed. Applying this procedure to the claim game Г( ), an NTU-game (N, V) can 
be associated with an NTU-game (JV, V). It is found that V is the superadditive hull 
of V. 
In section 9 it is shown that cooperative solution concepts for an TVTIZ-game are closely 
related to non-cooperative equilibrium concepts for the corresponding strategic claim 
game. In particular, if (N, V) is superadditive, then strong core elements of (N, V) 
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exactly correspond to the payoff vectors of strong Nash equilibria for Г( ). Finally, 
section 10 discusses some applications of the correlated Aumann procedure. 
4. COMMUNICATION SITUATIONS, THE MYERSON VALUE AND THE POSITION 
VALUE. 
Recall that the set TUN of cooperative games in coalitional form consists of pairs 
(ЛГ, v), where N is the (finite) set of players and υ is a function from 2N into R with 
u(0) = 0. A game (N, v) is often identified with its characteristic function v. 
An important and well-known solution concept for TtZ-games is due to Shapley 
(1953). Let υ € TUN. For defining the Shapley value Φ(υ) e R N of the game v, 
suppose the players enter a room in some order and that all n! orderings have the same 
probability. Then Φ,(υ) is defined to be the expected marginal contribution made by 
player i, i.e. 
Uv):=^ Σ, (v(PR
a
(i)U{i})-v(PR*m (4.1) 
where P(N) is the set of permutations of N and 
PR.{i) := {J e Ν I аЦ) < *(»)} 
denotes the set of ргеаесеззогз of player i according to σ. 
Further, defining the -unanimity game us G TUN on a coalition S G 2N\{9)} by 
^
τ
Ηί *J£L ( 4 · 2 ) 
it is found that 
v= Σ A
v
(S)us, (4.3) 
where the dividends AV(S) (cf. Harsanyi (1959)) are given by 
Δ„(5) = £ (-l)lsHr|ü(T) (4.4) 
T.TCS 
For the Shapley value it readily follows that, for all S £ 2N\{4}, 
». («*) = {]РГ i f t í e 5 (4.5) 
L 0 otherwise 
12 
and consequently, for all i € Ν, 
ад= Σ ^ег
 ( 4
·
6 ) 
The simplest model for a 'framework of communication and negotiation' (cf. 
Aumann and Муетзоп (1988)) within the context of cooperative game theory, is that of 
a coalition structure, defined as a partition of the set of players into disjoint coalitions. 
Once the coalition structure has been determined, communication and negotiations can 
take place only within each of the coalitions that constitute the structure. However, 
coalition structures do not capture all subtleties of communication, e.g. the fact that 
communication relations need not be transitive can not be modeled this way. To model 
a richer kind of framework, Myerson (1977) introduced the notion of a cooperation 
graph or communication graph, in which the players axe the vertices. One possible 
interpretation is that a link between two players (an edge in the graph) exists if it is 
possible for these players to communicate directly and in a meaningful way. Indirect 
communication between two players can take place only if there exists a p a t h in the 
communication graph that connects these players. In particular, coédition structures 
may be modeled this way by defining two players to be linked if and only if they belong 
to the same partition element. 
Let us define an {exogenous) communication situation as a triple (Ν,ν,Α), where 
ν € TUN describes the economic possibilities of each subgroup of players and where the 
undirected graph (N, A) describes the possibilities for communication among the play-
ers. Because of the interpretation given above, we restrict attention to communication 
graphs without parallel arcs and loops. Further, for convenience, we assume throughout 
that the underlying game ν € TUN is zero-normalized, i.e. t>({¿}) = 0 for all г E N. 
Communication situations were studied by Myerson (1977, 1980) who introduced 
corresponding graph-restricted games or communication games and who characterized 
the Shapley value of these games in terms of efficiency and fairness. In this section 
Myerson's communication games will be called point games and the Shapley value of 
these games will be called the Myerson value for the underlying communication situa­
tion (cf. Aumann and Myerson (1988)). Further, to each communication situation we 
associate a so-called arc game: the axes of the communication graph are the players of 
this game. The total amount a player obtains by dividing the Shapley value for each 
arc in the arc game equally among the two players connected by the arc, is called the 
position value for the player in the underlying communication situation. The position 
value was first introduced in Meessen (1988). 
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Let CSN denote the class of all communication situations {Ν, υ, Á) as described 
above. In particular, for (N, v,A) € CSN we have that ν 6 TVN \ zero-normalized 
and that (ЛГ, ^4) is an undirected graph without parallel arcs and loops. 
Let (N, v, Á) € CSN. It is clear that the communication possibilities within N, 
given by the graph (JV, A), determine a partition N/A of N into (communication) com-
ponents. So a coalition Γ is a component within N if and only if all players in Τ can 
communicate (directly or indirectly) and there is no coalition Τ with Τ ^ Τ such that 
all players in Τ can communicate. In a similar way one can define components within 
each given coaJition 5 by only allowing the communication possibilities given by the 
subgraph (5, J 4 ( S ) ) , where 
A{S) := { { i , j } € A | i e S, j € S} (4.7) 
Then a partition of 5 results, which will be denoted by S/A. 
The reward for a coalition 5 in a communication situation is assumed to be the 
sum of the rewards of the components within S. The following notation will be used 
frequently. For each zero-normalized game υ € TUN, each coalition S £ 2N and each 
communication graph (TV, L), 
rv(S,L):= Σ „(Τ) (4.8) 
Tes/L 
denotes the reward for the coalition S having the communication arcs in L(S) С L 
available (cf. (4.7)). Note that г ^ й , L) = rv(S, 0) = 0 for all L and S. 
D E F I N I T I O N (cf. MytTson (1977)). Let {Ν,υ,Α) € CSN. Then the point game {N,rvA) 
corresponding to (Ν,υ,Α) is given by 
»•ДО) : = г " № A) for all 5 € 2N (4.9) 
Further, the Myerson value μ(Ν,ν,Α) £ R^ corresponds to the Shapley value of the 
point game, so 
μ(Ν,ν,Α):=Φ(Ν,Γν
Α
) (4.10) 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let (TV,v,A) e CSN. Then the arc game (A,r^) corresponding to 
(Ν,υ,Α) is given by 
r
v
N(L) = rv(N, L) for all L € 2 A (4.11) 
Further, the position value 7r(TV, υ, A) € RN is defined by 
π,(ΛΓ, ν, A) = Σ 2 Ф « ( А ' ΓΝ) f o r all г' € TV (4.12) 
a€A, 
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where 
A,:={{i,j}eA\jeN} (4.13) 
denotes the set of all axes of which player » is an end point. 
So the players of the arc game r)y aie the arcs of the communication g r a p h a n d 
the worth of a subsystem of arcs is measured by the reward for t h e grand coali t ion 
N when only this subsystem is available for communication between the players. T h e 
position value for a player in the underlying communication situation is obtained from 
the Shapley value of the arc game by equally dividing the Shapley value for each a r c 
among the players connected by the arc. 
If there can be no misunderstanding, the upper index ν will be omit ted from t h e 
notations above. 
E X A M P L E 4.1. Let N = {1,2,3}, A — {{1,3}, {2,3}} and let ν equal the t m a n i m i t y 
game «{1,2}. T h e corresponding communication situation (Ν,ν,Α) is schematically 
represented in figure 4.1. 
FIGURE 4.1. 
The point game (N,rA) is given by 
r
j
s
\
 =
 ( 1 if S = N 
I 0 otherwise 
So ГА equals the unanimity game идг on N and, using (4.5), 
μ(ΛΓ,
ν
,Λ) = Φ(Ν,ΓΑ) = ( ί , ί ) ί ) . 
FUrther, the arc game (А, Гц) is given by 
rN/L) =í1 ÜL = A IO otherwise 
So, with α : = {1,3} and b := {2,3}, Φ
α
(Α,Γ
Ν
) = Фъ(А,гц) = | . 
15 
Consequently, 
π^Ν,υ,Α) = ± Ф
в
( Л , г „ ) = 1, π2(Ν,ν,Α) = $Фь(А,гы) = 1, 
π3(ΛΓ,
υ
,,4) = ί φ
β
( Λ , Γ
Ν
) + ίφ5(Α,Γ
Ν
) = ί. 
Intuitively one could say that the position value puts a higher evaluation on the crucial 
position player 3 has in establishing contact between player 1 and player 2 than the 
Myerson value does. 
Note that , for the game in example 4.1, the position value for each player i £ N 
is the same multiple of the degree d,(N,A) := \A,\ of the corresponding point in the 
graph (TV, A). The degree is in some sense a 'natural' measure for the importance of a 
point (player) in a (communication) graph. This relation between position value and 
degree will play an important role in the axiomatic characterization of the position value 
provided in section 5. 
If the communication situation (JV, v,A) is such that there are no restrictions on 
communication at all, i.e. if A = {{t,j} G 2^ | i φ j ' } , then it is easily seen that the 
point game г^ equals ν and the Myerson value coincides with the Shapley value of v. 
T h e following example shows that even in this case the Myerson value and the position 
value need not be the same. Hence, the position value induces a new solution concept 
for TÍ7-games. 
E X A M P L E 4.2. Let the communication situation (JV, υ, Л) be given by 
N = {1,2,3}, v = u { i , 2 } and A = {{1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3}} 
as represented in figure 4.2. Then, with a := {1,2}, δ : = {1,3} and с : = {2,3}, 
rN(n = f ! if α e L or {Ь, с} С L 
10 otherwise 
Hence, Фа(гы) = | , Фб(п ) = Φ « ( Γ
Ν
) = j and π(Ν,ν,Α) = ( n . Â ' Â ) · Further, 
μ(Ν,ν,Α) = Φ{Ν,η{1ί2}) = (ΙΙθ). 
Note t h a t , contrary to the Myerson value, the position value takes into account the fact 
t h a t t h e contact between player 1 and player 2 could be established via player 3. 
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В. AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATIONS 
In this section we consider properties of allocation rules 7 : CS —> R and provide 
axiomatic characterizations of both the Myerson value μ and the position value π on the 
subclass of cycle-free communication situations. For general communication situations 
Муетзоп (1977) showed 
T H E O R E M 5.1. The Myerson value μ : CSN —> RN is the unique allocation rule which 
satisfies component efficiency and fairness. 
Here, a rule 7 : CS —» R is called component efficient if 
Yj~lt{N,v1A) = v{C) (5.1) 
•ec 
for all {Ν,ν,Α) e CSN and all components С G N/A. Note that for all С e Ν/A we 
have that v[C) = Σ t>(T) = r(C, A). 
т е с / л 
Further, 7 : CSN -> R ^ is called ¡air (cf. Myerson (1977)) if 
Ίι
{Ν,ν,Α)-
Ί
,{Ν,ν,Α\{{ι,ί}}) =
 Ί}{Ν,ν,Α)-Ί,{Ν,ν,Α\{{ί,3}}) (5.2) 
for all {Ν,ν,Α) € CSN and {i, j} € A. So, if one uses a fair allocation criterium à la 
Myerson and an arc is removed from the communication graph, then the two players 
connected by this arc lose (gain) the same amount. 
The following example shows that the position value π : C S ^ —* R does not 
satisfy this fairness criterion. 
E X A M P L E 5.1. Consider the three-person communication situation {N, v. A) of example 
4.1. Then 
π1{Ν,ν,Α)-τί{Ν,ν,Α\{{\,Ζ)}) = \-ΰ = \ 
while 
π3{Ν,υ,Α)-^{Ν,ν,Α\{{1,Ζ}})=\-ΰ=\. 
A rule 7 : CSN -• R^ is called additive if 
Ί
{Ν, ν + w. A) = 7(iV, v. A) + 7(ΛΓ, w, A) (5.3) 
for all zero-normalized v, w g TUN and all communication graphs (TV, A). 
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An arc α € A is called superfluous for the communication situation (Ν,ν,Α) if 
r(N,L) = r(N,LU {a}) for all L С A. (5.4) 
This means that in each communication subsystem the presence of a superfluous arc 
does not affect the gains of the grand coalition. A rule 7 : CSN —» R is said to have 
the superfluous arc property if 
7(Ν,ν,Α) = Ί(Ν,ν,Α\{α}) (5.5) 
for all (Ν, v, A) e CSN and all superfluous arcs a e A. 
L E M M A 5.2. Both the Myerson value μ : CSN —* RN and the position value 
π : CSN —* RN satisfy component efficiency, additivity and the superfluous axe property. 
Proof. For both μ and тг additivity follows trivially from the additivity of the Shapley 
value since 
rA =rA + rA a n d rN =rN + rN 
for all zero-normalized v,w e T U ^ and all communication graphs (І , A). 
For μ component efficiency follows from theorem 5.1. To prove the component 
efficiency for π, let {N, v, A) 6 CSN and С € Ν/A. Then 
^ ^ ( J V , l ; , A ) = ^ 5 3 ^ e ( A , r J v ) = £ < M A , r N ) 
¿ее iÇCatAi aeA(C) 
^ Σ *.(A(C)trN) = rN(A(C))=v(C), 
aeA(C) 
where equality (*) follows from the definition of the Shapley value in (4.1) and the fact 
that 
r(JV, L U {α}) - r(N, L) = r(N, (L Π A(C)) U {a}) - r(N, L Π A(C)) 
for all L С A and α € A(C). 
Now let (JV, υ, A) G C S " have a superfluous arc a € A. To prove the superfluous 
arc property for μ it suffices to show that г^ = r^\{0 j. 
Let 5 С N. Then 
rA(S)= Σ υ ( Τ ) = £ « ( Г ) = ] Г v(T)=r(N,A(S)) 
TÇS/Α TeS/A(S) TeN/A(S) 
where the third equality follows from the fact that t; is zero-normalized. Similarly, 
rA\{a)(S)=r(N,A(S)\{a}) 
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So (5.4) immediately implies that гл(8) = r ^ o ^ S ) for all S. 
Proving the superfluous arc property for π, it suffices to note that Φ
β
(Α, rjv) = 0 and 
^b(A,rN) = Φ 6(.4\{α},πν) for all b 6 A\{a}. Hence, •κ(Ν,ν,Α) = π(Ν,ν, A\{a}). Π 
A communication situation (ΛΓ, v. A) £ CSN is called arc anonymous if there exists 
a function ƒ : { 0 , 1 , . . . , | J4 | } —• R such that 
r(N,L) = f(\L\) foral i L e A. (5.6) 
An allocation rule 7 : CSN —» HN is said to have the degree property if for all axe 
anonymous communication situations (N, v, A) we have that 7 ( ^ , υ, A) is a multiple of 
the degree vector d(N,A) := (d,(N,A))tç.N: 
y(N,v,A) = ad(N,A) for some α e R. (5.7) 
An equivalent formulation of (5.6) is given in the following lemma. The proof is 
straightforward and therefore omitted. 
L E M M A а.з. Let (Ν,ν,Α) € CSN. Then (Ν,υ,Α) is arc anonymous if and only if 
r{N, L\{a}) = r(./V, L\{b}) for all L С A and α, 6 e L. 
The Myerson value does not satisfy the degree property. This is seen in 
E X A M P L E e.2. The communication situation (Ν,υ,Α) of example 4.1 is arc anonymous 
since (5.6) is satisfied with ƒ : {0,1,2} —* R given by 
/(0) = / ( l ) = 0, /(2) = 1. 
Rirthermore, d(N,A) = (1,1,2), π(Ν,ν,Α) = ( Ì , \ , §) = id(N,A) and 
μ(Ν,ν,Α) = ( j , | , j ) , which is not a multiple of d(N, A). 
L E M M A 5.4. The position value π : C S ^ —» R^ satisfies the degree property. 
Proof. Let (Ν,υ,Α) € CSN be axe anonymous. If A = 0, then π(Ν,υ,Α) = 0 = ά(Ν,Α). 
Let ƒ be as in (5.6) and let α 6 A. Since (.4, rjv) is a symmetric game (i.e. all arcs axe 
substitutes) we have that 
Фо(А
'
Гі ) =
 Ш
г л / ( л ) =
 щ
/ ( | А | )
· 
Hence, 
π,(Ν,ν,Α) = Σ i».(A,r
w
) =^І.Ш.
 =
 I І Ж . |
Л ( | « I Ш . .dí{N>A) 
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for all г e N. D 
A (communication) graph (Ν, A) is called a tree if (N, A) is connected and does 
not contain cycles. A communication situation (Ν,ν,Α) is called cycle-free if (N, A) 
does not contain cycles, i.e. if (JV, A) is a disjoint union of trees. 
Now we prove that the four properties of the position value discussed above, characterize 
7Г on the class CS^1 of cycle-free communication situations. 
T H E O R E M в.Б. The (restriction of the) position value π is the unique allocation rule on 
CS+ which satisfies component efficiency, additivity, the superfluous arc property and 
the degree property. 
Proof. Let 7 : C 5 ^ —* R satisfy the four properties stated in the theorem. 
Because of lemma 5.2 and 5.4 it suffices to show that y(N,v,A) = π(Ν,ν,Α) for all 
(N,v,A)eCS?. 
Let (N,A) be a communication graph without cycles. By additivity and by the fact 
that the set {us | | 5 | > 2} of unanimity games is a basis of the class of zero-normalized 
TÍ7-games (cf. (4.3)) it remains to prove that 
7(N,ßus,A)=*(N,ßus,A) 
for all β e R and S G 2 ^ with | S | > 2. 
Let β G R and S € 2N, \S\ > 2, be fixed throughout the proof. Furthermore, for 
notational convenience we define w := βης. We distinguish between two cases. 
The first case is that there is no component С G Ν/A with S С С. 
Then rw(N,L) = 0 for all L С A. Since in this case each arc is superfluous, the 
superfluous arc property implies that 7(І ,и>,Л) = 7(JV, ti>,0). Then, since (N, w,tl) 
trivially is arc anonymous, the degree property implies that there is an α G R such that 
jt(N,w,fb) = adt(N,<l>) = 0 (5.8) 
for all ί e N. 
Secondly, let С 6 Ν/A be such that S С С Then (С, A(C)) is a tree and there 
exists a (unique) set H(S) С С defined by 
H(S) : = f]{T | 5 С Τ С С, (Г, А(Т)) is a connected (sub)graph}, (5.9) 
which is called the connected hull of S (cf. Owen (1986), theorem 5). 
It is easy to verify that 
r
w(N,L) = {P XMH(S))CL 
10 otherwise 
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This implies that each arc α ^ A(H(S)) is superfluous and, using the superflous arc 
property, it is found that 
7(ΛΓ, w, A) = f(N, w, A{H{S))) (5.10) 
The communication situation (Λ ,^ ω, Л(Д'(5))) is arc anonymous because of lemma 5.3 
and the fact that 
r-(JV,I\{a}) = ru'(JV,L\{&})=0 
for all L С A(H(S)) and a, b G L. So the degree property implies there is an α £ R 
such that 
7,(Λ/>, A(H(S)) = adt(N,A{H(S))) for all i € N (5.11) 
So, in particular, 
7,(N,w,A(H(S))) = 0 for all г € ЛГ\Я(5) (5.12) 
Using component efficiency, (5.10) implies that 
Y/y3(N,w,A(H(S))) = w(C) = ß, 
jee 
and, using (5.11), 
a=ÍY,dÁN,MH(S)))) ß=ij2d}(N,A(H(S)))) β (5.13) 
S e c ^ Sew ' 
So in both cases we may conclude that Ί(Ν, W,Ä) is uniquely determined (cf. 
(5.8) and (5.10)—(5.13)) by the four properties mentioned in the theorem. Hence, 
7(JV, w, A) = 7г(ЛГ, u>, A). D 
By introducing one other property for allocation rules we are able to provide an 
axiomatic characterization for the restriction of the Myerson value to communication 
situations in CS+ . 
A communication situation (Ν,υ,Α) € CSN is called point anonymous if there 
exists a function ƒ : {0 ,1 , . . . , |.D|} —• R such that 
Г ' ( 5 , І 4 ) = / ( | 5 П 2 ) | ) (5.14) 
for all 5 € 2N , where 
D := {г € Ν \ d,(N, A) > 0}. (5.15) 
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An allocation rule 7 : C S ^ —* RN is said to have the commuraieation ability property if, 
for all point anonymous communciation situations (N, v, A), there exists an α € R such 
tha t 
Jt(N,v,A) = {° ^ ^ D (5.16) 
10 otherwise 
L E M M A β.β. The Myerson value μ : CSN —* RN satisfies the communication ability 
property. 
Proof. Let (Ν,ν,Α) be point anonymous and let ƒ and D be as in (5.14) and (5.15), 
respectively. Clearly, if г ^ D, then μ^Ν,υ,Α) = Φ
τ
(Ν,ΓΑ) = 0. Further, since all 
players in D are substitutes, it is found that 
M « , A ) -ЛН,ГЛ) = ^ P . ^ 
for all г e D. D 
T H E O R E M β.τ. The (restriction of the) Myerson value μ is the unique allocation rule on 
CS? which satisfies component efficiency, additivity, the superfluous arc property and 
the communication ability property. 
Proof. Let 7 : C S ^ —• R^ satisfy the four properties stated in the theorem. Let 
the cycle-free communication graph (N,A), the real β ε R and the coalition S 6 2 ^ , 
| 5 | > 2, be fixed and define w : = /Jus- Then lemma 5.2, lemma 5.6 and additivity imply 
that it suffices to show that Ί(Ν, W,A) = μ(Ν, ιυ,Α). 
If there is no component С € Ν/A with 5 С С, then r ^ T , A) = 0 for all Τ e 2N. 
Consequently, μ,(Ν, w. A) = $t(N, r ^ ) = 0 for all i e N. Further, trivially, (N,w,A) 
is point anonymous, so there exists an a € R such that 7,(JV, w, A) = a for all г e Ν 
with d,(N, A) > 0 and y,(N,w,A) = 0 otherwise. Using component efficiency we may 
conclude that α = 0 and ^(Ν, w,A) = μ(Ν, w, A). 
Let С € Ν/A be such that S С С ana let the connected hull H(S) be as defined 
in (5.9). Then it is easily checked that 
U(T,A)={ = ƒ β if Я ( 5 ) С Г 
0 otherwise 
and, consequently, 
ß,(N,w,A)=i(\H(S)\)-^ і Ь
е
Я ( 5 ) 
1,0 otherwise 
Further, as in the proof of theorem 5.5, the superfluous axe property implies that 
1(N,w,A)='f{N,w,A(H(S))). 
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Then, since (Ν, ω, A(H(S))) is point anonymous with D = H(S), 
/(О) = ... = f(\D\ - 1) = 0 and f(\D\) = β, 
the communication ability property and component efficiency imply that 7(JV, w,A) 
equals μ(Ν, w, A). D 
For both the position value and the Myerson value none of the four characterizing 
properties of theorem 5.5 and theorem 5.7 is redundant. For the position value this can 
be seen as follows. 
Clearly, the degree property cannot be left out because the Myerson value satisfies com­
ponent efficiency, additivity and the superfluous arc property. FVirther, the allocation 
rule which assigns 0 G RN to each communication situation (Ν,ν,Α), trivially satisfies 
additivity, the superfluous arc property and the degree property. So also component 
efficiency can not be left out. 
Let (Ν,ν,Α) e CSN. Define 6(N,v,A) e RN by 
^^••-{0^{Ν^(Ν,Α) 
i{di(N,A) = 0 
otherwise 
for all г € Ν, where С,- e N/A is such that i e C¿. The allocation rule S : CSN -y RN 
trivially satisfies component efficiency and additivity. The rule 6 also satisfies the degree 
property. This is a consequence of 
L E M M A 5.8. Let (Ν,ν,Α) £ CSN be arc anonymous with ƒ : { 0 , 1 , . . . , \A\} —> R such 
that rv(N,L) = f(\L\) for all L С A. Then there is a constant α G R such that , for all 
С G Ν/Α, 
f(\A(C)\) = a\A(C)\ 
Moreover, if \{C G N/A | \A(C)\ > 1} |> 2, then a = f (I). 
Proof. Without loss of generality, one can choose С G N/A such that m : = |A(C) | > 1 
and A\A(C) φ 0. It suffices to show that / ( m ) = m / ( l ) . Let a G A\A(C) and 
L С A(C) be such that \L\ = m — 1. Then, using arc anonimity, 
f(m) = r"(JV, L U {α}) = ^(N, L) + rv(N, {a}) = f(m - 1) + ƒ ( ! ) 
Repeating this argument one obtains f(m) = m / ( l ) . Π 
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Having lemma 5.8, it is easily checked that 6 satisfies the degree property by noting 
that for each arc anonymous communication situation (Ν,ν,Α) € CS , with ƒ as in 
(5.6), 
«(C) r'(N,A(C)) f(\A(C)\) 
E jec<№A) 2\A(C)\ 2\A(C)\ 
for all С € N/A. Further, тс φ Ь because for the cycle-free communication situation 
(TV,υ, Л), given by JV = {1,2,3}, υ = u ^ } and A = {{1,2}, {1,3}}, we have that 
π(Ν,υ,Α) = ( 1 , 1 , 0 ) while δ(Ν,ν,Α) = ( 1 , 1 , 1 ) . 
Hence, the superfluous arc property is irredundant in the characterization of the position 
value provided in theorem 5.5. 
Finally, we show that also additivity cannot be left out. 
Let (N, v, A) € C 5 N . For all L С A, let L* С L denote the set of all arcs which are not 
superfluous in (N, v, L). Defining Θ(Ν, υ, A) e RN by 
0(N Δλ — ί π ( - ^ > υ ' - ^ ) if (TV,υ, A) is arc anonymous 
K
 ' " ' > '·~ \ δ(Ν, ν, A*) otherwise 
the allocation rule θ : CSN —• R^ trivially satisfies the degree property. 
Further, if (Ν, υ, A) £ CSN is not arc anonymous and С € N/A, then 
Σθ,{Ν,ν,Α) = Σδ
ι
{Ν,ν,Α*) 
•ее tec 
= Σ <0)= Σ <D) = 
DeN/A'DCC DeN/A-(C) 
= r'(N,A\C)) = rv(N,A(C)) = v(C), 
where the second equality follows from the component efficiency of 6 and the fact that 
N/A* is a finer partition than N/A. Consequently, the allocation rule θ satisfies com­
ponent efficiency. 
To show that the allocation rule θ : CSN —* RN satisfies the superfluous arc property 
we need 
L E M M A 6.9. (i) Let (ΛΓ, υ, A) e C 5 N . Let β e A be superfluous for {Ν,ν,Α). 
Then A* = (A\{a})·. 
(ii) Let (N,v, A) € CSN be arc anonymous with ƒ as in (5.6). 
If there exists a superfluous arc for (N, v, A), then ƒ = 0. 
Proof, (i) Trivially, (A\{a})* С A*. In order to show the converse it suffices to show that 
each superfluous arc for (JV, ν, A\{a}) is also superfluous for (Ν,ν,Α). Let b € A\{a} 
be superfluous for (N,v, A\{a}) . Then, for all L С Α\{α}, 
r
v(N, L U {α}) = rv(N, L) = r'(JV, L U {b}) = rv(N, L U {a, b}) 
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Hence, b is superfluous for (Ν,ν,Α), 
(ii) If there is a superfluous arc for (Ν,ν,Α), one obtains that f(k) = f (к — 1) for all 
к € {1,2,..., \A\}. Consequently, / (0 ) = 0 implies that ƒ = 0. D 
Let (Ν,ν,Α) G C S ^ and let α € A be superfluous for (Ν,ν,Α). 
We show that θ(Ν,ν,Α) = θ(Ν,ν, A\{a}). 
By lemma 5.9(ii) we have that θ(Ν,ν,Α) = θ(Ν,ν,Α\{α}) = 0 if (Ν,ν,Α) is arc 
anonymous. So we may assume that (Ν,ν,Α) is not arc anonymous. Then, using 
lemma 19.1(i), 
Θ(Ν, ν, A) = S(N, ν, A') = δ(Ν, ν, (Α\{α})*). 
We distinguish between three cases. If (N, v,A\{a}) is not arc anonymous, then 
θ(Ν,ν,Α\{α}) = 6(N,v,(A\{a})·) by definition of Θ. If (N,v, A\{a}) is arc anony­
mous and (Λ\{α})* jt A\{a}, then lemma 5.9(ii) implies that 
Θ(Ν, ν, A\{a}) = π(Ν, ν, A\{a}) = 0 = δ(Ν, ν, (А\{а}У ) . 
Finally, if (Ν, v,A\{a}) is arc anonymous and (Л\{а})* = Л\{а}, then component 
efficiency and the degree property for π imply that 
θ(Ν,ν,Α\{α}) = π(Ν,ν,Α\{α}) = δ(Ν,ν, A\{a}) = δ(Ν,ν(Α\{α}Υ). 
Consequently, θ : CSN —» R^ satisfies the superfluous arc property. 
Example 5.3 below provides a communication situation (І , v, A) 6 C S , for which 
π(Ν,ν,Α) φ θ(Ν,ν,Α). Hence, additivity cannot be left out from the characterization 
of the position value provided in theorem 5.5. 
E X A M P L E в.з. Consider the four-person communication situation (Ν,ν,Α) in which 
v = u{i,2} + u{2,3} ^ d (-Wi-Ä) is represented in figure 5.1. 
FIGURE 5.1. 
1 
2 
3 
Then (Ν,ν,Α) is not arc anonymous because r"(N, [a, c}) = 0 ^ 1 = rv(N, {a, &}). 
Since there are no superfluous arcs, θ(Ν,ν,Α) = 6(N,v,A) = ( j , | - , | - , l ) . Further, 
x(JV,«,i4) =
 w
(JV,u { 1 , 2 } ,>l) + 7 r ( ^ ) u { a i , } , A ) = ( i , l , 0 , i ) + ( 0 , ì | i , | ) = ( i , ì > i , l ) . 
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It is still an open problem how to characterize the position value axiomatically for 
the class C S of all communication situations. It would also be interesting to find an 
axiomatic characterization of π for the class of all communication situations (Ν,ν,Α) 
with a full communication graph (N,A), i.e. with A = {{i,j} ε 2 ^ | i / j } , because 
this class corresponds to the class of all (zero-normalized) TCZ-games. 
Having characterized the position value for the class of cycle-free communication 
situations, one might think of extending this concept to general communication situa­
tions by means of spanning trees. 
Let (Ν,ν,Α) 6 CSN. For each component С G Ν/A we consider the connected sub­
graph (C, A(C)) and the corresponding (non-empty) set T ( C ) of spanning trees for C, 
consisting of all trees (C,L) with L С A(C). Let the allocation rule ρ : CSN —» R " be 
defined by 
1 l
 *'" LCA:(C.,L)€T(C,) 
for all г € Ν, where С, e Ν/A is the component to which player г belongs. It is clear 
that ρ equals π on the class CS^1 of cycle-free communication situations. However, the 
following example shows that ρ φ ж. 
E X A M P L E 6.4. Consider the four-person communication situation (Ν,ν,Α) in which 
ν = «{1,2,3} and (N,A) is represented in figure 5.2. 
FIGURE 5.2. 
4 
с / \ d 
3 b 1 a 2 
There are three spanning trees corresponding to L\ = \a,b,c\, Li = {a,6,d} and 
L% = {δ, с, d}, respectively. 
Then i:(N,v,U) = T(N,V,L2) = ( Ì , 1,1,0), and n(N,v,L3) = ( ± , 1 > Ы ) · S o 
p(N,v,A) = (l,lll,) 
while 
7Γ(Λ',υ,.4) = ( £ . £ - £ ' á ) · 
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β. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS USING DIVIDENDS 
For cycle-free communication situations (Ν, v. A), a relation is derived between the 
dividends (cf. Нагзапуі (1959)) of the arc game rj^ S TUA and the dividends of the 
underlying game ν G TU . For the position value this leads to computational results 
similar to the ones derived by Owen (1986) for the Myerson value in case υ 6 TUN is 
a unanimity game, a pure overhead game or a quadratic measure game. 
For a communication situation (N, v. A) £ CS+ and the corresponding arc game 
(Α,Γχ) we can write 
rü,= £ D„(L)uL, 
L€2*\{ÌÌ 
where, for all L € 2Д\{0}, (A,UL) is the (arc) unanimity game on L and (cf. (4.4)) 
K-.KCL 
denotes the dividend for L in the game r]y. 
Then, extending definition (5.9) of the connected hull of a coalition 5 to a cycle-free 
communication graph (N, A) by setting H(S) = 0 if there is no component С 6 N/A 
which contains 5, the dividends of the arc game r^ and the underlying game ν are 
related in the following way. 
T H E O R E M е л . Let (Ν,ν,Α) e CS?. Then 
DV(L)= £ Δ „ ( 5 ) (6.1) 
S€K(L) 
for all L e 2 Λ \{0}, where 
E(L) : = {S G 2W\{0} | Я ( 5 ) ¿ 0, L = A(H(S))} (6.2) 
denotes the set of those coalitions which exactly have to use all communication arcs in 
L in order to communicate. 
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Proof. Let L e 2Λ\{0}. Then 
D.(L)= £ (-1)111-1*1 Σ i,(C)=£(-l)IH-IK| ^ γ Д0(5)«5(С) 
Kct ceN/K Kei ceN/Kse2N\{t} 
= E(-v]LHK{ Σ Σ Δ.(5) 
KCL C£N/KSe2c\{t} 
= £ Δ.(5)Σ Σ <-l) |LHJr | 
sez^xí») KcLceN/KiScc 
= Σ А„(5)^|{СеЛГ/А'|5сС}|(-1)^Н*1 
Σ M S ) Σ (-i) |LH,r| 
= Σ
 Δ
«(5) 
SeE(L) 
where the last equality follows from the fact that, for each 5 S 2ЛГ\{0} such that 
H(S) ¿ 0, and with / := \L\ and α : = \A(H(S))\, 
»(-D'-B-D'Cr) 
і._л V / 
K:A(H(S))CKCL k=a 
l-a 
- { 
fc=0 
1 if/ = a 
0 otherwise 
In lemma 6.2 below the set Σ ( £ ) of expression (6.2) is characterized in an easier 
way. Here, we use the following definitions. Let (Ν,Α) be a communication graph. 
Then, for L С A, N(L) С N is defined to be the set of players which are end point of 
an arc in L, and, if (TV, A) is a tree, then 
Ext(N, A) := {i G N | d,(N, A) = 1} (6.3) 
denotes the non-empty set of extreme points of (Ν,Α). 
L E M M A e.2. Let (Ν,Α) be a (communication) graph that contains no cycles. Let 
L € 2 J 4 \ { 0 } . Then the following two assertions hold. 
(i) If (N(L), L) is not a tree, then Σ ( Ι ) = 0. 
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(ii) If (N(L), L) is a tree, then 
Σ ( Ι ) = {S С N(L) I Ext(N(L),L) С S} (6.4) 
Proof. Part (i) is trivial. For part (ii), let (N(L), L) be a tree. 
First let 5 e Σ(Ιτ). Then A(H(S)) = L implies that 
S С H(S) = N(A(H(S))) = N(L), 
where the first equality follows from the fact that H(S) is connected. 
Hence, S С N(L) and Ext{N(L), L) = Ext{H(S),A{H(S))) С S, where the inclusion 
is a direct consequence of the definition of the connected hull H(S). 
Conversely, let S С N(L) be such that Ext(N(L), L) С S. Since Ext(N(L), L) φ 0, 
we have that 5 / 0 . Further, 5 С iV(I) implies that H(S) С H(N(L)) = N(L). 
Moreover, Ext(iV(L),L) С 5 implies that 
JV(L) = H{N(L)) = H(Ext(N(L))) С Я ( 5 ) 
Consequently, JV(L) = Я ( 5 ) , H(S) φ 0 and А ( Я ( 5 ) ) = A{N{L)) = L. 
Hence, 5 6 E(L) . D 
E X A M P L E e.i. Consider the four-person commimication situation (JV, v,Á) with 
v
 —
 u{i,2} and -^ = {a,&,c}, where a = {1,4}, Ь = {2,3} and с = {3,4}, as repre­
sented in figure 6.1. 
FIGURE β.1. 
With e.g. L = {b, c} we find N{L) = {2,3,4} and Exi(N{L\ L) = {2,4}. 
Lemma 6.2 implies that E({&,c}) = {{2,4},{2,3,4}}. In a similar way one obtains 
Σ({
α
,6}) = 0, Σ({α}) = {1,4}, Ц{0}) = {2,3}, Щс}) = {3,4}, 
Ща,с}) = {{1,3}, {1,3,4}} and E({a,ò,c}) = {{1,2}, {1 ,2 ,3} , {1,2 ,4}, {1,2,3,4}}. 
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Therefore, since Δ„(5) =f\ l f , 5 " f 1 ' 2 } , we have 
10 otherwise 
S№№) l 0 o t h e r w l s e 
Now theorem 6.1 and expression (4.6), which describes the Shapley value in terms 
of dividends, will be used to compute the position value for cycle-free communication 
situations (Ν,ν,Α), where υ is a unanimity game, a pure overhead game or a quadratic 
measure game: 
(i) Unanimity games. Let (Ν,υ,Α) 6 CS? be fixed with ν = us for some 5 € 2N, 
\S\ > 2. It is clear that for the dividends Δ„(Τ) we have 
Δ„(Τ)=ί 1 i f T = S 
І 0 otherwise 
Further, for all L e 2Λ\{0}, the dividends DV(L) are given by 
DV(L)= У Δ „ ( Τ ) = ( 1 ΐ ί 5 € Σ ( £ ) = ί 1 iíH(S)¿<OBndL = A(H(S)) 
~^ 10 otherwise 10 otherwise 
So, using (4.6), 
*t(N,v,A)= Σ !Ф.(Л,гЫ= Σ f Σ Чг 
= < вед ,ra(H(S)) ^ ^ ^ ^ " Σ^(^(Η(5))) 
>ÍN 
\ 0 if Я(5) = 0 
for all Î' e N (cf. (5.8) and (5.11)/(5.13), with β = 1). 
(ii) Pure overhead games. Let Τ be an arbitrary subset of TV. Then the (zero-normali­
zation of the) pure overhead game (Ν,ρτ) on Τ (cf. Owen (1986)) is defined by 
ρ τ ( 5 ) = ( - 1 + | 5 Π Γ | i f S n T ^ 0 
10 otherwise 
It is straightforward to verify that 
Δ ( 5 ) = | ( - l ) | s | i f S c T a n d | S | > 2 
1,0 otherwise 
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Considering a communication situation (Ν,ρτ,Α) e CS* , theorem 6.1 and lemma 6.2 
imply that, for all L € 2'4\{0}, 
DPT{L)=\ Σ (-1)
|S1
 if(JV(I,),L))isatree 
S:Ext(JV(L),I,)CSC(JV(L)nT) 
0 otherwise 
=
 | (-1)1м(^)пТ1 if (N(L), L) is a tree and Ext(JV(L), L)=N(L) Π Τ
 ( 6 5 ) 
i 0 otherwise 
A special, simple case occurs when Τ = N. 
The condition Ext(JV(I), L) = N(L) П Γ then boils down to Ext(JV(.L),.L) = JV(L), 
which is only satisfied if \L\ = 1. Hence, 
' "
 ;
 І 0 otherwise 
Consequently, one obtains the following expression for the position value: 
*
x
{N,pN,A)=\dl{N,A) (6.6) 
for all i e N. It turns out (cf. Owen (1986)) that in this case (T = N) the Myerson 
value is equal to the position value. In the more general case this need not be true. 
EXAMPLE e.2. Consider the five-person communication situation (Ν,ρτ,Α) where 
Τ = {1,2,3} and the communication graph (N, A) is represented in figure 6.2. 
F I G U R E 6.2. 
Then, using expression (6.5), it is found that 
1 ifLe{{a,b},{a,c},{&,c}} 
Г  if  {a, b], 
DPT(L)={-\ i fL={o,b,c} 
I 0 else 
Consequently, 
.Γ,(*,ΡΓ,Λ) = | Σ H # M ( è + i-*) = i 
LaÇL \L\ 
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Similarly one finds that 
π2(Ν,ρτ,Α) = π
Λ
(Ν,ρ
τ
,Α) = ¿, π4(Ν,ρΤίΑ) = 1 and ττ5(Ν,ρτ,Α) = 0. 
Further, using the definition of μ or the results in Owen (1986), one obtains 
μ(Ν,ν,Α) = (±±±±0). 
As already mentioned above, we have that 7r(JV, ν. A) = μ(Ν, ν. A) for all cycle-free 
communication situations (N, v, A) with υ = р ^ . It would be interesting to characterize 
the set of all communication situations for which the position value and the Myerson 
value coincide. 
(ii) Quadratic measure games. Let ω = (wi, · · · ,ω
η
) be a non-negative (weight-) vector. 
Then the quadratic measure game ς
ω
 G TUN corresponding to ω (cf. Owen (1986)) is 
defined by 
9Λ*):=(Σω ·ί - Σ ω . 2 = Σ 2 ω·^· 
Vies / ,6S {i.jJCS:·^· 
So in the quadratic measure game corresponding to ω, the worth of a coalition is com­
pletely determined by the worths of its various two-person subcoalitions which, in t u m , 
are completely determined by the product of the weights attached to eadi of its two 
players. It readily follows that 
д (S) = ( 2 ω , ω ' i f S = {*'·'} w i t h i ^ i 
l 0 otherwise 
Let us now consider a fixed communication situation (Ы,д
ш
,А) 6 CS?. Let L С A 
be a non-empty subset of arcs. Then, using theorem 6.1, 
rj / r\ _ ( 2ω,ω ( if there are s,t 6 N such that A{H({s,t})) = L 
І 0 otherwise 
In other words, the dividend D1a{L) equals 0 unless L establishes a path in the graph 
(N, A). If this is a p a t h from player s to player t, then the dividend Г
Чи
(Ь) equals the 
worth of the coalition {s, <} in the quadratic measure game. 
We now introduce the following definition. Let s,t G N. If there exists a path from 
player s to player t in the (cycle-free) graph (N, A), then the distance d(s,t) between s 
and t is given by 
ф , < ) : = | Л ( Я ( { М } ) ) | , (6.7) 
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which represents the number of arcs supporting the path from s to t. Computation of 
the position value will be based on the observation that 
{eit}CN.a€A(Ha>,ti)) K ' ' 
for all α € A. Note that in order to apply (6.8), it is necessary to find all paths supported 
by a given arc. This can be done in a rather smooth way using (weighted) generating 
functions. 
Let α = {í,j} € A be a fixed arc. If we were to cut this arc, then the component 
С € Ν/A with i,j e С would split up into two parts, say C, and Cj with г e С, and 
j E С j . The weighted generating function 0° describes the weighted number of points 
in C, lying at any given distance from the point i. Formally, 
*=0 \,£C,:d(t,i)=k J 
where d(i) := m a x , e c , ^(з,і), is the maximum distance between a point in C, and г. 
Similarly one defines d(j) and θ". 
T H E O R E M в.з. Let (Ν,ς
ω
,Α) 6 CS? and a = {i,j} e A. Then 
Φ.(Α,ι#) = 2 / θ^χ)θ'(χ)αχ. (6.10) 
Jo 
Proof. Note that 
,1 d(,)+d(j) ! 
2 / θ^(χ)θ^(χ)(1
Χ
 = Σ £ 2 / 2ω.ω(**ώ 
0
 t=o êec,,tec).d(»,t)+d(t,})=k·'0 
d(>)+d(}) 
^ Jfc + 1 
1=0 «ec,,tec,.<i(j,o=t+i 
( с
Ч
в в
Ч(Л,гП D 
E X A M P L E e.a. Consider the nine-person communication situation (N, д
ш
. A) with ω, = 1 
for all » G N and the communication graph (N, A) of figure 6.3. 
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FIGURE е.З. 
It is found that 
0 ϊ ( χ ) = l + 2x + 2x'2, %(х) = 1 + 2x + x2 
θ^χ) = 1 + 2x + 2x2 + x3, ь3{х) = 1 + 2x 
θ\(χ) = 1 + 2x + 4 i 2 + x 3 , 0 | (x) = 1 
and so 
π ι ( ^ , 9 ω , Α ) = / flf(*)ff;(i)dx + / θ\{χ)θ\{χ)άχ + / ÖÏ(x)Ö|(x)dx 
Уо JO JO 
= 73Ö + 62Ö + ^12 = 1 7 Ï S 
In a similar way one can compute the position value for the other players. 
7. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR AND ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF 
COMMUNICATION LINKS. 
So far we only considered exogenously given communication graphs. The players 
were assumed to be anchored within a fixed Outside' network of communication links. 
However, following Aumann and Mytrson (1988), one could raise the following question. 
Given a game in coalitional form, what communication links may be expected to form 
between the players? 
In analyzing this question about endogenous formation of communication graphs, strate-
gic considerations play a role. Not only the immediate consequences of 'building' a link 
(or not) have to be taken into account but one also has to consider where this deci-
sion will lead up to at the end. To evaluate any given communication graph for any 
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player, Aumann and Myerson (1988) used the Myerson value. In this section we use the 
position value instead and reconsider two of Aumann and Myerson's examples. In the 
context of coalition structures, an explicit treatment of endogenous coédition formation 
can be found e.g. in Hart and Kurz (1983). 
Let us first formally describe the (strategic) model for endogeneous formation of 
communication links as suggested by Aumann and Myerson (1988). 
Let ν € TUN be zero-normalized and let 7 : CSN —* RN be an allocation rule. Further, 
let К : = {{г,i} € 2N \ г φ j } denote the set of all possible communication links. Then 
the linking game Γ 7 (ι;) in extensive form, corresponding to ν with respect to 7, is defined 
as follows. At the beginning of the play there are no links between the players. Then, 
according to some specific rule of order, the players can propose to build links. The 
rule of order is common knowledge and each player г € Ν, in his turn, may or may not 
propose to form some link {t,j} g К. 
If player i proposes to form the link {i, j}, then player j has to decide whether or not 
to accept this proposal. If player j accepts, then the link {г, j} is formed. In all other 
cases, no link is formed at this stage. 
After such a (propose-reject/accept) round, the next player in line (with respect to the 
rule of order) may take the initiative to build some new link etc. Note that , once formed, 
a link can not be destroyed. The game stops if in |JV| subsequent rounds no new link 
is formed. Assume that at the end of this period of link formation the communication 
graph (N, A) has been established. Then the payoff for player г e N is defined to be 
Ί,(Ν,ν,Α). 
Note that the linking game Γ
γ
(υ) is a game in extensive form with perfect informa­
tion in which at any time (at each decision node), each player has full knowledge of the 
entire history of proposals and rejections. A subgame of Ι \ ( υ ) is defined as a game that 
starts out from a decision node where one of the players has the opportunity to make a 
proposal and that subsequently is played according to the same rules as Γ 7 ( υ ) . In fact, 
each subgame of a linking game can be viewed upon as a linking game itself in which, 
at the beginning of the play, there are already certain links present. A subgame perfect 
equilibrium for T^(v) is defined to be a Nash equilibrium for Γ
Ύ
(ν) that induces a Nash 
equilibrium for each subgame. Since Γ 7 ( υ ) is a game of perfect information, a subgame 
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies exists (cf. Selten (1975)). Any communication 
graph (N, A) that is reached at the end of a play corresponding to such a pure subgame 
perfect equilibrium (for some rule of order) is called a natural communication graph for 
ν with respect to 7. 
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To illustrate this model, we compare the natural communication graphs with re­
spect to the Myerson value μ and the position value π in two examples. 
(i) Let the three-person zero-normalized Tt7-game (JV, v) be given by N = {1, 2,3} and 
ÍO if | 5 | < 1 
t>(S) = I 60 if | 5 | = 2 
[ 7 2 i f | S | = 3 
Because of symmetry table 7.1 below completely determines the Myerson value and the 
position value for each possible communication graph. 
TABLE 7.1. 
A 
0 
{{1,2}} 
{{1,2},{1,3}} 
{{1,2},{1,3},{2,3}} 
<N,v,A) 
(0,0,0) 
(30,30,0) 
(36,18,18) 
(24,24,24) 
μ{Ν,υ,Α) 
(0,0,0) 
(30,30,0) 
(44,14,14) 
(24,24,24) 
To determine all subgame perfect equilibria for the linking game Γ
π
(υ) we use 'back­
ward induction'. Suppose we are already in the situation that two links have been 
formed. Then, the two players who can not communicate directly, both will profit from 
establishing a direct communication link, because their payoffs will go up from 18 to 
24. Hence, whenever a decision node is readied in which such a situation occurs, we 
will inevitably (i.e. according to each equilibrium path for the corresponding subgame) 
end up in a full communication graph with three links. 
Let us go back one step further and suppose that we are in the situation that precisely 
one link has been formed, say the link between player 1 and player 2. Then, on each 
(subgame perfect) equilibrium path for the corresponding subgame, neither player 1 nor 
player 2 will propose or accept to form a link with player 3 because at the end, using 
the arguments above, this will lead to a payoff of 24 instead of 30. 
Now we come to analyze the initial situation in which there are no links formed yet. 
Let us assume for the analysis (not for the argument) that the rule of order is (1,2,3). 
Suppose we are in the situation that player 3 can make a proposal and that no links have 
been formed yet. Clearly, a (subgame perfect) equilibrium path for the corresponding 
subgame will prescribe player 3 either to propose the link {1,3} or the link {2,3} and 
prescribe the player t o whom the proposed is made, to accept. This is the case since 
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this, at the end, will lead to a payoff of 30 for both players, which is better than the 
payoff of zero they would get otherwise. 
Continuining our backward induction argument we now arrive at the situation that 
player 2 can make a proposal and that no links have been formed yet. Note that , in the 
corresponding subgame, the action of player 2 not to propose any link at all supports a 
subgame perfect equilibrium play because player 3 still could offer the link {2, 3} in the 
next round. Similarly, also the action of player 2 to propose a link, together with either a 
subsequent rejection or acception, supports a subgame perfect equilibrium play. Finally, 
applying similar arguments to the first round of the game, one may conclude that there 
are three natural communication graphs for ν with respect to π, each consisting of a 
single link between two of the players. 
Note that exactly the same analysis can be applied for the linking game Tß(v). 
Consequently, for this example, the natural communication graphs with respect to π 
and μ coincide. In general, this need not be the case, as is seen in the following example. 
(ii) Let the five-person zero-normalized TU-gaxae (Ν,υ) be determined by 
N = {1,2,3,4,5} and 
v(S) = l l i f ' ? = {2>3,4,5},or, if both | S | > 2 and 1 € S 
10 otherwise 
Let A's := {{ г іІ} € 2 s | i φ j'} correspond to the complete communication graph on 
a coalition 5. For complete communication graphs the position value and the Myerson 
value axe represented in table 7.2. 
TABLE 7.2. 
A 
#{1,2} 
#{1,2,3} 
#{1,2,3,4} 
#{2,3,4,5} 
#{1,2,3,4,5} 
T ( J V , M ) 
(MAM) 
(U'bM) 
/Ί 1 1 1
 n
\ 
V2' 6 ' 6 ' 6>U<' 
fO i ì ì M 
VU> 4 ' 4 ' 4 ' Ь> 
^(716,241,241 241,241) 
μ(ΛΓ,ϋ,Λ) 
(М> 0 ' 0 ' 0 ) 
(f,U,0,0) 
fä J_ _L J . ni 
V4' 12 ' 12' 1 2 ' " / 
ГО ì i ì M 
( i _L _L J_ JN 
^ S ' 1 0 ' 1 0 ' 1 0 ' \ü> 
As argued in Aumann and Myerson (1988), using a similar line of thought as in the 
first example, it is found (rather anti-intuitively) that #{2,3,4,5} is the unique natural 
communication graph for ν with respect to the Myerson value μ. Here, we only provide a 
37 
brief argumentation. Each subgame perfect equilibrium for Τμ(ν) will convert .^ {1,2,3,4} 
into .^ {1,2,3,4,5} and ^{1,2} into ^"{1,2,3}· Therefore, the problem the players face at the 
beginning of the play boils down to a choice between / {^1,2,3} and КІ2,З,І,Ь}· Clearly, 
• {^2,3,4,5} results. 
However, as can be seen in table 7.2, the same arguments do not apply to the linking 
game Γ
π
(υ) > and it is not difficult to verify that the first four complete graphs represented 
in table 7.2 are natural communication graphs for υ with respect to the position value 
π. So with respect to the position value there are many natural commtmication graphs 
for t». 
We like to note that this section only sketched a first a t tempt to model endogenous 
formation of communication links. No final answers are given and further research seems 
worthwhile. 
8. ATtJ-GAMES AND STRATEGIC CLAIM GAMES 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) indicated a way t o construct a superadditive 
TZJ-game to each game in strategic form. In this way all superadditive TÍZ-games can 
be obtained (cf. Burger (1959)). More generally, Aumann (1961, 1967) constructed a 
superadditive NTU-gaxne to each game in strategic form. In this procedure the players 
are allowed to act highly cooperative in the sense that they can correlate their actions. 
In particular, this implies that Aumann's procedure always leads to NTU-gaxnes where 
all sets of attainable payoff vectors for the various coalitions are convex. 
This section follows Borm and Tijs (1989) and only allows the players to coordi-
nate their actions. Again, the resulting 7VTÍ7-games are superadditive. Moreover, all 
superadditive NTU-gaxnes can be obtained in this way. This is shown by introducing 
a strategic claim дате Г( ) € SGN to each NTU-game (N,V). Then, it is found 
that the NTU-game (N,V), which is derived from applying the coordinated Aumann 
procedure to Г( ), is the superadditive hull of V. Thus, in particular, if (N, V) is 
superadditive, then V = V and (N, V) can be seen as arising from a (claim) game in 
strategic form. 
The construction of the claim game T(V) bears some resemblance to the way Nash 
(1950, 1953) constructed a game in strategic form to each two-person bargaining game 
and also to the way Burger (1959) showed that each superadditive TtZ-game arises from 
a game in strategic form. According to Nash both players can make claims on their 
own payoffs. If this pair of claims fits (i.e. is a feasible pair), then the players get their 
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claims. Otherwise, the disagreement point is reached. Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
let the players make claims on the coalition they want to participate. A coalition S 
forms if all players in S claim S. If the coalition 5 is formed, then each of the players 
in S obtains an equal share of the gains of S. If a player's claim is not consistent in 
the above sense, then he obtains the payoff he can make on his own. In the claim game 
T(V) the players can make claims on both a coalition and a payoff. 
First we briefly recall the definition of an iVTC-game and a game in strategic form. 
Let N := { 1 , 2 , . . . , n} be the set of players. 
An NTU-game is a pair (N, V) where F is a mapping which assigns to each coalition 
S € 2W \{0} a comprehensive subset V(S) of R 5 . If a coalition S decides to cooperate, 
then each of the payoff vectors α e V(5) is attainable by S, giving a payoff (utility) of 
a, to player i € S. An JVTU-game (N, V) is often identified with V and the set of all 
JVTl7-games with player set N is denoted by NTUN. A game V e NTUN is called 
superadditive if, for all S, Τ 6 2N\{0} with S П Τ = 0, V(S) x V(T) С V ( S U T ) . 
A strategic game Г £ S G ^ is given by Γ = ( Χ ι , . . . ,X„,Ki,... ,K
n
), where X, 
represents the strategy space of player i 6 Ν, and К, : Χι x ... x X„ —+ R his payoff 
function. The following notations will be used frequently. 
Let 5 e 2 ^ 0 } and χ € Y\,eNX,. Then 
Xs := Π * " χ* := Μ** 6 Xs, Ks{x) : = ( t f . ( i ) ) . e s 6 R s 
•es 
and χ is identified with ( Z S I ^ N V S ) · 
Following Aumann (1961, 1967) but allowing the players only to coordinate their 
actions, we construct NTU-games Ar and Вт to each strategic game Г in the following 
way. 
DEFINITION. Let Г = (Χ1,...,Χη,Κι,...,Κη) € SGN. Then Ar e NTUN and 
Br € NTUN are defined by 
A r ( 5 ) := {a £ Rs \ 3 i s e x s V I J V N s e x N V S : Ks(xs, XN\S) > a} (8.1) 
and 
Br(S) := {a G R s | V r j n s e x „ v s 3iseXs : Ks(xs, XN\S) > a} (8.2) 
for all 5 e 2 ^ \ { 0 } . 
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Note that Ar (S) corresponds to a pessimistic view on the cooperative behaviour 
of the coalition 5, while Br(S) corresponds to a more optimistic point of view. 
E X A M P L E 8.1. Consider the two-person game Γ in strategic form with strategy spaces 
{T, B) for player 1 and {L, R) for player 2, and where the payoffs are determined by 
L R 
Τ /(1-1) (-Ι,ΐΛ 
в\(-М) (і,-і)У 
Then 
Лг({1}) = А
Г
({2}) = ( - с о , - 1 ] , Вг({1}) = Вг({2}) = (-оо, 1] and 
Аг({1,2}) = Яг({1,2}) = С о т р г { ( 1 , - 1 ) , ( - 1 , 1 ) } . 
Note that Br is not superadditive. 
L E M M A 8.1. Ar is superadditive for all Г € SGN. 
Proof. Let Г = ( Λ Ί , . . . , Χ
η
, Κ!,..., Κ
η
) 6 SGN and let S, Τ € 2 N \ {0} be such that 
5 Π Γ = 0. Take a
s
 = ( α , ) ^ e Ar(S) and aT = (сч),£т 6 А Г ( Т ) . We have to show 
that asuT ε Ar(S U T ) . Let i s € Xs and i r 6 Χτ be such that 
KS(XS,XN\S) > as and KT(ZT,XN\T) > ατ 
for all XN\S € XN\S and all XN\T 6 XN\T· bi particular, 
-K"s(îs)(aT>ZN\(suT))) > asandAVCÍT, (¿s,a;N\(SuT))) > Τ 
for all XN\SUT € XN\(SUT)· Consequently, defining i s u r := ( ¿ S ^ T ) ε -XsuT, w e have 
that KSUT(XSUT,XN\(SUT)) ^ « s u r for all XN\(SUT) S -^ ÍV\(SUT) · 
Hence, o s u r 6 ^ r ( 5 U Γ) . D 
Conversely, for a large class of ./VTCZ-games, we define a corresponding game in 
strategic form in the following way. 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let V 6 NTUN. Then V is called standard if V({i}) is non-empty, 
upper-bounded and closed for all i e Ν. 
If V is standard, then the strategic claim game T(V) £ SGN corresponding to V is 
given by Γ(V) = (Χι,...,Χη,Κι,•·•,K
n
), where for each г G Ν 
Χ, : = {S € 2N | i e S) x R (8.3) 
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and, for χ = (5},і})}сн 6 Xu, 
К
(
х
).
=
 [и if Sj =S, forali j eS, a n d ( < j ) j e s . 6 ^ ( 5 . ) ( 8 4 . 
\min{t 1 , t)(t)} otherwise ^ ' ' 
with v(i) := max{t \ t g V({t})}. 
In a claim game Г( ) the strategy (S,,i,) of player i can be interpreted as follows. 
Player i wants the coalition 5, Э i to form and he claims a payoff equal to t,. His 
demands axe met if the claims with respect to coalition formation axe consistent for 
all players in S, (i.e. S¡ = 5, for all j € 5,) and the payoff demand vector for S, is 
attainable in V (i.e. ( i j) jes, 6 ^ (S , ) ) . Otherwise, player i stays on his own and obtains 
the individual rational payoff υ(ι), except for the case his claim i, is less than v(i). 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let V e NTUN be standard and let χ = (5,,ί,)
ι ε
Λτ be a strategy vector 
in the claim game Г( ). Then the fitting F
x
 С 2ЛГ\{0} is the partition of TV which is 
defined as follows. For S С N with | S | > 2 we have that S € Fx if and only if 
5, = 5 for all i 6 5 and (t,),es G V(S). 
Further, with г ξ Ν, we have that {г} e Fz if and only if 
г 0 (J{S € Fz | |S| > 2} 
Consequently, 
KT(X) € V(T) for all Г € Fx (8.5) 
Claim games are tight (cf. Ichiishi (1986), p.281) in the sense that the associated 
./VTlf-games of (8.1) and (8.2) are identical. 
LEMMA 8.2. Let V € NTUN be standard. Then Аг( ) = #Г( )· 
Proof. Let 5 e 2 N \{0} and Г( ) = (Χχ,... ,Χη,Ι^,... ,K
n
). Since it is clear that 
Лг( )(5) С 5r(v)('S')i w e only have to show the converse. 
Let b € Br(v)(S) . Let xs = (5 , , i , ) ,es G Xs be such that 
For ί G S, let 5ι : = S, if 5, С S and 5, := {г} otherwise. Then, with i s : = (St,t,) g Xs, 
it is clear that 
Ks(xs,({J},(vU))ieN\s) = Ks(xs,({j},v(j))j
eN\s)· 
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Consequently, for all хдг\5 € XN\SI 
KS(XS,XN\S) = Ks(xs,({J},vÜ))jeN\s) > Ь. 
Hence, b e ^ r í^ í -S 1 ) . D 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let V e NTUN be standard. Then the claim associate V € NTUN is 
defined by V := ^1г( ) ( = Вт(, ))· 
Some properties of claim associates are summarized in 
L E M M A s.a. Let V e NTUN be standard. Then the following four assertions hold. 
(i) V is standard and superadditive. 
(ii) V С V, i.e. V(S) С V(S) for all 5 e 2W\{0}. 
(iii) If V is superadditive, then V = V. 
(iv) If W e ЛГТг/" is standard and V С W, then К С W7. 
Proo/. Let Г( ) = (Xu..- ,X
n
,К^...,K
n
) and S1 € 2Ν\{ϋΐ}. 
(i) Superadditivity of V follows from lemma 8.1. Let i ζ N. Considering ({t}»^1')) £ X, 
one finds that ^({¿}) С ^({г}) and, considering ({j},v{j))j£N\{i] € -^Ν\{·}ι that 
V({i}) С V({i}). Hence, V({i}) = V({i}) and V is standard. 
(ii) Let α e V(S). Since Ks((S,ai)t£SiXN\s) = α for all ^NXS € XN\S, it follows that 
α e 7(5). 
(iii) Because of part (ii) it suffices to show that the superadditivity of V implies that 
V(S) С V(S). Let V be superadditive and α e V(S). Let i s £ -Xs be such that 
Ks(xs,({i}>vU))]eN\s) > fl­
it is clear that the fitting -Fcis.COhuO)) ems) "iduces a partition { S ( l ) , 5 ( 2 ) , . . . , S ( r ) } 
of S such that, according to (8.5), as(k) = {ai)teS(k) € 'V(S(k)) for all fc € {1 ,2 , . . . , r } . 
Consequently, 
Γ 
α = ( a s ( t ) ) t 6 { i . j r} 6 Π V(S(k)) С V(S) 
k=l 
by supereidditivity of У. Hence, α Ç V(S). 
(iv) Let W € NTUN be standard and V С W. With T(W) = ( Α Ί , . . . ,X„, L j , . . . , X
n
) , 
it is straightforward to show that Л"дг(а;) < Ьці(х) for all ж € Х^ (cf. (8.4)). This 
implies that V С W. D 
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Theorem 8.4 below shows that the claim associate V is the superadditive hull of 
V. In particular, this implies that each standard superadditive NTU-g&me can be seen 
as arising from a game in strategic form. 
T H E O R E M 8.4. Let V G NTUN be standard. Then the claim associate V is the smallest 
superadditive game containing V. 
Proof. Let W g NTUN be superadditive and assume that V С W. For proving the 
theorem it suffices to show that V С W (cf. lemma 8.3(i)). 
Define W1 e NTUN by W1^}) := V({i}) for all i € Ν, and І ЦЗ) := W(S) for 
all S G 2N with | 5 | > 2. It is clear that tV1 is standard and superadditive and that 
V С W1 С W. Hence, using lemma 8.3(iii) and (iv), 
V С W1 = W1 С W D 
As a direct consequence of theorem 8.4, we can provide an 'inside' description of the 
claim associate V. Recall that, for a finite set A, <A> denotes the set of all partitions 
of A 
COROLLARY β.5. Let V € NTUN be standard. Then, for all 5 e 2 W \ { 0 } , 
F(5)= U П у ( т ) · 
P e < s > T e p 
In a strategic claim game Г(У) it may seem unnatural for player i to claim less 
than the individual rational level v(i). Ruling these claims out in advance, one obtains 
the following 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let V € NTUN be standard and Г( ) = (Α'α,... ,X„,A'i . . . , Α '
η
) . 
Then the reatricted claim дате ГГ( ) G SGN corresponding to V is given by 
Tr(V) = (X{,..., Λ-;, Α Ί , . . . , Λ'
η
) where, for each i € Ν, 
ΧΙ := {S e 2 N I i € S } χ [υ(ι), οο) (8.6) 
and the payoff function К, is restricted to Х^ С XN-
Further, the restricted claim associate V € NTUN is defined by V := Arr(v)-
Copying the proof of lemma 8.2, it is found that also restricted claim games are 
tight, i.e. V = Arr(v) = •örr(V)· How the claim associate V and the restricted claim 
associate V are related, is described in theorem 8.7. First we need 
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L E M M A β.β. Let V e NTUN be standard, Г( ) = ( Χ ι , . . . ,X„,Κι,...,Κ
η
) and 
x = (S},tj)J&N € ΧΝ· Let ι g Ν. Defining the restriction x\ e Xf of x, by 
il" : = (S,,max{t,,D(i)}), we have 
Kt(x%xN\{t) >/i,(x„XAr\{,}) (8.7) 
and, for all j e N\{t}, 
K}{xr,,XN\{,)) < K){X„XN\{,))- (8-8) 
Proof. Let j € Ν\{ι}. If t, > «(»), we have equalities in both (8.7) and (8.8). 
So assume t, < v(i). 
Then ίίΓ,(χ1,Χ7ν\{,}) = t, < v(i) = К,(х^,хц\^,]). This proves (8.7). 
Clearly, if j £ St, then there is equality in (8.8). Take j € S,. If 5, £ ^I^,XK\{,))^ 
comprehensiveness impHes that S, G F(XítXN.. ,) and, again, there is equality in (8.8). 
Otherwise, if St g F(x-,xNni}), then / ^ ( x ^ x ^ . j ) = nún{tj,v(j)} < Κ}(χ„χΝ\^)).Ώ 
T H E O R E M 8.r. Let V E NTUN be standard and S e 2Ν\{4}. then 
Vr(S) = Compr({ α € V(S) | α > («(»».es}). 
Proof. To prove the "C"-part , let a £ Vr(S). Define b 6 R 5 by 6, : = т а х { а „ (г)} for 
all г € 5 . It suffices to prove that b 6 V(S). Since a € V (5) , there exists a strategy 
vector x s € Х$ С Xs such that , for all xjv\s € XN\SI 
KS(XS,XN\S) > KS(XS,XN\S) ^ b ' 
where the first inequality follows from (8.8). Hence, 6 6 V^S). 
Conversely, to prove the "l)"-part, let а £ Rs and let b € V(S) be such that 
b > a and b > (t;(î)),es· By comprehensiveness, it suffices to show that b £ V (S). 
Since 6 £ V(S), there exists a strategy vector xs £ Xs such that KS{XS,XN\S) ^ Ь 
for all ΧΛΓ\5 ε Xms -^ -X-NXS- Using the fact that Ь > (v(i))tçsi this implies that 
x s = х£ € Χζ. Hence, 6 e V(S). D 
EXAMPLE 8.2. Let the two-person jVTÍZ-game V be defined by ({г}) = (—oo,3] for 
all г £ {1,2} and 
V({1,2})= {(a,b)£R2 | a < 4 , b < 4 a n d a - | - ò < 5 } 
Then V({i}) = ^ ( { г } ) = (-oo,3] for all ι e {1,2}, 
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and 
V({1,2}) = V({1,2}) U {(α, 6) G tí¿ \ a < 3, 6 < 3} 
V r ( { l , 2 } ) = { ( a , b ) e R 2 | a < 3 , Ь < 3} , 
as is represented in figure 8.1. 
FIGURE 8.1. 
• : boundary of V({ 1,2}) 
: boundary of V({ 1,2}) 
: boundary of Ці, 2}) 
θ. IMPLEMENTATION OF COOPERATIVE SOLUTION CONCEPTS 
In this section it is seen that cooperative solution concepts for NTU-games can be 
implemented by means of Nash equilibria for strategic games. More specifically, if an 
iVTiZ-gaine is (standard and) superadditive, then imputations and strong core elements 
correspond exactly to the payoff vectors attained by payoff undominated equilibria and 
strong equilibria for the corresponding claim game. 
First we recall the definitions of some well-known solution concepts for NTU-games. 
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D E F I N I T I O N . Let V € NTUN be Standard. The imputation sei I(V) is defined by 
I(V) := {a € RN | a e I/(V(JV)) and a > (ü(i))¡ew} , 
where, for А С R', ^ ( A ) denotes the set of undominated elementi of A: 
U(A) : = {a e A \ -йъ^л • b > a and Ь φ a) 
The strong core SCÇV) consists of those payoff vectors which are attainable by the 
grand coalition N and which are 'stable' with respect to domination. More specifically, 
SC(V) := {a e V(N) | ^3se2»\{t}3beviS) : Ь > a s and Ь ^ a s } 
The core C(V) consists of those payoffs vectors which are attainable by JV and which 
are 'stable' with respect to strict domination, i.e. 
C(V) : = {a e V(N) | ->3s
e
2N\ {e}36 ev(s) : b > as) 
It is clear that the strong core is a subset of both the core and the imputation set, 
and that , for a two-person (standard) JVTÍZ-game, the imputation set and the strong 
core coincide. 
Further, with respect to the three solution concepts of core, strong core and imputation 
set, there is no difference between claim associates and restricted claim associates. This 
is seen in 
L E M M A 9.1. Let V e NTUN be standard. Then 
1(7) = I(Vr), SC(V) = SC{Vr) and C(V) = CÇ^). 
Proof. We only prove that SC(y) = SC(V ) . The other two assertions follow in a 
similar way. 
Let α G S C ( F ) . Then o e V{N) and, using the fact that ^({г} = V{{i}) for all 
ι 6 N, a > (г;(г))
і6л/· According to theorem 8.7, this implies that α € V {Ν). Suppose 
a £ SC(Vr). Then there exists a coalition S € 27V\{0} and a 6 e Г ( 5 ) such that 
b > as and b φ as- By theorem 8.7, there is а с G V(S) with с > 6. In particular, 
с > a s and с / as- This contradicts the fact that α G SC(V). 
Conversely, let a £ SC(Vr). Then α e Vr(N) С V(N) and α > (ν(ί))
ί
€
Ν
 because 
V ({г}) = ^({г}) for all i Ç N. Suppose a 0 SC(V). Then there exists a coalition S 
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and a i ) 6 V^S) such that b > as and 6 / a s · However, by theorem 8.7 it follows that 
b e F ^ S ) . Contradiction. D 
Now we provide the definitions of the various types of equilibria for games in strate­
gic form that play a role in the implementation of imputations and strong core elements. 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let Γ = (X
u
... ,X
n
, Α Ί , . . . , K
n
) e SGN. 
The set .Ε(Γ) of Nash equilibrta for Γ is given by 
E(T) : = {* 6 XN I -.З.блгЭу.ех. : if,(y„a;jv\{.}) > K,{x)} 
Further, we define the set 5Е(Г) of strong equilibria for Г by 
SE(T) := {x e XN b^se2f\{»}^y
s
&Xs '• KS(VS,XN\S) > Ks(x) and 
Ks(ys,XN\s) ψ A ' s ( i ) } , 
and the set PUE(r) of payoff undommated equilibria for Γ by 
PUE(T) : = {x £ E(T) | ^ χ » : KN(y) > KN(x) and KN(y) φ KN{x)-\ 
With respect to these three types of equilibria, there is no difference between claim 
games and restricted claim games. This is seen in 
L E M M A e.2. Let У e NTUN be standard. Then 
E(T(V)) = E(Tr(V)), SE(T(V)) = SE(Tr(V)) and PUE(T(V)) = PUE(rr(V)). 
Proof. Let Г(V) = (X1,...,Xn,Ku...,Kn). We only prove that 
SE(r(V)) = SE(Tr(V)). The other two assertions follow in a similar way. 
Let χ = (Sjjt^jçN e SE(r(V)). Clearly, if we can show that x Ç Х^, then 
χ € E(TT(V)). Suppose χ £ XrM. Then there is a player г e N with t, < v(i). 
However, К,(({і}, (г)),хіч\ι,\) = υ(ι) > ί, = Κ,(χ). This contradicts the fact that 
χ e 5Е(Г( )). 
Conversely, let x G 5Е(ГГ( )). Suppose χ £ SE(T(V)). Then there is a coalition 
S £ 2N\{4)} and a strategy vector ys € Xs such that Ksiysi^NXs) ^ -KsC1) and 
Ks(ys,XN\s) Φ -ft"s(z)- However, since Ks{x) > (^(OiieS) this would imply that 
ys = 2/s G -^s- Contradiction. D 
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Now we show that, for a superadditive (and standard) NTU-game V, imputations 
of V can be implemented by means of payoff undominated equilibria for the strategic 
claim game Г( ) (or ГГ( ), cf. lemma 9.2). 
T H E O R E M 9.3. Let V € NTUN be standard and Г( ) = № , . . . ,ΛΓ,,,ΑΊ,... ,Α^) . 
Then the following two assertions hold. 
(i) For all α 6 I(V) there is an ζ € E(T(V)) such that KN(X) = a. 
(ii) If V is superadditive, then a G I(V) if and only if there is an χ € PUE(T(V)) with 
А'дг(аг) = α. 
Proof, (i) Let a 6 I (V) . Define χ := (JV,a,) j
e W G XN- Clearly, KN(X) = a-
Suppose χ & Е(Г( )). Then there is a player ι £ N and a strategy y, = (S,,i,) € X, 
such that v(i) < a, < К,(у„х^\^) = t,. 
Hence, S, = N and Ь : = (ii,{aj)j€N\{t)) 6 V(N). However, this contradicts the fact 
that o e U(V(N)) because b > a and b φ а. 
(ii) Let V be superadditive. First assume α € I(V). For χ := (Ν,α^-,ζΝ we have that 
KN(x) = α and χ 6 E(T(V)) (cf. (i)). Suppose χ <¿ PUE(T(V)). Then there exists a 
strategy vector y £ XN such that KNÍV) > KN(X) and KNÍV) Φ KN(X). According to 
(8.5), we can find a partition {N{1), N(2),..., .W(r)} of N such that 
Г 
KN(V) e Π W * ) ) c у ( ^ ) ' 
by superadditivity of V. However, this would imply that а = К^(х) g U(V(N)). 
Conversely, let χ £ PUE(r(V)) and define α := KN(X)- Trivially о > (v(i))ì£N. 
Superadditivity and (8.5) imply that α € V(N). It remains to prove that α is undom­
inated in V(N). Suppose we can find a vector b e V(JV) with b > α and b φ α. Then, 
defining у : = (Ν, 6,),g/y € XN, it is found that A'jv(y) = b > α = KN(X). Since 6 φ а, 
this contradicts the fact that χ is payoff undominated. D 
For a superadditive (and standard) NTU-gaxne V, strong core elements of V can 
be implemented by means of strong Nash equilibria for the strategic claim game Г( Г ) . 
This is seen in 
T H E O R E M 9.4. Let V e NTUN be standard and Г( ) = ( Λ Ί , . . . , Χ „ , Α Ί , . . . , Λ ' „ ) . 
Then the following two assertions hold. 
(i) For all α e SC(V) there is an χ G 8Е(Г( )) such that KN(x) = a. 
(ii) If V is superadditive, then α G SC(V) if and only if there is an a; G SE(T(V)) such 
that KN(X) = a-
4S 
Proof. We only prove (i). For the remaining part of (ii) one can use a similar line of 
argument as in the corresponding part of the proof of theorem 9.3(ii). 
Let a € SC(V). Defining χ = (Ν,α})}ζΝ e A'jv, we have KN(X) = a. 
Suppose ι ^ SE(r(V)). Then there exists a coalition S, a player i € S and a strategy 
vector ys = ( 5 7 , ί , ) 7 Ε 5 e A's such that 
(v(j))jes < as < Ks(ys,XN\s) = ¿s and a, < t,. 
Hence, 5, 6 - ί ^ , χ , ^ ) and |5 , | > 2. If S, С S, then (8.5) implies that 
V^S,) Э Ks,{ys,XN\s) = *S. > as. · 
Otherwise, (N\S) П S, φ 0 which implies that S, = N and 
V(N) Э KN(ys,XN\s) = (ts,aN\s) > a 
However, since t, > a,, both cases contradict the fact that a e SC(V). D 
In particular, for bargaining games, theorem 9.4 implies that the Nash bargaining 
solution (Nash (1950)), which by definition is a strong core element, corresponds to a 
payoff vector attained by a (strong) Nash equilibrium for a (claim) game in strategic 
form. 
Now we illustrate that core elements can not be implemented in the same way as 
imputations and strong core elements. The superadditive two-person NTU-game of 
example 9.1 has core elements that do not correspond to any payoff vector attained by 
a Nash equilibrium for the corresponding claim game. 
E X A M P L E 9.1. Let the two-person NTU-gaxne V be given by 
V({1}) = V({2}) = (-σο, 0] and V({1,2}) = {(a, b) e R2 | a < 4, & < 4 and α + b < 5} 
Clearly, V is superadditive, 
I(V) = SC(V) = {(α,δ) € R2 | о + 6 = 5,a > 1,6 > 1} 
and 
C(V) = SC(V) U {(α, 6) £ R2 Ι α = 4,0 < b < 1} U {(α, b) £ R2 | δ = 4,0 < α < 1}. 
There axe three types of Nash equilibria for Γ( V). In the first type of equilibrium, both 
players want the grand coalition to form and claim a payoff of at least one. Moreover, 
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t h e sum of the payoff claims must equal five. In the second type of equilibrium, at least 
one of the players claims a payoff which is strictly higher than five. Finally, in the third 
type of equilibrium, both players want to stay on their own and claim the individual 
rational payoff of zero. Note that all equilibria of the last two types induce a payoff 
vector of (0,0). 
Hence, e.g. the core element (0,4) of V is not attained as a payoff vector of any Nash 
equilibrium for T(V). 
Finally we note that , by using appropriate definitions, all results in this section can 
be extended towards e-(strong) cores, e-(strong) Nash equihbria etc. 
10. C O R R E L A T I O N A N D F I N I T E C L A I M G A M E S 
By applying the correlated Aumann procedure to the strategic claim game Г( ), 
one can associate an NTU-gaxne V to each standard NTU-game V. It is shown that 
the correlated claim associate V is the convex hull of the (coordinated) claim associate 
V. Further, for a special class of NTU-games V, we define finite claim games Г ' ( ) in 
such a way that , by applying the (correlated) Aumann procedure to Г^( ), we again 
obtain V, which was originally derived from the infinite claim game Г( ^). 
Following Aumann (1961, 1967) and allowing the players to correlate their actions, 
we construct NTU-games Ar and Br to each strategic game Γ in the following way. 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let Γ = (X1,...,Xn,Ku...,Kn) 6 SGN. For S С Ν, the set C s of 
correlated »trategies for S in Γ is defined by 
C s :=< ¿ XkS(xs) I r € N, ¿ Xk = 1, λ* > 0 and xks e A's for all к e {1,2,. . . , г} 
\k=l fc=l 
where, for each i s G -Xs, f>(xs) represents the probability measure on Xs which assigns 
probability one to xs- So correlated strategies for 5 correspond to probability mea­
sures on Xs with finite support. Allowing correlated strategies, the payoff functions 
Ki,i € І , axe extended in the following way. For 5 С TV, cs = Σ ί = ι ^ t ¿ (xs ) € C s and 
c w \ s = Σ / = ι /^(Zjvxs) e cN\s, we define 
г s 
Ks(cs, cNS¡s) = Σ Σ bkPiKsixs, xN\s)-
k=l 1=1 
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Further, Ar, Br E NTUN are given by 
Är(S) := {α G R s I 3is€csVewx,ecWXJ : Ks{às, cN\s) > a} (10.1) 
and 
Br(S) := {a € R5 | V e ^ e 6 c w v e 3 e e e c . : ^ s ( 2 S , cN V S) > a} (10.2) 
for all 5 € 2N\{<0}. 
L E M M A lo.i . Let Γ e S G ^ . Then the following three assertions hold. 
(i) i
r
( S ) and B
r
(S) are convex for all S e 2ЛГ\{0}. 
(ii) Ar and Br are superadditive, Ar С Br. 
(ïü) Ar С i r , Вг С Br. 
Proof. For a proof of (i) and (ii) we refer to Aumann (1961) and Abdou (1989). 
(iii) We only prove that Аг С ÄT. Let Г = ( Л "
ь
 . . . ,Х
п
, К
и
... ,К
п
) and S € 2 ^ \ { 0 } . 
Take α e Ar(S). Choose i s G Xs С C s such that Ks(xsi xN\s) ^ α for all 
xJV\s 6 XN\S· Let c N \ s = Σ)ϊ=ι ^ t í ( i w\s) ^ CN\S be an arbitrary correlated strategy 
vector for JV\S. Then 
г г 
Ks(xs, CN\S) = 5 3 ^kKs(xs, XN\S) > 5 3 λ
Λ
α = a. 
it=i t = i 
Hence, a € Âr (S ) . D 
Using the same arguments as in the proof of lemma 8.2, one can show that strategic 
claim games are tight in the sense that for these games (10.1) and (10.2) yield the same 
.NTi7-game. 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let V e NTUN be standard. Then the correlated claim associate 
V G NTUN corresponding to V is defined by V = Ar(v) (= -Bi^v))· 
The correlated claim associate V is the convex hull of the coordinated claim asso-
ciate V. This is seen in 
T H E O R E M 10.2. Let V G NTUN be s tandard. 
Then V{S) = Conv(7(5) ) for all S G 2 N \ { 0 } . 
Proof. Let S G 2 N \ { 0 } . Using lemma 10.1 (iii), we have that V^S) С V(S). So, by 
convexity of V(S), Conv(F(5)) С V(S). 
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Conversely, let α e V(S). Define W € NTUN by W := Соп (У). Then W is 
superadditive because V is, and W({i}) = F({¿}) = ({г}) for ali i E N. Fur­
ther, since V С W, we have that V С W. Hence, α e W(S) and therefore, with 
r ( W ) = (Χι,...,Χ
η
,Κ1,...,Κη), there exists a correlated strategy vector 
e s = Σ ί
=
ι Ьк6(х§) such that 
α < Ks(cs,({j},v(j))jçN\S) 
Γ 
= 5>*ад*1,(0'},»0')),е*\5) e Соп (Щ5)) = w(S), 
because the superadditivity of W and (8.5) imply that KS(XSÌ (.{J}iv(J))]€N\s) € ^ ( 5 ) 
for all к e {1 ,2 , . . . , r } . Consequently, α 6 W(S) = Conv(V(5)). D 
In particular, theorem 10.2 implies that all (standard and) superadditive NTU-
games with convex sets of attainable payoff vectors for all coahtions, arise from games 
in strategic form by means of the correlated Aumann procedure. 
Further it may be noted tha t , by defining the restricted claim associate Vr by 
Vr := А
Г
г
і ), we have that V
r(S) = Compr({a e V(S) \ a > (t)(i)) i 6 s}) for all 
S G 2 W \{0} (cf. theorem 8.7). 
Now we introduce the class of finitely generated iVTi7-games and define corre­
sponding finite claim games. 
D E F I N I T I O N . A game V S NTUN is called finitely generated if, for all 5 e 2 N \{0}, 
V(S) is convex, 1 < |Ext(V(S)) | < oo and 
V(S) = Compr( Coiiv(Ext(V(5)))). 
Note that each finitely generated NTU-game is standard. 
Let V € NTUN be finitely generated and T(V) = (Xu... ,Xn, Α Ί , . . . , Kn). The finite 
claim дате Г ' ( ) corresponding to V is given by Г ' ( ) = (X{,... ,Χ^,Κι,..., K
n
) 
where, for each i € Ν, 
Χ { := ( J {(5, t)\t = α,· for some α e Ext(V(S))} (10.3) 
8€2г'\{І}:5Эг 
and the payoff function K, is restricted to Jfjy С ΧΝ· 
For a finitely generated NTU-gaxne V, the correlated Aumann procedure constructs 
the same •ATTÍZ-game to both the finite claim game Γ ' ( V) and the (infinite) claim game 
Г(У). This is seen in 
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T H E O R E M 10.3. Let V e NTUN be finitely generated. Then V = Ár(V) = ^r / (V) · 
Proof. Let Г( ) = (Xy X
n
, Κ
λ
,..., A'„) and define W := Âr/(V) 6 NTUN. 
(a) First we prove that V С W. Let S e 2N\{0} and take o e V(S). Since У is finitely 
generated, we can choose b € Conv(Ext(V(S))) such that b > a. It suffices to show that 
b G W(S). 
Let b = £ ; = 1 Afcòfc(5) with г € Ν, ΣΙ-=ι λ* = 1, At > 0 and bk(S) e Ext (V(5)) for all 
к e {1,2,. . . , г}. Defining the correlated strategy vector cs for 5 in Г ' ( V) by 
г 
as:=^Afcí((S,6f(S))l6S), 
k=l 
it is found that Ks{cs, CN\S) — b for all correlated strategy vectors c # \ s for the 
coalition JV\S. Hence, & G W(S). 
(b) Secondly we prove that V С W. Since W is superadditive and V С W, theorem 
8.4 implies that V С W. Hence, using theorem 10.2 and the convexity of 1^(5) for all 
S G 2 Ν \{0}, we have that V = ConvCK) с W. 
(c) Finally we prove that W С V. Let S G 2N\{0} and take α G W ( S ) . 
Then we can find a correlated strategy vector cs = Σ ί = ι ^ib^( xs) ^ o r $ ' n ^^(^) 8 и с ^ 
that 
г 
α < Ks{cs,({j},v{J))}eN\s) = ^2^kKs(xs,({J}^(j))jeN\s)· 
k=l 
Farther, using expression (8.5), corollary 8.5 and theorem 10.2, we have that 
г 
]r>7t ' s(4,({JMJ)W\s) € Conv(ñS)) = V(S). 
t = l 
Combining these facts, it is found that a G V(S). D 
E X A M P L E ю л . Consider the two-person NTU—game V of example 8.2. Clearly, V is 
finitely generated, V({i}) = V({i}) = V({i}) for all ¿ G {1,2} and 
V r({l,2}) = {(a,6) GR2 I a < 4 , 6 < 4 , a + 2 & < 9 a n d 2 a + & < 9 } , 
as represented in figure 10.1. 
53 
FIGURE 10.1. 
— : boundary of V({1,2}) 
: boundary of V({ 1,2}) 
. . . . : boundary of ^({1,2}) 
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III. B I M A T R I X G A M E S 
In this chapter we concentrate on the class of bimatrix games: non-cooperative two-
person games in strategic form with a finite number of pure stategies for each player. 
In example 1.1/1.2 in chapter I we have already discussed some games of this type. 
Formally, an m χ η bimatrix game (А, В) is defined as a two-person game 
(A
m
,A
n
,K,L) in strategic form with mixed strategy spaces Am and Δ
η
, and pay­
off functions К : A
m
 χ Δ „ -+ R and L : A
m
 χ Δ
η
 —> R, with K(p, q) = pAq and 
LÌPIQ) = pBq for all (p,q) g Δ,,, χ Δ „ . The strategies ei e Δ „ ( Δ „ ) are called рите 
and correspond to choosing rows (columns) in the payoff matrices A and B. Strategies 
ρ £ A
m
{q £ Δ „ ) are called completely mixed. 
A Nash equilibrium (p, q) £ A
m
 χ Δη for (A, B) is such that 
pAq > pAq and pBq > pBq for all (p, 5) € A m χ Δ
η
. 
Nash (1951) showed that each bimatrix game has at least one Nash equilibrium. 
This chapter considers various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. In 
the sections 11-15 we focus on the geometric combinatorial approach (in short the GC-
approach) of Borm, Gijsberts and Tijs (1988), to analyze refinements for 2 χ η bimatrix 
games. Although the class of 2 Χ η bimatrix games is a 'small' class of games, it is 
a rather important class in the sense that many examples in non-cooperative equilib­
rium theory lie within this class. In this context the study of 2 χ η bimatrix games 
is worthwhile and the GG-approach offers a useful tool to determine various types of 
refinements in a systematic way. This leads to a better understanding of the special fea­
tures of many examples encountered in the literature, and of the relationships between 
the various refinements. 
The second part of this chapter (the sections 16-18) investigates the structure of sets of 
refinements for general bimatrix games. In particular, it will be shown that the structure 
of the set of perfect equilibria resembles the structure of the set of Nash equilibria. 
The last part of this chapter (the sections 19-20) addresses the construction problem 
for 2 χ η bimatrix games with respect to Nash equilibria. An algorithm is provided to 
decide whether, for a given set S С Δ2 x Δ«, there exists a 2 χ η bimatrix game ( A, B) 
with equilibrium set S. 
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11. THE GC-APPROACH TO 2 Χ 71 BIMATRIX GAMES: NASH EQUILIBRIA 
For matrix games (A, —A) a geometric solution method was provided by Motzktn, 
Raiffa, Thompson and Thrall (1953): the double description method. This method 
can be easily visualized for 2 χ η matrix games. Another geometric solution method 
for matrix games was suggested by von Neumann (cf. von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944)), and was used by Karlin (1959) to provide a new proof of the minimax theorem. 
For bimatrix games there exists a useful geometric representation for 2 x 2 and 2 x 3 
games that relies on the best reply structure of a game. This method has been worked 
out by Vorobev (1977), and is used in Borm (1987a) to give a systematic classification 
of all 2 x 2 bimatrix games. Further, Shapley (1974) discusses a geometric application 
of the Lemke-Howson algorithm (cf. Lemke-Howson (1964)) to find a Nash equilibrium 
(but possibly not all) for a 'nondegenerate' bimatrix game. 
The GC-approach to 2 Χ η bimatrix games establishes a generalization of the dou­
ble description method, in the sense that it extends the geometric appUcations of that 
method for 2 χ η matrix games towards 2 χ η bimatrix games. Further, this section 
shows that the GC-approach offers a systematical way to determine all Nash equilibria 
for any 2 x η bimatrix game. 
Let BG(m.,n) denote the set of all m χ η bimatrix games. Let (A,B) G BG{m,n). 
For ρ € Д
т
, we define the carrier C(p) := {г G {1,2, . . . , m} | ρ, > 0}, the set 
РВг{р) := {j G {1,2, . . . , η} \ pBe, > pBe, for all s G {1,2, . . . , гг} } of pure best replies 
of player 2 to p, and the set I ^ C P ) : = Соп {е ; G Δ η | j G Ρί?2(ρ)} of best replies to p. 
For q G Δ
η
, the sets C(q).tPBi(q) and ^1(5) are defined analogously. 
Having these definitions, it is clear the the set E(A, B) of Nash equilibria for (A, B) 
consists of those strategy pairs (p, q) G A
m
 χ Δ
η
 with ρ G B^q) and q G ^ ( p ) or, 
equivalently, with C(p) С PBi{q) and C(q) С РВгСр)· 
Let (A, B) G B G ( 2 , n ) . Let g : Δ2 —> R be defined by g(p) : = maocjg^^, . . i n }pßej 
for all ρ G Δ2. 
Obviously, g is a piecewise linear function: there exists a minimal number ι^  + 1(< n + l ) 
of strategies 
e a = p ( 0 ) , p ( l ) , p ( 2 ) , . . . , p ( i / ) = e i l 
such that g is affine on [p(fc — l),p(fc)] for all к G {1,2,. . . , ν}. Note that g exactly de­
scribes the best reply structure for player 2, and that, for all completely mixed strategies 
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ρ1
, ρ
2
 with ρ 1 φ ρ2, we have РВг(рх) = ΡΒ2(ρ2) if aad only if there is а к e {1,2,..., и} 
such that ρ 1 ,ρ 2 e (p(k - l),p(fc)). 
Further, in geometrie representations, a pure strategy Cj £ Δ
η
 will be provided 
with a label [1] if РВі(е ; ) = {!}, with a label [2] if PB^e,) = {2} and with a label [12] 
i fPB 1 (e,) = {l,2}. 
Let /([I]) := {j £ {l,2,...,n} | PB^Cj) = {1}} represent the set of (indices of) pure 
strategies of player 2 with label [1]. The sets I([2]) and /([12]) are defined analogously. 
Finally, for Jfc e {1,2,..., ν], let І
к
 := Р Я г ^ р ^ - 1) + %p(k)) denote the set of pure 
best replies to any strategy in (p(fc — l),p(fc)). 
EXAMPLE i i . i . Let the 2 x 6 bimatrix game (A, B) be given by 
{A,B) = (2,0) (0,6) (0,8) (0,6) (3,8) (-1,3) (0,8) (0,6) (1,0) (2,6) (1,-8) (0,7) J 
Identifying a strategy (p, 1 -p) £ Δ2 with ρ e [0,1], the GC-approach uses the geometric 
representation in figure 11.1 (the subindices of the labels indicate the corresponding pure 
strategies). 
FIGURE 11.1. 
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It is found that ν = 3, 
ί>(0) = e 2 , p ( l ) = i e j + f e 2 , p(2) = f d + ¿e2 ,p(3) = e i 
/ i = { l } , / 2 = {2 )4}, 7з = {3} 
while e.g. J([l]) = {1,5} and P B ^ e j + f e 2 ) = {1,2,4,6}. 
Let {Α, Β) E BG(2,n) and let ρ G Δ 2 be a strategy for player 1. The set S(p) of 
solutions (for player 2) to ρ is defined by 
S(p):={qeAn\(p,q)eE(A,B)} (11.1) 
It is straightforward to show that the set of solutions is a bounded polyhedral set and 
hence a polytope. So, using the Krein-Milman theorem, S(p) is the convex hull of its 
finitely many extreme points. 
Defining the set PS(p) of pure solutions to ρ by 
PS(p) := {ej € Δ „ I (ρ, e;) e E(At В)}, (11.2) 
it readily follows that P S ( p ) С E x t ^ f c ) ) , and that 
f {ej 6 Δ
η
 | j € PB2(p, [12])} if ρ G Δ 2 
PS(p) = { {ej € Δ „ I j € PB2(p, [1]) U P S 2 ( p , [12])} if ρ = e, 
{ {e,- e Δ
η
 I j G P B 2 ( p , [2]) U P ß 2 ( p , [12])} if ρ = e 2 
where P B 2 ( p , [12]) : = Р Я 2 ( р ) Π /([12]) denotes the set of pure best replies to ρ having 
label [12]; P P 2 ( p , [1]) and P.B 2(p, [2]) are defined in a similar way. 
However, pure solutions need not be the only extreme points of the set of all 
solutions. It is straightforward to show 
L E M M A i i . i . Let (A, B ) G BG(2, η) with A = [α
Γ
*]?=ι ?=ι· L e t i G /([!]) and j G /([2]). 
Then there exists a unique (i,j)-coordina,tion strategy ^(i, j) G Δ
η
 such that 
C(q(i,j)) = {i,j} and dAqiiJ) = e 2 J 4 5 ( i , j ) . 
In particular, g,(t, i) = τ "47?l' r and q,(i,j) = τ "'{Г/"8' r • 
Having this lemma, one can define the set CS(j>) of coordination solutions to ρ by 
CS(p) : = {q(i,j) G Δ „ I i G P f ^ P , [1]), J £ P B 2 ( p , [2])}. (11.3) 
Obviously, CS(p) С Ext(5(p)) . Moreover, each extreme point of the solution set 5(p) 
is either a pure solution or a coordination solution. This is seen in 
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T H E O R E M 11.2. Let ( Л , В ) € BG(2,n). Then, for all ρ € Дг, 
Ext(S(p)) = P S ( p ) U CS(p) . ( П - 4 ) 
Proof. Let ρ e Δ2. We only have to prove that Ext(S(p)) С ( P S ( p ) U CS(p)). 
For this, it suffices to show that 
q € Ext(S(p)) = > \C(q)\ < 2. (11.5) 
Suppose q € Ext(5(p)) is such that |C(g)| > 3. Then we can find a strategy g1 € S(p) 
such that C(q1) ^ C(q) and eiAq1 = tyAq1 in the following way. 
If there is a t e C(q) Π Д[12]), we can choose 91 = e ( . If there are г e C(q) Π / ( [1]) a n d 
j € C{q)r\I{[2)), we can choose q1 - q(i,j). Otherwise, if C(q) С J([l]) or C{q) С /( [2]) , 
we have that ρ = e\ or ρ = ез, and g € Conv(PS(p)) . However, this contradic ts t h e 
fact that q E Ext(5(p)). 
Fixing q1, let a := max{a € (0,1) | aq1 < q). Note that a is well-defined because t h e r e 
is a j G C(q) with g] > Çj. 
Obviously, q — äq1 + (1 — 3)ç2 , where q2 := (1 — а ) - 1 ( д — а д 1 ) 6 Δ
η
. 
Note that q2 G 5(p) because 
C(q2) С C(q) С Р Л 2 ( р ) and C(p) С P B J Í Í ) = P ß i ( g 2 ) , 
where the equality foüows from the fact that e1i4g1 = 63Ад1. However, since g1 φ q2 -, 
this contradicts the fact that g G Ext(5(p)) . D 
It may be noted that a generalization of (11.5) towards general m χ η bimatrix 
games is well-known. However, for 2 χ η bimatrix games we wanted to provide a new 
proof, based on the GC-approach. 
Using the geometric representation illustrated in example 11.1, theorem 11.2 enables us 
to determine the set of Nash equilibria for any 2 χ η bimatrix game in finitely many 
(< 2i/ + 1) steps, since it is clear that ^ ( p 1 ) = S(p 2 ) for all p 1 , ? 2 G (p(fc — l),p(fc)) and 
fc € { 1 , 2 , . . . , v\. These considerations are reflected in 
T H E O R E M i i . s . Let ( J 4 , P ) e BG(2,n). Then E(A, B) is the union of finitely many 
polytopes Γ of the following form: either 
(a) there exists a к € { 1 , 2 , . . . , и} such that Τ = [p(Jfc - l),p(fc)] x 5( ip(Jt - 1) + §p(fc)) 
or 
(b) there exists a Jfc £ { 0 , 1 , . . . , v) such that Τ = {p(Jfc)} X S(p(Jfc)). 
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E X A M P L E 11.2. For the 2 x 6 bimatrix game (Α,Β) of example 11.1 it is found that 
E(A, B) = T1 U Τ2 U Τ 3 , where 
Τ
1
 = { Ь + fe 2 } χ C o n v { e 2 , g ( M ) , g ( l , 6 ) } 
= U e 1 + f e 2 } x C o n v { e 2 , ( l 1 0 , 0 , | , 0 , 0 ) , ( i ) 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , | ) } > 
2 , 2 = [ } e , + f e 2 , f e 1 + } e 2 ] x { e 2 } 
a n d 
T 3 = {ei} x Conv{e5,9(5,3)} = { e ^ χ Convfes^O.O, f ,0 ,1,0)} 
A further consequence of theorem 11.1 is 
T H E O R E M 11.4. Let {Α,Β) e BG{2,n) be such t h a t \E{A,B)\ < oo. Then 
|£;(A,B)|<{n + 1 ^ " І 5 е ^ п (η if η is odd 
Proof. Let ρ e Δ 2 be such that S(p) φ 0. Since \E(A,B)\ < oo, we have that \S(p)\ = 1 
and ρ e {ρ(0),ρ(1),. . . ,p{v)}. Consequently, \E{A,B)\ <v + l<n + l. 
Assume \E(A,B)\ = η + 1. Then ι/ = η and |Д | = 1 for all к e {1 ,2, . . . ,η} . So 
J([12]) = 0 and, letting Ik = {ik} for all Jb e {1,2,... ,n}, the labels [1] and [2] should 
alternate in the following way: 
ή e /([2]), i2 e /([i]),...,¿„., e /([2]),ι» e J([i]). 
This implies that η is even. D 
12. QUASI-STRONG EQUILIBRIA 
Quasi-strong equilibria were introduced by Hananyi (1973). For bimatrix games, 
a strategy pair (p,q) is called quasi-strong if C(p) = PBi(q) and C(q) = PB^p). 
By QS(A, B) we denote the set of all quasi-strong equilibria for (A, B). It is still an 
open question whether each bimatrix game has at least one quasi-strong equilibrium. 
This section shows that QS(A, B) is non-empty for each 2 Χ η bimatrix game (A, B). 
This result is based on 
T H E O R E M 12.1. Let {Α,Β) e BG(2,n) and {p,q) € Δ2 x Δ
η
. Then (p,g) e QS(A,B) 
if and only if the following two assertions hold: 
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(i) If ρ G Δ2, then either PB2(p) С /([12]) or both PBiip, [1]) ^ 0 and Р Л 2 ( р , [2]) / 0. 
If ρ = e j , then РВІІР, [1]) ^ 0, and, if ρ = сг, then РВгСр, [2]) ^ 0. 
(ii) q € Relint(5(p)). 
The proof of this theorem is given at the end of this section. Note that condition 
(i) provides a necessary and sufficient condition to decide whether, for a given strategy 
ρ £ Δ2, there exists a strategy q Ç A„ such that (p, q) is quasi-strong: if (i) is satisfied, 
then S(p) φ 0 (cf. theorem 11.2) and hence, Relint(5(p)) φ 0. 
A direct consequence of theorem 12.1 is 
T H E O R E M 12.2. Let (A, £ ) € BG(2 ,n) . Then QS{A, B) is the union of finitely many 
convex sets Q of the following form: either 
(a) there exists а к g {1,2,.. ., ν} such that 
Q = (p(fc - 1),ρ(*0) χ Itelint(S(ìp(fc - 1) + ip(fc))) 
or 
(b) there exists a к ζ {0,1,...,ι/} such that Q = {p(k)}x Relint(S(p(fc))). 
This result is illustrated in 
E X A M P L E 12.1. For the 2 x 6 bimatrix game (A,B) of example 11.1 it is found that 
QS(A, B) = Q 1 U Q 2 U Q 3 , where 
3 
Q1 ={Іеі + |е2}х{аіс(1,4)+а2с(1,6)-І-азе2еД6 1 ^ ^ = !, 
ι = 1 
α,- >0for alii e {1,2,3}} 
е
2
 = (Іе 1 + | е 2 , | е 1 + і е 2 ) х { е 2 } 
and 
Q3 = {ei} x { a i g ( 5 , 3 ) + a 2 e 5 € Δβ | a i + a 2 = 1, a j > 0, a 2 > 0}. 
Existence of quasi-strong equilibria for 2 Χ η bimatrix games is shown in 
T H E O R E M 12.3. Each 2 χ η bimatrix game has at least one quasi-strong equilibrium. 
Proof. Suppose (A, B) £ 5(7(2, n) is such that QS(A, B) = 0. Then, using thereom 
12.1, we have that /j Π /([2]) = 0, /„ Π 7([1]) = 0 and, for all к e {1,2, . . . , и}, 
h Π /([!]) φ 0 or h Π /([2]) φ 0. 
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Hence, и > 1 and there is an I € {Ι, ., . , ι/ — 1} such that ƒ; Π /([!]) Φ 0 and 
J , + 1 Π /([2]) φ 0. So, in particular, Р Б 2 ( р ( / ) , [1]) ^ 0 and PB2(p(l), [2]) ^ 0. 
However, this would imply that S(p(l)) φ 0 and that (p(0,g) ε Q'S'C-AJ-Ö) for e a c h 
9 £ Relint(S(p(/))). Contradiction. D 
Lemma 12.4 below describes the relative interior of a solution set which plays a 
role in the characterization of quasi-strong equilibria as given in theorem 12.1. 
Here, we use the following notation. For 5 С Δ„, the corner C7(S) of S is defined by 
C ( 5 ) = U g e s Cfo). 
L E M M A 12.4. Let (A,B) e BG(2,n) and ρ G Δ2. For q e 5(p) we have that 
9 S Relint(5(p)) if and only if the following two assertions hold: 
(i) C(g) = C(5(p)) 
(ii) If ρ = ei and Ρ Β 2 ( β ι , [1]) ^ 0, then PBi(g) = {1}. 
If ρ = e 2 and P B 2 ( e a , [ 2 ] ) φ 0, then P B I ( Í ) = {2}. 
Proof, (a) Let q € Relint(5(p)). We show that C{q) = C(5(p)) . 
Take 9' G S(p) with 9' / 9. Since 9 6 Relint(S(p)), there are 9" e S(p) and λ € (0,1) 
such that 9 = Ag' + (1 - A y . Hence, £(9 ' ) С C(g) and C(S(p)) = C{q). 
(b) Let 9 € Relint í^íej)) and assume P B ^ C i J l ] ) 7^  0. We show that P ß i ( 9 ) = {1}. 
Suppose not. T h e n P B i ( 9 ) = {1,2}. Take г e P B 2 ( e i , [ l ] ) . Defining 9(ε) : = g + e ^ - e . ) 
for ε > 0, we have that 9(ε) e S{t\) for small ε, since 9 6 Relmt(S(e 1 )) ,e , e ¿"(ei) and 
9 φ e¿. However, this contradicts the fact that for all ε > 0, 
ε 1 ^ 9 ( ε ) — e 2A9(e) = г ^ Л е , — ejAe.) < 0. 
Similarly one can show that 9 e Relint(5(e 2)) and PS 2 (e2,[2]) φ 0 imply that 
P S 1 ( 9 ) = {2}. 
(c) Assume ρ € Δ 2 or, ρ = Cj and P S 2 ( e i , [ l ] ) = 0, or ρ = e 2 and P52(e2,[2]) = 0. 
Let 9 e 5(p) be such that C{q) = C(5(p)) . We show that 9 € Relint(S(p)). 
Take g' e S(p) with 9' ^ 9. We are finished if we can find g" € 5(p) and λ € (0,1) such 
that 9 = Ag' + (1 - A)g". 
Since C(g') С C^g) we can define λ : = max{a S (0,1) | ag ' < g}. 
Clearly, with g" : = (1 - À)-1(g - Ag') e Δ„ we have that g = Ag' + (1 - A)g". 
Further, g" G S(p) because 
C(g") С C(g) С P ß 2 ( p ) and C(p) С {1,2} = P B i ( g " ) , 
where the equality folows from the fact that PBi(q) = PBi(q') = {1,2}. 
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(d) Assume Р Б 2 ( е
ь
 [1]) φ 0. Let q G S(ei) be such that C{q) = CiSfa)) and 
PBiiq) = {1}. We show that q € Relint(S(ei)). 
Proceeding as in (c), take q' € 5(6!) , q' φ q, and define λ : = max{a G (0,1) | aq' < q}. 
Since ei Aq > e<iAq we can choose μ G (0, λ] such that q" := (1—μ)~1^ — μ^) G Δ
η
 and 
eiAq" > ег-Ад". It is straightforward to show that q = μq' + (1 — μ)q" and q" G S(e i) . 
Similarly, if РВгСег, [2]) φ 0, one can show that q G Relint(S(e2)) for all q G S ^ ) with 
C(q) = C ( S ( e 2 ) ) and PB^q) = {2}. D 
Proof of theorem 12.1. 
Let Α = [ α „ ] »
= 1 : = 1 . 
(a) Assume ρ G Аг- First, let g G Δ
η
 be such that (ρ,q) G QS(A,B). Suppose (i) does 
not hold. Then, without loss of generality, P-^fa , [1]) φ 0 and РВгСр, [2]) = 0. So, 
e1Aq-e2Aq= ^ (a l f c - a2k)qk 
kecd) 
= ^ ( α ι * - a2it)5* = ¿ Ζ ( a n t - a 2 i t ) 9 t > 0 
fcePß5(p) fcePB,(p,[i]) 
However, this contradicts the fact that ρ G Bi(q). Now suppose q £ Relint(S'(p)). Then, 
however, using lemma 12.4, C(q) ^ C(S(p)) С РВгір). 
Conversely, let (i) be satisfied and take q G Relmt(S(p)). 
Obviously, C(p) = {1,2} = PB^q). Further, C(q) = C(S(p)) = PB2(p), where the 
first equality follows from lemma 12.4 and the second equality from (i) and theorem 
11.2. Hence, (p, q) is quasi-strong. 
(b) Assume ρ = ei (the case ρ = е^ can be treated similarly). First, let q G Δ
η
 be such 
that ( е і , 9 ) Е < Э 5 ( Л , В ) . 
Suppose (i) does not hold. Then, P B j i e i J l ] ) = 0 and С(е{) = {1} φ {1,2} = PB^q). 
Suppose q £ Relint(S(ei)). Then, using lemma 12.4, either C(ç) ^ C{S{ei)) or 
PBy(q) = {1,2}. Both cases contradict the fact that (ei ,g) is quasi-strong. 
Conversely, let (i) be satisfied and let q G Relint(S(ei)). Then, using lemma 12.4 
and theorem 11.2, С ^ ) = {1} = PB^q) and C(q) = C(S(e i ) ) = P ^ e i ) . Hence, 
(e i ,ç) is quasi-strong. D 
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13. PERFECT AND PROPER EQUILIBRIA 
In this section we concentrate on perfect and proper equilibria. For a 2 χ η bimatrix 
game, the undominated strategies of both players are characterized and it is shown that 
the proper equilibria can be determined by means of the perfect equilibria for the game 
one obtains by deleting all pure strategies of player 2 to which player 1 is indifferent. 
These results enable us to understand the remarkable features of an example of гіап 
Damme (1987b), concerning the 'position' of proper equilibria within the set of perfect 
equilibria. 
D E F I N I T I O N . (Selten (1975)). Let (A, B) € BG(m, n). A strategy pair (p, q) e Am χ Δ
η 
is called perfect if there are sequences {(pfc)9':)}ibeN С A m χ Δ „ converging to (p,q) 
and {ε*}*6Ν of positive reals converging to zero, such that (p , q ) is ek-perfect for all 
к € Ν, i.e. 
pkBe} < p
kBe, = > q) < e* {i, s e {1,2,... ,η}) 
e,Aqk < e
r
Aqk = > pf < ε* (»> 6 {1,2,.. . ,m}) 
Selten (1975) showed that perfect strategy pairs are Nash equilibria, and that the 
set PE(A, B) of perfect equilibria is non-empty. Further, Selten indicated that the 
definition of perfect equilibria can be interpreted in terms of 'mistakes': perfect equi­
libria can 'remain' if the players put small probabilities on pure strategies that are not 
'optimal'. 
Van Damme (1983, 1987a) proved that perfect equilibria for bimatrix games exactly 
correspond to undominated equilibria, i.e. to Nash equilibria that consist of two undom­
inated strategies. 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let (A,B) € BG(m,n). A strategy p' e Д
т
 is said to dominate ρ € A m 
if 
p'A > pA and p'A φ pA. 
Similarly, a strategy g' Ε Δ
η
 dominates q 6 Δ
η
 if 5 g ' > Bq and i?g' φ Bq. A strategy 
ρ e Д
т
( с € Δ
η
) is called undominated if there is no p ' e A
m
(q' ζ Δ
η
) that dominates 
p(q). By U,(A, B) we denote the set of all undominated strategies of player г 6 {1,2}. 
Lemma 13.1 below provides a straightforward characterization of the undominated 
strategies of both players for 2 χ η bimatrix games. The proof of this lemma is left to 
the reader. 
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L E M M A 13.1. Let {A,В) e BG(2,n). Then 
Пег} i f J ( [ l ] ) í É í a n d I ( [ 2 ] ) = 0 
гіА, В) =<{е2} if J([2]) φ 0 and /([I]) = 0 
Ι Δ ζ otherwise 
and 
U2(A,B)= g Bao») 
This lemma immediately implies 
T H E O R E M 13.2. Let (A,B) E BG(2,n) and (p,g) e Δ2 x Δ
η
. Then (p,q) G ΡΕ(Α,Β) 
if and only if the following three assertions hold: 
(i) If ƒ([!]) ^ 0 and J([2]) = 0, then ρ = e j . If /([2]) ^ 0 and /([I]) = 0, then ρ = e j . 
(ii)
 5 G 5(p) . 
(iii) If ρ = ei , then C ( Î ) С /„. If ρ = ег, then C(9) С /χ. 
E X A M P L E 13.1. For the 2 x 6 bimatrix game (A, B) of example 11.1 it is found that 
U1(A,B) = Δ2, UÌ(A,B) = Conv{e I ,e2,e4,e 6} U Соп {е2,ез,е4} 
and PE(A, B) = T 1 U Г 2 , where 
r
1
= U e 1 + | e 2 } x C Q n v { C 2 , ( l , 0 , 0 , l , 0 , 0 ) , ( ì 1 0 > 0 , 0 , 0 , f ) } , 
T2 = [\el + \e2,\tx + \e2\x{e2}. 
The properness concept is a modification of the perfectness concept in the sense 
that the players are assumed to make mistakes in a rational way: more costly mistakes 
are made with less probability. This idea is reflected in the following 
D E F I N I T I O N . (Муетзоп (1978)). Let (A,B) G BG(m,n). A strategy pair 
(p,q) G Л
т
 χ Δ
η
 is called proper if there are sequences {(p*, g*)}A:eN С A
m
 χ Δ
η 
converging to (p, q) and {ε*}*£Ν of positive reals converging to zero, such that (pk,qk) 
is Sk-proper for all к G Ν, i.e. 
pkBe, < ркВе
а
 = • q* < ekq
k
a
 0 , 5 G {1,2, . . . , η}) (13.1) 
е.Лс* < е
г
 Aqk = » ρ* < е
к
р
к
 (i, г e {1,2,..., m}) (13.2) 
Obviously, proper strategy pairs are perfect equilibria. Myerson (1978) showed that 
the set PR(A, B) of proper equilibria is non-empty. Note that in order to determine 
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proper equilibria, one has to distinguish between (first-) best replies, second-best replies, 
third-best replies etc. For this aim we introduce the following notation. 
Let (A,B) e BG(2,n) a n d p e Δ2. For t e {1,2,. . . ,η},ΡΒ*2(ρ) denotes the set of t-ih 
pure beat replies t o p, i.e. PBl(p) : = PB2{p) and, for t € { 2 , . . . , n } , 
Í - 1 
PB\(p) := {j e { l , 2 , . . . , n } I p S e j = т а х { р В е
к
 | к € {1 ,2 , . . . , n } \ ( J PB'2(p)}} 
Further, РВ*2(р, [1]) : = PB¡(p) П /([ !]); РВ'2(р, [2]) and РВ*2(р, [12]) are defined analo­
gously. 
Theorem 13.3 below shows that proper equilibria for a 2 χ η bimatrix game (A,B) 
depend on perfect equilibria for a 'smaller' game (A, B). 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let (A, B) € BG(2, n) and assume /([12]) ^ { 1 , 2 , . . . , n } . Then the 2 χ ñ 
bimatrix game (A, B) is obtained from (A, B) by deleting all pure strategies e3 € Δ „ 
with j £ /([12]). 
Now we can formulate 
T H E O R E M 13.3. Let (A,B) e BG(2,n) and (p,q) € Δ2 x Δ „ . 
If /([12]) = { l , 2 , . . . , n } , then PR(A,B) = PE(A,B). Otherwise, we have that 
(Pi я) ε PR(A, В) if and only if t h e following three assertions hold: 
(i) There is a q € Δ η such that (p,q) is perfect for (A,B). 
(ii) q e 5 ( P ) . 
(iii) If ρ = ei, then C(q) С I». If ρ = ег, then C(q) С h-
Proof. The proof consists of two parts: in the first part we assume ρ to be completely 
mixed, in the second part to b e pure. 
First, let ρ £ Δ2. Define a t : = |PB^(p) | for all i e {1,2,. . . ,η} and 
τ := max{í 6 { 1 , 2 , . . . ,η}|α« > 0}. 
(a) Assume /([12]) = {1 ,2 , . . . ,η} . Let (p,q) € PE(A,B). We show that (p,q) is 
proper. Let, for к € Ν, 
е
*
:
= Г Г 7 ' Pk:=P ( 1 3 · 3 ) 
к + 1 
and 
r 
qk:=(k(k + I ) " 1 +6(k))q + Y/aT1(k +1)"21 £ e,, (13.4) 
«=1 iePBi(p) 
where 
r 
«(*):=(* + 1 ) " 1 - £ ( * + l)-2f (13.5) 
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is such that Σ"=ι 9* :=: 1· Obviously, (pk,qk) € Δ2 Χ Δ „ . Further, the coefficients are 
chosen in such away that (13.1) is satisfied for large k. Condition (13.2) trivially holds, 
because CiAq' = 62Aq' for all q' € Δ „ . So (pk,qk) is £fc-proper for large k. Hence, 
(p,q)ePR(A,B). 
(b) Assume 7([12]) ^ { l , 2 , . . . , n } . Let {p,q) € PR(A,B). We show that (i), (ii) 
and (iii) are satisfied. The assertions (ii) and (iii) are obvious. Suppose (i) does 
not hold. Then, without loss of generality, there exists a i * € {1,2, . . . , n } such that 
ΡΒί*(ρ,[1]) Φ 0, PBÇ(p,[2]) = 0 and РВ*2(р) С /([12]) for all < € { 1 , 2 , . . . ,f - 1}. In 
particular, choosing г e ΡΒζ (ρ, [1]), we have that pBe, > pBe¡ for all l e ^([2]). 
Take sequences {(р*,д*)}*еи С Аг x Δ „ converging to (ρ,q) and {е*}ке\ of positive 
reals converging to zero, such that (р*,9*) is ejfc-proper for all к £ N. Obviously, if к is 
large enough, then p^Be, > pkBe¡ for all l e /([2]). Let A = [ α „ ] *
= 1 J - j . Condition 
(13.1) implies that, for large Jk, 
eiAqk -e2Aqk = ^ («ι» - α 2ί) ϊ* + Х^ ( α ι ' - e 2l) í* 
'e/([i]) іеД[2]) 
> « , * ( ( а і і - а 2 , ) + е
к
 5 3 ( а н - а г / ) ) > 0 . 
'е/([2]) 
Consequently, using (13.2), рк < e t pf for large fc. However, this would imply that 
ρ = ei . So we may conclude that (i) is satisfied. 
(c) Assume /([12]) ^ {1,2,. ..,n}. Let (i), (ii) and (iii) be satisfied. We show that (p,q) 
is proper. 
Because of (i), there are t* £ {1,2,... ,ra}, i £ ΡΒ*2'(ρ,[1]) and j e P B ^ ( p , [ 2 ] ) with 
P B j ( p ) С J([12]) for all t e {1,. . . ,<* - 1}. For к e Ν, let ε* and pk be as in (13.3), 
and, with 6(k) as in (13.5), 
qk :=(k(k + I)-1 + 6(k))q+ (13.6) 
¿ о г ^ + і г 2 ' ! Σ e'+ Σ «(/.j)+ E «(boj 
<=1 €РВІ(
Р
,[12]) lePÖJlp.ll]) l€PBJ(P.[2]) / 
By construction, (13.1) is satisfied for large fc. Since ejAg* = 62^9* for all к £ Ν, also 
(13.2) holds. So (pk,qk) is e^-proper for large k. Hence, (p, q) £ PR(A,B). 
Secondly, let ρ — ег (the case ρ = ei can be treated in a similar way). 
Choose p* e A 2 such that ( Р В £ ( Р ' ) ) < 6 { 1 , 2 n } = (P^(p')) t€{i ,2, . . . ,n} for all 
P' € (e2,P*]· Define at := |PBJ(p*)| for all ί e {1,2,. . . , n } , and let 
r : = max{t £ {1,2, . . . , η} | at > 0}. 
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(a) Assume /([12]) = {1,2 , . . . ,η} . Let (ег.д) e ΡΕ(Α,Β). To show that (e2,q) is 
proper, the sequences {(pfc,</*)}fceN ^nd {ejt}t6M of (13.3) and (13.4) are appropriate, 
if we change the definition of pk into p* : = - j x ^ + jprfP* for all A: € N. 
(b) Assume /([12]) ^ { l , 2 , . . . , n } . Let (e2,q) e PR(A,B). Since (e2 ,ç) is perfect, (ii) 
and (iii) are satsified (cf. theorem 13.2). Suppose (i) does not hold. 
Then there exists an i e /([1]) such that p*Be, > p*Bei for all / e /([2]). 
However, using a similar line of argument as in (b) in the first part of this proof, this 
would imply that ρ = ei. 
(c) Assume /([12]) / {1,2,.. . , n } . Let (i), (ii) and (iii) be satisfied. We show that 
(e2,q)ePR(A,B). 
Because of (i), there are f € {1,2 η} and j e РВі'(р*, [2]) with PB¡(p) С /([12]) 
f o r a l l í e { 1 , 2 , . . . , * * - 1 } . 
Let, for к € Ν, 
1 ι. fc -f- 1 1 A / . Α β \ 
£
*
:=
гтт' ' ••=ΓΓ2β2 + ττ2ρ ( 1 3 · 7 ) 
and, with 6(к) as in (13.5), 
9* : = ( * ( * + I ) " 1 + S(k)q+ 
¿«¡-'(fc + l)-") Σ e ' + Σ 9(U)) (13.8) 
Note that C(q) С PBzip*)- By construction, (13.1) is satisfied for large k. With respect 
to (13.2) we have that e2Aqk > e1Aqk for all fc € N and 
it 1 . , , 1 „ 1 / * +1 , 1 Л * 
P i =
 jfcT2Pi - m - i n ІІГГ2+ ττ2Ρ2)= £кРг· 
So (p*,^*) is Sfc-proper for large k. Hence, (e2,q) £ PR(A, B). D 
It may be noted that condition (i) of theorem 13.3 provides a necessary and suf­
ficient condition to decide whether, for any given strategy ρ of player 1, there exists 
a strategy q of player 2 such that (p, q) is proper: if /([12]) ^ {1,2,... ,n} and (i) is 
satisfied, then there has to be a solution q to ρ satisfying (iii). 
E X A M P L E 13.2. Let the 2 x 3 bimatrix game (A, B) be given by 
B i _ f ( 2 , 0 ) (0,6) (0,8) ' 
^ ' ^ - [ ( 0 , 8 ) (0,6) (1,0) 
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By deleting the second column, it is found that 
(Ä,B) = (2,0) (0,8) (0,8) (1,0) 
A geometric representation is provided in figure 13.1. As before (p, 1 — p) e Δ2 is 
identified with ρ G [0,1]. 
FIGURE 13.1. 
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Clearly, if (ρ, g) is a (perfect) equilibrium for (A, B), then ρ = ^еі + ^ег. Hence, 
РЯ(Л,В) = [ìex + fe,, fe, + ¿е2] χ {e2) *ndPR(A,B) = {(fa + fa,e2)} . 
This approach enables us to understand the remarkable position of the (unique) proper 
equilibrium within the relative interior of a convex set of perfect equilibria. It is easily 
seen that there can be various (even infinitely many) proper equilibria like this. 
Let the 2 x 5 bimatrix game (Λ ' ,β 1 ) be given by 
(A\B1) = (2.0) (0,6) (0,8) (0,4) (1,6) (0,8) (0,6) (1,0) (1,6) (0,4) 
Using the GC-approach one can verify that 
PEiA^B1) = [fa + fa, fa + fa] χ {e2} and 
PR(A\Bl) = {(fa + fe 2 ,e 2 ),(i e i + fa,e2),(fa + fa,e2)} 
Further, for the 2 x 6 bimatrix game (A2,B2) one obtains from (.Λ1,!?1) by adding a 
sixth column (0,6) 
(1,4) 
, it is found that 
PE(A\B2) = [fa + fa, fa + fa] χ {
e2} 
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and 
PR(A2, В2) = {(¿e , + | e 2 , e2)} U ( [ i e i + Ι
β 2 , f e ! + ì e 2 ] x {e2}). 
E X A M P L E 13.S. For the 2 x 6 bimatrix game (A, B) of example 11.1, it is found that 
Р Л ( Л , В ) = { і е 1 + | е 2 } х С о п { е 2 , ( і , 0 , 0 , і , 0 , 0 ) , ( і , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , | ) } 
14. STABLE SETS 
In this section we concentrate on the set-valued stability concept of Kohlberg and 
Метіетіл (1986) that generalizes the concept of strictly perfect equilibria as introduced 
by Okada (1984). Although Метіепз (1989) reformulated this stability concept, this 
section reserves the term stability for minimal strictly perfect sets. For 2 χ η bimatrix 
games, it is shown that each stable set consists of either one or two (perfect) equilibria, 
and that each stable component contains a proper equilibrium. It may be noted that 
the last result is conjectured by van Damme (1987b) for general bimatrix games. 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let (A, B) 6 BG(m, n). Then ε 1 g Rm and ε 2 e R n are called mistake 
vectors for player 1 and player 2, respectively, if 
m η 
ε
1
 > Ο,ε2 > Ο , ^ ε ' < 1 and £ ε 2 < 1. 
г=1 »=1 
For mistake vectors ε 1 and ε 2 , the (ε 1 , ε 2 ) - perturbed game (Α, Β; ε1, ε2) is defined as 
the strategic game that differs from (A, B) only in the fact that the strategy spaces of 
the players are restricted to Δ^, : = {ρ 6 Д
т
 | ρ > ε 1 } and Δ ^ = {q S Δ
η
 | q > ε2}. 
The following lemma will be used frequently. The proof is straightforward and 
therefore omitted. 
L E M M A 14.1. Let (A,B) £ BG(m,n). 
(i) Let ε 1 € Rm and ε 2 € Rn be mistake vectors and let (p,q) € Δ ^ Χ Δ ^ . Then 
(ρ, q) € E(A, Β; ε1, ε2) if and only if the following two assertions hold: 
(i.l) p
r
 = εί. forali г 6 {1,2, . . . ,m} with г g PB^q). 
(І.2) q, = ε 2 for all 5 g {1,2,. . . ,n} with s <¿ PB2(p). 
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(ii) Let (ρ, g) e Am x Δ
η
 and let {(ρ 4 , 5 * ) } * Ε Ν С Δ „ χ Δ
η
 be a sequence t h a t converges 
to (PIQ)· Then, for large k, 
C(P) С C(pk),C(q) С C(qk),PB2(p) D PB2(pk) and РВгія) Э PB1(qk). 
D E F I N I T I O N . (КоМЪетд and Mertena (1986), Okada (1984)) 
Let {A, B) e BG(m, n) and let С be a non-empty closed subset of E{A, B). Then С is 
called strictly perfect for (A, B) if, for each open set V С Δπ, χ Δ „ with С С V, there 
exists an open neighbourhood U of (0,0) in R m X R" such that , for each pair of mistake 
vectors {ε1,e2) e С/, we have E{A,B·^1 , ε 2 ) П V φ 0. 
A strictly perfect set t h a t does not properly contain another strictly perfect set, is called 
stable. A strategy pair (p, q) € Δ,,, χ Δ
π
 is called strictly •perfect if the set {(p, g)} is 
stable. 
In order to prove that a given subset of equilibria is strictly perfect, we will use the 
following characterization. 
L E M M A 14.2. Let {A, B) e ВС{тп, η) and let С be a non-empty closed subset of E(A, B). 
Then С is strictly perfect for (A, B) if and only if, for each sequence {(e1(fc),62(A;))}t
e
isi 
of mistake vectors converging to zero, there exists a sequence 
{(p*,g*)heN С A
m
 χ Δ
η
 such that (pk,qk) € Е(А,В;г1(к),г2(к)) for all A: e Ν, 
with all limit points in C. 
Some nice properties of stable sets are summarized in 
THEOREM 14.3. (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), van Damme (1987b)) 
(i) Each strictly perfect set contains a stable set. 
(ii) For each game, there is at least one stable set {existence). 
(iii) Stable sets consist of perfect equilibria only (admissibility). 
(iv) A stable set corresponds to a strictly perfect set in any game t h a t is obtained by 
deleting dominated pure strategies (iterated dominance). 
(v) There is a stable set that lies within a maximally connected subset of the set of 
Nash equilibria (connectedness). 
For some games, the properties of theorem 14.3 suffice to determine all stable sets. 
E X A M P L E 14.1. Let the 2 x 3 bimatrix game (A, B) be given by 
(A,B) = (0,0) (2,2) (1,1) (4,4) (2,2) (0,0) J 
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Using the results of the previous sections, it is found that 
PE(A,B) = E(A,B) = {(ег.е,)} U ( [ l e , + ¿ e ^ e , ] χ {e2}). 
Let С be stable for (A,B). Suppose С С [ ^ е , + Ìe2 ,e , ] χ {ег}. Let ( Л 1 , В 1 ) be the 2 x 2 
bimatrix game that is obtained from ( A, B) by deleting the (dominated) third column. 
Then, С corresponds to a strictly perfect set for ( A1, S 1 ) (cf. (iv)), therefore С contains 
a stable set for (А 1 , В 1 ) (cf. (i)) and, in particular, С contains perfect equilibria for 
( A 1 , ! ? 1 ) (cf. (iii)). However, the equilibria in С are not perfect for ( Л 1 , ^ 1 ) . Hence, 
(e2,ei) e С. Then, using (ii) and (v), С = {(62,6,)}. 
A systematic way to determine the stable sets for any 2 χ η bimatrix game, is described 
in 
T H E O R E M 14.4. Let (A,B) 6 BG(2,n). 
(i) Let /([I]) = 0 or J([2]) = 0. Then each stable set for (A,B) consists of one point. 
In particular, each perfect equilibrium for (A, B) is strictly perfect. 
(ii) Let ƒ([!]) / 0 and J([2]) ^ 0. Then each stable set for (A,B) consists of one or 
two points. 
In particular, a perfect equilibrium (p, q) is strictly perfect if and only if one of the 
following three assertions holds: 
(ii.l) ρ € Δ 2 , Р В 2 ( р , [1]) ^ 0 and РВ2(р, [2]) φ 0. 
(11.2) ρ = e, and ƒ([!]) Π /„ φ 0. 
(11.3) ρ = ej and J([2]) Π ƒ, φ 0. 
Further, with ( ρ 1 , q1), ( р 2 , з 2 ) G PE( A, B), we have that {(ρ 1, q1), (ρ 2 ,q 2 )} is stable 
if and only if the following two assertions hold: 
(11.4) Either p 1 e A 2 , P B ^ p 1 , [1]) ^ 0 and P B 2 ( p \ [2]) = 0 
or, p 1 = 6 2 and/([2]) Π J, = 0. 
(11.5) Either p 2 e Δ 2 , PB2(p\ [2]) ^ 0 and Р В г ^ 2 , [1]) = 0 
or, ρ
2
 = e, and ƒ([!]) П ƒ„ = 0. 
Proof, (i) Without loss of generality, we assume /([!]) = 0. Let (p, q) e PE(A,B). We 
show that (p, q) is strictly perfect. 
Let {(ε 1(λ;)ι ε 2(^))}λ€Ν be a sequence of mistake vectors that converges to zero. 
If ρ £ Δ2, it follows that /([12]) = { l ,2, . . . ,n} and, by defining p* : = p and 
V 1€{1,2, ,η) / le{1.2, ...t.) 
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lemma 14.1(i) implies that (pk,gk) € E(A,Β;ε1 (к),ε2(к)) for large к 6 N. For pure ρ, 
a silimar result is found by defining qk as in (14.1), p* := χ^γ«ι + jg+rP( ,/ — 1 ) if Ρ = ei» 
a n d p * := e}(fc)ei + (1 - ε 1 ( £ ) ε 2 if p = ег. 
In all three cases { (p^gOj i teN converges to (p,q). Hence, (p,g) is strictly perfect. 
(ii) Let ƒ([!]) φ β a n d J([2]) ^ 0. Assume Л = K , ] ?
= 1 ? = 1 . 
(a) Let (p, g) £ Δ2 χ Δ
η
 be a strictly perfect equilibrium. We show that one of assertions 
(ii.l), (ii.2) or (ііЗ) is satisfied. 
Let ρ e Δ2. Suppose (ii.l) does not hold. Then, without loss of generality, 
РВІІР, [1]) = 0. Choose j e /([2]) and define, for к e Ν, e}(Ib) = eJ(Jfc) = χ^γ and 
e?(fc) : = W ! \2 ., · ( 1 4 · 2 ) 
Since (p, q) is strictly perfect, there is a sequence {(pk, 9*)}*6Ν converging to (p, q) such 
that (pk,qk) e E(A,B%e1(k),e2(k)) for all it e N. Using lemma 14.1(ii), it follows 
that PB2(pk) С PB2(p) for large k. Consequently, qf = (j^)2 for all I e /([!]) 
and e2Aqk — eiAqk > 0 for large k. However, this would imply 1 £ PB-i(qk) and 
p* = TÊfyei + k+îe2 for lar^e к. This contradicts the fact that {p*}*eN converges to p. 
Let ρ = e j . For each sequence {ρλ}*£Ν С Δ2 converging to ei, we have that 
PB2(pk) = I
v
 С. PB2(t\) for large к. Then, using the same line of argument as above 
it follows that ƒ([!]) Π /„ φ 0. Analogously, 7([2]) П h φ 0 if Ρ = ег-
(b) Let (p,g) 6 Р.Е(.А,В) be such that one of the assertions (ii.l), (ii.2) or (ii.3) is 
satisfied. We show that (p, q) is strictly perfect. 
Let {(£*(<:),e2(fc))}jt
e
N be a sequence of mistake vectors that converges to zero. 
If ρ € Δ2, we can choose г e PB^lp, [1]) and j 6 P i M p , [2])) and, by defining p* : = ρ 
and 
qk:=(l-V{k))q+ £ £?(fc)e/ + 
/едііз]) 
E eì(k)(ql(i,l))-1g(itl)+ Σ е?(*)(
С
,(/,Л)- /,І) (14.3) 
where r;(Ä;) £ [0,1) is such that 5ZÍLj (¡f = 1. 
If ρ = ei, we can choose г e ƒ„ Π /([2]) and, by defining pk : = (1 — гЦк^еі + еЦк^ 
and 
g* :=(1-£(*)«+ Σ ^(fc)e/+ ^ ^(^Κΐ'^ΟΓ 1 ^,/) (14.4) 
/€Л[і])иД[і2]) /еДЮ) 
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where £(k) 6 [0,1) is such that 5Zjl=i Яі — 1· Of course, one can define a similar 
sequence if ρ = e j . 
In all cases (j>k,qk) & E(A,B,e1(k),e2(k)) for large Jfc and {(p'',9fc)}jteN converges to 
(p, q). Hence, (p, q) is strictly perfect. 
(c) Let ( p 1 , ? 1 ) , ( p 2 , 9 2 ) € ΡΕ(Α,Β) be such that (ii.4) and (ii.5) are satisfied. We show 
that {(p 1 ,^ 1 ) , ( p 2 , î 2 ) } is a stable set. 
Using symmetry considerations, we may, without loss of generality, assume that 
p 1 e Дг.РВаО» 1 , ! ! ] ) / 0 and Р Д ^ р М Э Д = 0, while ρ 2 = ei and I([l]) П I
v
 = 0. 
Choose i € РВІІР1,^}). 
By (a) it suffices to show that {(p1,q1),(e1,q2)} is strictly perfect. 
Let {(e1(fc),e2(fc))}igN be a sequence of mistake vectors that converges to zero. For all 
к 6 Ν, let 
7 ( e a ( t ) ) : = Σ e ? ( f c ) ( e i i - 0 2 i ) + ^ e?(*)(aii - ад) (14.5) 
'€/([!]) /e/f[2]) 
Then, for all к 6 N sudi that 7(e2(Jl·)) < 0, we define p* ^ p 1 and 
η 
qk := (1 - rt*))«1 + X)e?(fe)ei - 7(e2(fc))(«i¿ - a«)" 1 «*, (14-6) 
1=1 
where p(fc) € [0,1) is such that $Z!Li î f = 1- Further, for all fc g N such that 
7(e2(fc)) > 0, we define p* := (1 - ej(fc))ei + e\(k)e2 and 
9 t : = ( l - ¿ £ ? ( f c ) ) í 2 + ¿ £ ? ( f c ) e I (14.7) 
1=1 ( = 1 
It is easily verified that (p*,5*) 6 ^ ( Α , Β ^ Η ^ ) ^ 2 ^ 1 ) ) for l ^ S 6 λ € N. Since the 
sequence {p*,9*)}teN has (at most) two limit points (p1,«?1) and (ei,q2), the set 
{ ( р 1 ! ? 1 ) ^ 6 ! ) ? 2 ) } i s strictly perfect. 
(d) Let С be a stable set with \C\ > 2. For each sequence {(e1(fc),e2(fc))}j:eN of mistake 
vectors converging to zero, the ' indicator' 7(ε2(λ·)) of (14.5) plays a decisive role: С has 
to contain both a perfect equilibrium (p 1 ,^ 1 ) that is proof against mistakes of the type 
j(e2(k)) < 0 and a perfect equilibrium (p2, q2) that is proof against mistakes of the type 
7(e2(fc)) > 0. This is achieved only if (p1,qi) satisfies (ii.4) and (p2,Ç2) satisfies (ii.5). 
Using (c), it follows that С = { ( р ^ ' Ц р 2 , ? 2 ) } · Q 
In particular, theorem 14.4 implies that each stable set for a 2 χ η bimatrix game 
consists of finitely many perfect equilibria. This result has been generalized towards 
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m χ η bimatrix games by Jurg, Jansen and Dorm (1990). However, for general bimatrix 
games a stable set can contain more than two elements. This is seen in 
E X A M P L E 14.2. Let the 3 x 4 matrix game (A, —A) be given by 
A = 
2 0 0 0 
0 2 0 0 
1 1 2 0 
ThenE(A,-A) — A3 x{e4},PE(A, -A) = [e^eajx {е4}и[е2,ез]х {64} and the unique 
stable set for (A, —A) is given by 
{(еі1е4),(с2,е4),(сз,С4)} 
Theorem 14.4 is illustrated in 
E X A M P L E 14.3. For the 2 x 6 bimatrix game (A, B) of example 11.1 each stable set has 
only one element. The stable sets are 
{( ìe i + f e2, q)} with q e Conv{e2, ( 1 , 0 , 0 , § , 0 , 0 ) , ( 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , f ) } . 
Further, the unique stable set for the 2 x 3 bimatrix game (A, B) of example 13.2 
is given by 
{( je j + | e 2 , e 2 ) , ( | r i + іег.ег)} · 
As can be seen in example 14.3/13.2, there need not be a stable set that contains 
a proper equilibrium. However, defining a stable component as a maximally connected 
subset of the set of Nash equilibria that contains a stable set (cf. (ν) of theorem 14.3), 
we have 
T H E O R E M 14.B. For 2 χ η bimatrix games the following two assertions hold. 
(i) Each strictly perfect equilibrium is proper. 
(ii) Each stable component contains a proper equilibrium. 
Proof, (i) This is a direct consequence of theorem 14.4 and theorem 13.3. 
(ii) Let D С E(A,B) be a stable component for (A, B) 6 S G ( 2 , T I ) . Because of (i) 
we may assume that there is no strictly perfect equilibrium within D. Then, theorem 
14.4 implies that /([1]) φ 0, /([2]) ^ 0 and that there аде (p 1 ,«? 1 )^? 2 ,? 2 ) e PE(A,B) 
satisfying (ii.4) and (ii.5) of theorem 14.4 with {(p1 ,q1),(p2,Ç2)} С D. 
Without loss of generality we may assume that p 1 = p(r) and p 2 = р(з) for some 
r,s G {0,1,. . . ,г} with r < s. Since D is connected and there axe no strictly perfect 
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equilibria within D, we have that h Π /([12]) φ 0 for all к £ {г + 1,...,л}. By 
distinguishing cases corresponding to the conditions in (ii.4) and (ii.5), ала using similar 
arguments as in the proof of theorem 12.3, it is not difficult to verify that there exists a 
perfect equilibrium (p, q) for the game (A, B) of theorem 13.3 such that ρ £ \p(r),p(s)]. 
Hence, theorem 13.3 implies that (p.e,-) 6 PR(A,B) Π D for all j E Ik П /([12]) if 
к € {г + 1,..., s} is such that ρ e [p(fc — l),p(k)]. D 
The following example shows that there can be stable sets that are not contained 
within a connected subset of Nash equilibria. 
EXAMPLE 14.4. Let the 2 x 5 bimatrix game (A,B) be given by 
(A,B) = 
(0,-4) (1,-4) (0,2) (0,4) (0,4) 
[ (0,4) (0,4) (1,2) (0,-4) (1,-4) 
Then e.g. {( |ei + | е2 ,е і ) , ( | е і + 562,64)} is stable while E(A,B) consists of two 
maximally connected components D1 and D2: 
and 
D1 = [e2, ¿e, + |e2] x { e ^ U {¿ej + fe2} χ С о т г ^ Д О , ¿, £.0,0)} 
^
2
 = [!ei + je2,ei] χ {е^}. 
This section concludes with an example in which no stable set is contained within 
a convex subset of Nash equilibria. Moreover, each stable set consists of two perfect 
equilibria with the property that one of these equilibria is (strictly) payoff dominated 
by the other one. 
EXAMPLE 14.5. Let the 2 x 6 bimatrix game {A, B) be given by 
(A,B) = (3,-8) (1,-8) (3,-2) (2,0) (0,1) (2,1) (3,8) (0,8) (3,6) (2,4) (1,1) (2,1) 
Then E(A, B) consists of 7 maximally convex components T 1 , T2,..., T 7 where 
T 1 = h . i e j + fej] x { ε^ ,Τ 2 = {¿ej + fej} x Соп ^ ь е з } , 
Τ
3
 = [jei + f e2, §6! + ie 2 ] χ {езЬГ4 = {fa + \e2} χ Соп ^з.е*}, 
Т
Ъ
 = [fa + §62, f ej + fa) χ Ы . Г 6 = {f ej + fa} x Conv{e4,e6} 
and Γ 7 = [16!+ ¿62,6!] χ {e«}. 
76 
Further, using theorem 14.4, it is found that С is stable for {A,B) if and only if 
С = {{p\ql)Áp\q2)} with ( p \ f / ) e Τ 1 U T 2 and ( ρ 2 , g 2 ) € Γ 6 U T 7 . 
Let ( ρ 1 , g 1 ) G Γ 1 U Γ 2 and (ρ 2 ,g 2 ) 6 Τ 6 U Τ 7 . Then ( ρ 1 , g 1 ) strictly payoff dominates 
(ρ 2 ,g 2 ) because 
ρ
1
 Ας
Ύ
 = 3 > 2 = p 2 . V and ρ 1 Bql > 4 > 1 = p2Bq2. 
IB. PERSISTENCY 
This section provides a characterization of persistent retracts ( К alai and Samet 
(1984)) for 2 χ η bimatrix games. In particular, it is found that all equilibria that 
are contained in a persistent retract (persistent equilibria) are perfect, and, that each 
persistent retract contains a stable set. 
D E F I N I T I O N (Kalai and Samet (1984)). Let (A,B) € BG(m,n). 
Let R = Ri χ R2 С Д
т
 χ Δ
η
 be non-empty, closed and convex. Then R is called an 
absorbing retract for (A, B) if there exist open neighbourhoods Ui of Ri and U2 of R2 
such that for all (p', q') € Ui x U2 there is a (p, q) £ R with q € B(p') and ρ € B^q'). 
An absorbing retract that does not properly contain another absorbing retract is called 
a persistent retract. Nash equilibria that are contained in a persistent retract are called 
persistent. By PERS(A,B) we denote the set of all persistent equilibria for (A, B). 
To determine (all) persistent retracts for a particular bimatrix game, one can use 
the fact that persistent retracts have the special form of selection retracts. 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let (A,B) e BG(>n,n). A non-empty finite set F С Δ
η
 is called a 
selection for player 2 in (A, B) if 
q G F = > Bcj = Bc, for all j,s € C(q) (15.1) 
and 
q\q2 e F, q1 φ
 ч
1
 = > Bf Φ Bq2. (15.2) 
Selections for player 1 are defined апаіодоиьіу. 
An absorbing retract R = Л 1 χ 7?2 is called a selection retract if there are selections F
1 
for player 1 and F2 for player 2 such that J?i = ConviF1) and Л 2 = C o n v ( F 2 ) . 
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Summarizing the results of Kalai and Samet we have 
THEOREM 15.1 (Kalai and Same.t (1984)). 
(i) Each persistent retract is a selection retract. 
(ii) Each absorbing retract contains a persistent retract. 
(iii) For each game, there is at least one persistent retract. 
(iv) Each persistent retract contains a proper equilibrium. 
In particular, theorem 15.1(iv) implies that each persistent retract contains an 
equilibrium that is both persistent (by definition) and proper. If a persistent retract 
consists of only one strategy pair, this strategy pair is called a robust equilibrium ( Okada 
(1983)). 
All persistent retracts for a 2 χ »г bimatrix game are characterized in 
T H E O R E M ie.2. Let (A,B) Ç BG{2tn). 
(i) Let (p,q) € Δ2 x Δ
η
. Then (ρ, q) is a robust equilibrium if and only if (p, q) is a 
perfect equilibrium and one of the following three assertions holds: 
(i . l) ρ = ei and, either PB^q) = {1} or I([2}) = 0 
(1.2) ρ = ег and, either PBi(q) = {2} or ƒ([!]) = 0 
(1.3) ρ € Â 2 \ {p ( fc )h e { i „_!, a n d 7 ( [ 1 2 ] ) = { l , 2 η]. 
(ii) Let R = Ri χ R2 С A2 x Δ
η
 be such that \R\ > 1. Then R is a persistent retract 
if and only if one of the following a-ssertious holds: 
(ii.l) /([12]) = {1,2, . . . , л } and there is а к 6 { 1 , . . . , ν - 1} s u c h t h a t 
Ri = {p(k)} and R2 = Conv{qk,qk+1} 
with qk e Conv{ei | l e Ik} and ç*4"1 6 Соп {е( | l e J t+i} · 
(ІІ.2) ƒ([!]) ? 0, /([2]) ¿ 0 and 
Rx = Δ2 and R2 =Colw{q1,q2,...,q^'}, 
with qk € Conv{ei | 1 € h] for all к € { l , . . . , i / } , 1 G PB^q1) and 
2 e PiM?")· 
Proof, (i) Let (ρ, q) be a robust equilibrium for (.4, B). By theorem 15.1(iv) we have 
that (p,q)€PE(A,B). 
Assumep = e j . Suppose (i.l) is not satisfied. Then PBi(q) = {1,2} and /([2]) φ 0. Let 
j 6 Д[2]) and define q(X) := (1 — X)q + Xe, for all λ 6 [0,1]. Since {(t\,q)} is absorbing, 
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we should have that ej e PBi(g(A)) for small λ > 0. However, PBi(q(X)) = {2} for all 
λ e (0,1). Similarly, if ρ = e 2, then (ii.2) is satisfied. 
Assume ρ e Аг- By theorem 15.1(i) and (15.1), it follows that C\A = ег-А and so 
/([12]) = {1,2, . . . , n } . Suppose ρ = p(fc) for some к e { 1 , . . . ,v — 1}. Define 
ρ'(λ) : = Лег + (1 - λ)ρ and ρ"(λ) = \ε
λ
 + (1 - λ)ρ for all λ 6 [0,1]. Since {(p,ç)} is 
absorbing we should have that q 6 I ^ i p ' M ) ^ ^ ( p ' ^ ^ ) ) ^Ο Γ s m a 4 λ > 0. However, 
Β 2 (ρ'(λ)) Π Β 2 ( ρ " ( λ ) ) = 0 for all λ > 0. 
Conversely, if (p, q) € PE(A,B) is such that one of the conditions ( i . l ) , (i.2) or 
(i.3) is satisfied, then it is straightforward to verify that {(ρ,ΐ)} is an absorbing retract, 
and so (p, q) is robust. 
(ii) (a) If (ii.l) is satisfied, then i ï trivially is a persistent retract. 
Let (ii.2) be satisfied. Obviously, .R is an absorbing retract. By theorem 15.1(ii) we 
can find a persistent retract R = Лі χ Дг with R С R- Since R is a selection retract 
(cf. theorem 15.1(i)) and eiA φ Z-ÍA, we may, without loss of generality, assume that 
e1 G R\. Absorbingness implies that q" Ç Лг- Since егЛд'' > e.\Aqv and J([2]) φ 0, it 
follows that ti G R\ and, by convexity, R\ = Aj . Therefore, { î 1 , ? 2 , . . . , ΐ " } С Ri and 
Ri = R. Hence, R = R and i ï is a persistent retract. 
(b) Conversely, let i ï be a persistent retract. Suppose (ii.l) does not hold. We 
show that (ii.2) is satisfied. 
Since |Л | > 1, part (i) implies that i([12]) φ {1,2, . . . , η} . If /([!]) / 0 and i([2]) = 0, 
then absorbingness implies that ei 6 -Ri and so, there exists a q" £ Conv{ej | l e I
v
} 
with q" g п г . However, using part (i), this would imply that (61,9") g i ï is a robust 
equilibrium. Similarly, it can not be the case that i([2]) φ 0 and i([ l]) = 0. Hence, 
-Щ1]) Φ 0 a n < i -^([2]) Φ 0· Without loss of generality, we may assume that ei G Ri. 
Consequently, there is a q" G Conv{ei | / G /„} with q" G Ri- Because of part (i), 
2 G PBi^q"). Since i([2]) φ 0, absorbingness implies that ei G i ï i and so i ï i = Δ2. 
Hence, there are q1,... , ? " - 1 G Ri with qk G Conv{ej | l G i t } for all к € { 1 , . . . , ν — 1}. 
Moreover, part (i) implies that 1 G P J B I ( Ç 1 ) . Hence, using (a), (ii.2) is satisfied. D 
EXAMPLE I6.1. The persistent retracts for the 2 x 6 bimatrix game (A, B) of example 
11.1 are the sets Δ2 x Conv{ei,g, 63} with q G Conv{e2,e4}. Consequently, 
P í ; i í 5 ( J 4 , B ) = { ¿ e 1 + f e 2 } x C o n v { ( i , 0 , 0 , i , 0 , 0 ) , e 2 } U 
[ iei + f c 2 , | c i + ic2] x {ег} 
E X A M P L E 15.2. Let the 2 x 3 bimatrix game (Л, В) be given by 
(1,0) (0,0) (3,2) ' (A,B) = (0,2) (1,2) (0,0) 
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Then all persistent retracts consist of one point, and 
PERS{A,B) = {(еі.ез)} U {e2} χ {q € Δ3 | 93 = 0 and q2 > §} 
Note that PERS(A,B) is not closed. 
An immediate consequence of theorem 15.2 and theorem 13.2 is 
C O R O L L A R Y 16.3. For 2 χ η bimatrix games, each persistent equilibrium is perfect. 
For general bimatrix games a persistent equilibrium need not be perfect. This is 
seen in 
E X A M P L E 15.3 (van Damme (1987b)). Let the 3 x 3 bimatrtix game (A, B) be given by 
{A,B) = 
(2,2) (2,2) (2,2) 
(3,1) ( 4 , - 4 ) (-4,4) 
L(3,l) (-4,4) ( 4 , - 4 ) 
Then (e j , ^ + | е з ) 6 E{A, B) is not perfect, because the strategy | β 2 + \е
ъ
 of player 
2 is dominated by ei. However, ( e i , i e 2 + 5-63) is persistent because Дэ Χ Δ3 is the 
unique persistent retract for {A, B). 
The following simple example shows that a strictly perfect equilibrium need not be 
persistent. 
E X A M P L E 16.4. For the 2 x 2 bimatrix game (A, B) with 
i A B i _ Г(1.1) t 0 ' 0 ) ' 
^ ' ^ - [ ( 0 , 0 ) (1,1). 
we have that (\ei + ¿62, ^ej + ^62) is a strictly perfect equilibrium, while the only two 
persistent equilibria are ( e i , e i ) and (62,62). 
So, in particular, a stable set need not be contained in a persistent retract. However, 
it holds 
T H E O R E M 16.4. For 2 χ η bimatrix games, each persistent retract contains a stable set. 
Proof. Let (A, B) e BG(2, n ) . Let R = Ry χ Яг С Дг х Δη be a persistent retract 
for {A,B). If ƒ([!]) = 0 or /([2]) = 0, then each perfect equilibrium for ( Л , В ) is 
strictly perfect (cf. theorem 14.4(i)), so by theorem 15.1(iv) R contains a strictly perfect 
equilibrium. 
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Let /([1]) Φ 0 and /([2]) φ 0. If | і£| = 1 we may, without loss of generality, assume 
that R = { (ε ι ,ς")} with qv e Convie/ | / € / „} such that aAq" > е з ^ д " . Then, 
/„ Π /([1]) φ 0 and, using theorem 14.4(ii), (61,5") is strictly perfect. 
Let \R\ > 1. It follows that (ii.2) of theorem 15.2 is satisfied: Ri = Δ2 and 
R2 = Conv{ql,q2,...,qv} with qk e Convfe, | / e Ik} for all Jfc Ê { 1 , 2 , . . . ,v), 
¿lAq1 > CiAq1 and eiAq" < CiAq". Suppose i ï does not contain a stable set. 
Then we can make the following observation. For all к € { 1 , . . . , f — 1}: if 
eiAqk > e2Aqk, then eiAqk+l > e2Aqk+1. Otherwise, if A: € { 1 , . . . , v — 1} is such that 
e1Aqk > e2Aqk and CiAq^1 < егЛд*"1"1, it follows that P B Z C P C * + i ) . t1]) Φ 0. 
PB2(p(k + 1),[2]) / 0 and that there is a strategy q E Conv{qk,qk+1} with 
eiAq = e2Aq. Then, however, theorem 14.4(ii) would imply that (p(k + l),q) & R 
is a strictly perfect equilibrium. 
Defining 
г : = min{fc € { l , 2 , . . . , i / } | e jAq k < егАс*} and 
s :=max{fc e {1,2,. ..,u} \ elAqk > 62^9*}, 
this observation implies that ejA<7r = e2Aqr, eiAq' = CiAq' and г < s. 
Note that Д Π /([2]) = 0 if г = 1. Otherwise, theorem 14.4(ii) would imply that 
(ezi? 1 ) € Л is a strictly perfect equilibrium. Similarly, ƒ„ Π /([1]) = 0 if s = и. Then, 
however, theorem 14.4(ii) and the definition of г and 5 imply that 
{(p(r - 1), qr), (p(s), q')} С R is a stable set. D 
It may be noted that theorem 15.4 has been generalized towards m χ η bimatrix 
games by Jurg, Jansen and Borm (1990). 
Finally, figure 15.1 provides a full description of the relations between various refine­
ments of the Nash equilibrium concept for 2 χ η bimatrix games, in the sense that each 
implication that is not present in the diagram does not hold. 
F I G U R E 15.1. (Relations between refinements for 2 Χ η bimatrix games) 
robust 
/ \ 
strictly perfect 
J. persistent 
proper 
\ У 
perfect 
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1Θ. ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE SET OF NASH EQUILIBRIA 
This section recalls two important results on the structure of the set of Nash equi­
libria for general bimatrix games: 
(i) The fact that the set of Nash equilibria is the finite union of maximal Nash subsets. 
(ii) A dimension relation for maximal Nash subsets. 
First, we briefly discuss the structure of the set of Nash equilibria for matrix games. 
The famous minimax theorem of ron Neumann (1928) states that every m Χ η matrix 
game (A, —A) has a value val(A) such that 
аІ(Л) = max min pAq = min max pAq, 
р€Д
т а
 »ед„ д е д
п
; > е д
т 
and that the optimal strategy seti 0\{Á) := {ρ G Д
т
 | pAq > val(A) for ail g € Δ „ } 
and 02(A) : = {q € Δ „ | pAq < аІ(Л) for all ρ e Д
г о
} are non-empty. Moreover, Οι(Α) 
and 02(A) axe polytopes and 
E(A,-A) = 01(A)x02(A). 
The extreme points of the optimal strategy sets were characterized by Shapley and Snow 
(1950) in terms of square submatrices of the payoff matrix A. 
Further, Bohnenblust, Karlin and Shapley (1950) and Gale and Sherman (1950) estab­
lished the following dimension relation: 
I d U ) ! - Oim(01(A)) = \C2(A)\ - В і т ( 0 2 ( Л ) ) , 
where C^A) : = UpeOtiA) C(p) ^ ^(A) := Ug60j(>i) C ( î ) represent the carriers of 
the optimal strategy sets. 
Finally, Gale and Sherman (1950) solved the construction problem by providing neces-
sary and sufficient conditions on two polytopes, - the dimension relation being the most 
important one -, to be the optimal strategy sets for some matrix game. 
The structure of the set of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games can be described by 
means of (maximal) Nash subsets, a term introduced by Heuer and Millham (1976). 
Nash (1951) called them subsolutions. 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let (A,B) £ ВС(тп,п). A non-empty subset Τ of Nash equilibria for 
(A, B) is called a Nash subset if Γ = Tj χ T2 for some Ti С Д
г о
 and Г2 С Δ
η
. A Nash 
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subset that is not properly contained in another Nash subset is called a maximal Nash 
subset. 
Theorem 16.1 summarizes some important features of maximal Nash subsets. Here, 
expression (11.1) is generalized towards τη χ η bimatrix games (A, B) by defining 
ЗД : = {p € Am | (p,q) € E(A,B)} and 5 a(p) := {<? € Δ
η
 | (p,q) e E(A,B)} 
for all ρ € A m and q € Δ „ . 
T H E O R E M ie.1 (Heuer and Millham (1976), Jansen (1981a, 1981b)). 
Let (A, B) 6 BG(m,n). Then the following three assertions hold: 
(i) If Τ is a Nash subset, then Conv(T) is a Nash subset. 
In particular, each maximal Nash subset is convex. 
(ii) Let Τ be a maximal Nash subset with (p 0 , ç0) £ Relint(T). Then 
Τ = S^g0) χ S2(p0). 
Further, for (p,q) 6 Д
т
 χ Δ
η
, we have (ρ, g) € Τ if and only if 
C(p) С C ( p 0 ) , C(q) С CG/0), PB2(p) D PB2(p0) and PB^q) D PB^q0). 
(iii) E(A,B) is the finite union of the maximal Nash subsets for (A, B). 
In particular, since Si(q) and 52(p) are polytopes, theorem 16.1(ii) implies that 
each maximal Nash subset is a polytope. For 2 χ η bimatrix games, it is clear that each 
maximal Nash subset has one of the two forms described in theorem 11.3. 
A theoretical way to determine the set of Nash equilibria for an arbitrary bimatrix 
game is the following. Let a Nash equilibrium be called extreme if it is an extreme point 
of some maximal Nash subset. For an arbitrary bimatrix game, all extreme equilibria 
can be determined in a systematic way, by means of the characterization in terms of 
square submatrices of the payoff matrices provided by Vorobev (1958), Kuhn (1961) 
and Jansen (1981b). Subsequently, one can apply the algorithm of Winkels (1979) to 
construct the various underlying maximal Nash subsets. 
Theorem 16.2 below provides a dimension relation for maximal Nash subsets. 
Here, with A = [a,,]™ j ?
=1, B= [bt]\™=1 ?=1, Tx С Д т and Тг С Δ „ , we define 
CÍTO := [J С{р), С(Г2) := (J C(Ç), (16.1) 
PB^T,) := f ) P B J C P ) , РВ^Тг) : = f ) PB^q) 
ρ€Τι q€T2 
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and 
А{Тг) •= [α·^ιβΡΒι(Γ,), jec(T 2), # № ) = [Ъ,}],ес(Ті), I^PB^TJ (16.2) 
Note that theorem 16.1(ii) implies that for each maximal Nash subset Τ = Γι χ Гг we 
have C(Ti) φ 0, С(Г 2 ) φ 0, P B ^ T j ) ^ 0 and ΡΒ2{Τλ) φ 0. 
T H E O R E M і .2 (Millham (1974) and Jansen (1981b)). 
Let (А,В) G BG{m,n) be such that A > 0 and 5 > 0. Let Τ = Γι χ Гг be a maximal 
Nash subset for (A, B). Then 
(i) D i m ( r 2 ) = |С(Гг) | - Капк(Л(Г 2 )) . 
(ii) DimCTO = \С(Т{)\ - RankíBÍT!)) . 
It may be noted that it is no restriction in theorem 16.2 to assume that A > 0 and 
В > 0. Adding the same number to each entry in A (or B), the set of Nash equilibria 
does not change. 
E X A M P L E ie.1. Let the 2 x 3 bimatrix game (A, B) be given by 
( Л , В ) = 
This game has one maximal Nash subset Τ = Γι x Гг С Дг х Дз : 
Τι = {§6! + §е 2 } and Г2 = Соп {ез, ^ + ±е 2 } 
Adding 2 to each entry in A and 1 to each entry in B, we obtain 
( A \ B ' ) = 
while E{A',B') — E(A,B) = Γι χ Γ 2 . Checking the dimension relation, we have 
Dim(Ti) = 0 = 2 - 2 = | C ( T i ) | - Rank(B') = |С7(Гі)| - R a n k ^ r j ) ) 
and 
D i m ( r 2 ) = 1 = 3 - 2 = \C(T2)\ - Капк(А') = | ί : ( Γ 2 ) | - Еапк(А'(Г 2 )) . 
Note that 
Dim(r 2) = 1 ^ 2 = |C(T 2) | - Капк(Л(Г2)). 
(1,0) (-1,2) (0,1) 
(0,2) (0,0) (0,1) 
(3,1) (1,3) (2,2) 
(2,3) (2,1) (2,2) 
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17. ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE SET OF PERFECT EQUILIBRIA 
Introducing maximal Selten subsets, this section shows that the structure of the 
set of perfect equilibria for bimatrix games resembles the structure of the set of Nash 
equilibria. It is found that the set of perfect equilibria consists of finitely many maximal 
Selten subsets. In particular, each maximal Selten subset is an (external) face of a 
maximal Nash subset. By extending the dimension relation of theorem 16.2 towards 
faces of maximal Nash subsets, we obtain a dimension relation for maximal Selten 
subsets. At the end of this section, we illustrate some special features regarding the 
structure of the sets of proper and persistent equilibria. 
For bimatrix games perfect equilibria exactly correspond to Nash equilibria that 
consist of two undominated strategies (van Damme (1983, 1987a)). The notion of 
an undominated strategy has been already introduced in section 13. An equivalent 
formulation is provided in the following 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let (A, B) € BG(m,n). Let P(A) := Conv{eJA,e2A,... ,emA} С R" 
and P(B) : = Coav{Bei,Be2,. ..,Be
n
} С R m . A strategy ρ € Am (q € Δ
η
) is called 
undominated if pA {Bq) is an undominated element of P(A) (P(B)). By {/,(A, B) we 
denote the set of undominated strategies for player г € {1,2}. 
Let I С {1,2,. . . , m } . The subsimplex Aj = Conv{e1 € A m | г Ç. 1} of Д т is called 
undominated if Δ/ С Ui(A,B). Δ/ is called maximally undominated if there is no 
/' С {1,2, . . . , m } such that I ^ I' and Aj· С Ui(A,B). Analogously, one defines 
(maximally) undominated subsimplices Aj of Δ „ for J С {1,2,. . . , η}. 
L E M M A 17.1. Let (А,В) € ВС(тп,п). Let ρ € {/ι(Α,Β) and I := C(p). 
Then Aj is an undominated subsimplex of Δ „ . 
Proof. Let ρ1 ε Aj with ρ 1 / p. Choose a e (0,1) such that ap1 < p. Defining 
p 2 := (1 — a ) _ 1 ( p — a p 1 ) € Δ/, we have ρ = α ρ 1 + (1 — α ) ρ 2 . Suppose ρ 1 ¿ Ui(A, В). 
Then there is a strategy ρ 6 A
m
 such that ρ A > p1 A and ρ Α -φ- ρ 1 Л. Consequently, 
(αρ + (1 - α)ρ 2 )Α > (αρ 1 + (1 - α ) ρ 2 ) Α = ρΑ, 
and there is no equality. However, this would imply that ρ ^ V\(A, B). 
Hence, p 1 Ç Ui(A,B) and Δ/ is undominated. D 
Lemma 17.1 immediately implies 
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LEMMA 1T.2. Let (A, В) e BG(m,n). Then Ui(A,B) is the finite union of the maxi­
mally undominated subsimplices of A
m
. 
Of course, similar statements hold with respect to the undominated strategies of 
player 2. 
EXAMPLE iT.i. Let the 6 χ 2 bimatrix game (A, B) be such that 
A = 
Using figure 17.1, we may conclude that there are two maximally undominated subsim­
plices for player 1: Ui(A, B) = Δ\
ια
} U Δ{2,3,4,5}· 
FIGURE 17.1. 
Γ0 
2 
3 
4 
4 
Ll 
31 2 
1 
0 
0 
i j 
Before describing the structure of the set of perfect equilibria, the underlying line 
of thought is illustrated in 
EXAMPLE 17.2. Let the 3 x 4 bimatrix game (A, B) be given by 
(A,B) = 
(-3,3) (-3,0) (-3,0) (-3,2) 
(3,0) (3,0) (3,0) (-6,0) 
(-3,0) (-3,0) (-3,3) (-3,2) 
The game (Л, B) has six maximal Nash subsets. One of these maximal Nash subsets is 
Τ = Τ! χ T2 = {e2} χ {q e Δ4 Ι ?4 < f}-
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It readily follows that Ui(A,B) = Δ3 and U2(A,B) = Δ ^ } U Δ ^ ^ } . Hence, 
PE(A, В)ПТ consists of two (disjoint) faces of T: 
PE(A, В)ПТ = {e2} χ Convie,, fa + fa] U {e2} x Соп {ез, fe* + fa}. 
These two faces we will call maximal Selten subsets. 
Recall that a face F of a polytope Τ is such that there exists a supporting hyper-
plane Я of Τ with F = Τ Π Η. 
L E M M A 17.3. For a bimatrix game the set of perfect equilibria is a finite union of faces 
of maximal Nash subsets. 
Proof. Clearly, for each maximal Nash subset Γ = Τι χ Tj and each maximally undom-
inated subsimplex Ρ, for player г g {1,2} we have that T, П P, is a face of T,. 
Hence, using theorem 16.1(iii) and lemma 17.2, the set of imdominated equilibria is a 
finite union of faces of maximal Nash subsets. D 
Further, we have 
L E M M A 17.4. Let 5 = 5i x ^2 be a convex subset of Nash equilibria for the τη χ η 
bimatrix game (А, В) and let (р 0 ,9 0 ) € Relint(5). If (p,q) G S, then 
C(p) С C(p0), C(q) С C V ) , PB2(p) D PB2(p0) and PB^q) D PB^q0). (17.1) 
Moreover, if S is a face of maximal Nash subset, then (ρ, q) £ S if and only if (17.1) is 
satisfied. 
Proof. Let (p, q) e S with ρ ^ ρ 0 . Since ρ 0 € ΙΙβ1ΐηΐ(5Ί), there is a strategy p 1 € 5 
and a real number a G (0,1) such that p 0 = ap + (1 — a )p 1 . Hence, C(p) С C(p0). Let 
j e P 5 2 ( P 0 ) . Then 
p0Bq0 = p0Be} = арВе, + (1 - a ) p 1 B e 7 < apBq0 + (1 - a)plBq0 = p0I?<A 
where the inequality follows from the fact that (p, g 0 ) and ( p 1 , ^ 0 ) are Nash equilibria. 
Consequently, p B e , = pBq0 and j e . P ^ p ) . Hence, P ^ p 0 ) С PB2(p). 
Similarly one shows that C(q) С C(q°) and PB^q0) С PB^q). 
Now let S be a face of a maximal Nash subset T. Let (p, q) satisfy the inclusions 
in (17.1). We show that (p,q) € S. 
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Since F is a face of T, there is a pair (x, y) G R m χ R" and a real number β such that 
(*, v)-(p',q') = ß for all (p',q')eS (17.2) 
(x,y)-(p',q')<ß for all (p',5') e r \ S 
By theorem 16.1(ii) we have (p, q) Ç. T. Suppose (p, q) g S. Then, for λ > 0, we define 
p(A) = (1 + λ)ρ 0 - λρ and q(X) = (1 + λ ) 9 0 - Xq. 
Since C(p) С C ( p 0 ) and Σ?=ι Ρ(λ) . = 1, we have that ρ(λ) e A
m
 and C(p(A)) = C(p0) 
for small λ. Let j € PB2(p0). For s e РВгСр0) we have p(X)Be} = p(X)Bes because 
PBiip0) С РВІІР). Further, for s <£ PBiip0), it is found that р(А)Ве, > p(A)Be 5 for 
small A because p(A) converges to p 0 if A goes to zero. 
Hence, Pi?2(p(A)) = PBi(p0) for small A. Similar arguments show that ^(A) £ Δ
η
, 
C(q(X)) = C(q0) and ΡΒ^(Χ)) = PB^q0) for small A. 
Consequently, by theorem 16.1(ii), (p(A),ç(A)) £ Τ for small A. However, for such A 
(x,y)(p(X),q(X)) = (1 + X)(x,y)• ( P V ) - X{x,y) • (p,q) 
>(l+X)ß-Xß = ß, 
which contradicts (17.2). Hence, (p,^) 6 5 . D 
Now we introduce the following 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let (A, B) € BG(m, n). A non-empty convex subset S of perfect equilibria 
for (A,B) is called a Selten subset if 5 = 5Ί χ S2 for some Si С Д
т
 and S2 С Δ
η
. A 
Selten subset that is not properly contained in another Selten subset is called a maximal 
Selten subset. 
Note that we have added a convexity requirement. Without this requirement nei­
ther of the two faces described in example 17.2 would be a maximal Selten subset. 
Clearly, each (maximal) Selten subset is a Nash subset and is therefore contained 
in a maximal Nash subset. Further, it holds 
T H E O R E M 17.5. Let (A, B) € BG(m, n). Then the following three assertions hold: 
(i) Let 5 = 5ι χ S2 be a maximal Selten subset and let Τ = Tj χ Tj be a maximal 
Nash subset with S С T. Then 
&с(5.)ПТ, = 3, for ¿ € { 1 , 2 } . 
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(ii) Each Selten subset is contained in a maximal Selten subset. 
(iii) PE(A,B) is the union of the finite number of maximal Selten subsets for (A,B). 
Proof, (i) It suffices to show that A ^ s , ) Π Τχ С Si- Let ρ e A c ( s t ) Π ^ і . Suppose 
ρ £ Si . Let Si : = Conv(Si U {ρ}). By theorem 16.1(i), Si С Τι. Further, with 
p 0 e Relint(Si) we have p 0 6 Ui(A,B) and, by lemma 17.4, С (Si) = C(Si) = C ( p 0 ) . 
Then lemma 17.1 implies that Si С Ui(A,B). However, this contradicts the fact that 
S is a maximal Selten subset since Si X S2 £ Si x S2 С PE(A,B). Hence, ρ e S i . 
(ii) Let S be a Selten subset with (p 0 , q0) e Relmt(S). Let Τ 1 , Γ 2 , . . . , Т г , г € Ν, be the 
maximal Nash subsets that contain (p 0 ,g 0 ) (cf. theorem 16.1(iii)). 
For each Jfc 6 {1,2, . . . , r } , choose the unique face Fk of T* with ( p 0 , g 0) e Relmt(.F*). 
Then, using lemma 17.3, Fk С PE{A,B) for all it € { l , . . . , r } . Further, lemma 17.4 
implies that S С F * . 
According to lemma 17.3 we can choose, for each к G { 1 , . . . , г}, a unique face G* of 
Τ* with Fk С Gk and Gk С PE{A, B) in such a way that F С Gk for all faces F of T* 
with Fk С F and F С PE(A, В). Without loss of generality, we assume G 1 to be such 
that 
GlcGk=*Gl=Gk (Jb € { ! , . . . , r } ) (17.3) 
Since S С F1 С G 1 , it suffices to show that G 1 is a maximal Selten subset. 
Obviously, G 1 is a Selten subset. Let S be a Selten subset with G 1 С S. Since 
(p 0 ,q 0 ) € S, there is an / € { l , 2 , . . . , r } such that S С Τ ' . With (ρ,q) e Relint(S), 
there is a unique face F of T ' with (p,^) € ReUnt(F ). As above, this implies that 
SCF' CPE(A,B). 
Since (p0 ,50) G F1 Π Rel int(F'), we have F' С F1. So the definition of G' implies that 
Τ' С G'. Consequently, G 1 С S С ψ' С G'. Then, (17.3) implies that G 1 = S. Hence, 
G 1 is a maximal Selten subset. 
(iii) By (i) each maximal Selten subset is a face of maximal Nash subset. Hence, there 
are only finitely many maximal Selten subsets. 
Further, since a perfect equilibrium point corresponds to a Selten subset consisting of 
one element, (ii) implies that each perfect equilibrium is contained in a maximal Selten 
subset. Π 
It may be noted that, since each maximal Selten subset is a face of a maximal 
Nash subset and the intersection of two maximal Nash subsets is a face of both sets, no 
maximal Selten subset is redundant in the union of theorem 17.5(iii). 
Defining an extreme perfect equilibrium to be an extreme point of some maximal 
Selten subset, theorem 17.5(i) implies 
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COROLLARY ιτ.β. Each extreme perfect equilibrium is an extreme Nash equilibrium. 
Theorem 17.7 below generalizes the dimension relation of theorem 16.2 to faces 
of maximal Nash subsets. In particular, the proof of this theorem induces a proof of 
theorem 16.2 that differs from the original proof of Jansen (1981b). We use the notations 
introduced in (16.1) and (16.2). 
T H E O R E M 17.7. Let (A,B) e BG(m,n) with A > 0,B > 0. Let F = Fi χ і^ be a face 
of a maximal Nash subset. Then 
(i) Dimíí1,) = | О Д ) | - К а п к ( В Д ) ) . 
(ii) Dim(F2) = \C(F2)\ - Rank(yl(F2)). 
Proof. We only prove (i). Let p 0 e Relint(Fi). By lemma 14.1(ii) we can choose an 
open neighbourhood U С Д
т
 of ρ 0 such that 
P e U =* C{p) D C(p0), PB2(p) С PB 2 (p 0 ) . 
Further, let the vector space V С Rm be given by 
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V:={x e Rm | ^ s , =0,3;, = 0 for all ι g C(Fi) and χ
 Fl В (Fi) = ße for some β e R}, 
where χρ1 is the restriction of χ to R
c(Fi) and e := (1 ,1 , . . . , 1) € RPB^FlK 
(a) First we compute the dimension of V. Using the fact that В > 0, C(p0) = C(.Fi) 
and PB2(p0) = PBi(Fi), it is found that p0FiB(Fi) = ße for some β > 0. Therefore, 
Dim({x € Rm | x, = 0 for all t ^ C(Fi) and xFiB(Fi) = ße for some β e R}) = 
1 + Dim({x € Rm Ι χ, = 0 for all i £ С (Fi) and xFlB(Fi) = 0}) = 
1 + Dim({¿ e Rc{Fl) I zB(Fi) = 0} = 
1 + | О Д ) | -Rank(B(Fi)). 
Hence, since p 0 0 V (Σ,Ζι Ρ? = 1 Φ 0), 
Dim(V) = ICÍFj)! - RankiBiFO). 
(b) Secondly, we show that Din^i i) = Dim(V) by proving that 
((p0 + V) Π 17) С Fi С (ρ0 + V) 
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Let ρ e F i . By lemma 17.4, C(p) С C(p0) = С (Fi) and PB2(p) D PB2(p0) = PB2(F1). 
Hence, ρ - ρ 0 e У. Now let ρ ζ (p° + V) П U. Since ρ e U, we have C(p) D C ( F i ) 
and PB2(p) С P B 2 ( F i ) . Consequently, ρ - ρ 0 € V implies that C(p) = C(F1) and 
РВгСр) = PB2(Fi). Hence, using lemma 17.4, ρ € F i . D 
Theorem 17.5 and theorem 17.7 imply 
C O R O L L A R Y 17.8. Let (Α, Β) ζ ВС(тп, η) with A > 0 and В > 0. Let 5 = Si x S^ be 
a maximal Selten subset for (A,B). Then 
(i) Βπη(5Ί) = | C ( 5 i ) | - R a n k ( 5 ( S i ) ) . 
(ii) Dim(52) = | C ( 5 a ) | -Rjmk(A(Sa)). 
Now we illustrate that the structure of the sets of persistent and proper equilibria 
for bimatrix games essentially differs from the structure of the set of (perfect) Nash 
equilibria. 
As is seen in example 15.2, the set of persistent equilibria need not be closed. So, in 
particular, the set of persistent equilibria need not be the (finite) union of polytopes. 
Due to the fact that the proper equilibrium correspondence is semi-algebraic, Blume 
and Zame (1989) pointed out that the set of proper equilibria consists of finitely many 
connected components. However, for bimatrix games, it is an open question whether the 
set of proper equilibria is the finite union of polytopes. Some differences with respect 
to the structure of the set of perfect equilibria are illustrated in 
E X A M P L E 17.3 (cf. example 13.2). 
Let the 2 x 3 bimatrix game (A, B) be given by 
( A m _ [(3,1) (1,7) (1,9) [Л>*}- [ (1,9) (1,7) (2,1) 
Then, E(A,B) = [ ie i + fe 2 , f d + \e2] χ {e2}. 
All equilibria are perfect, while ( | e i + §62,62) is the unique proper equilibrium. 
One is tempted to call M = Μχ χ M2 := {§βι + i¡e2} χ {e2} a maximal Муетзоп subset. 
Then, the following conclusions can be made: 
(i) A maximal Myerson subset need not be a face of a maximal Nash subset. 
(ii) For maximal Myerson subsets there is no dimension relation in the sense of theorem 
16.2: 
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О = Dim(Mi) φ \C{MX)\ - Ranki^Af j)) = 2 - 1 = 1 
and 
О = Dim(M 2 ) = | С ( М 2 ) | - Калк(Л(М 2 )) = 1 - 1 = 0. 
18. THE CONSTRUCTION OF 2 Χ Π BIMATRIX GAMES WITH A UNIQUE MAXIMAL 
NASH SUBSET 
For m χ η bimatrix games, the general construction problem with respect to Nash 
equilibria can be formulated as follows. 
What are necessary and sufficient conditions on a set S С A
m
 χ Δ
η
 (18.1) 
for the existence of a game {A, B) g BG(m, n) with E(A, B) = S? 
As mentioned in section 16, for the subclass of matrix games the construction problem 
is completely solved. For bimatrix games, no general answer to (18.1) has been found 
yet. A partial answer is provided by Millham (1972) for bimatrix games with special 
properties, and by Kreps (1974) for bimatrix games with a unique Nash equilibrium. 
Using the GC-approach as a tool, this section solves the construction problem for 
the class of 2 χ η bimatrix games with a unique maximal Nash subset. The results in 
this section are based on the paper of Borm and Gijsberts (1990). 
The construction problem for 2 χ η bimatrix games with a unique maximal Nash 
subset can be formulated as follows. 
What are necessary and sufficient conditions on a set (18.2) 
S = Si x S2 G Δ2 Χ Δ
η
 for the existence of a game 
(A,B) e BG(2,n) with E(A,B) = S? 
Obviously, such a set S must be a polytope (cf. theorem 16.1(ii)). So, for describing 
S, it suffices to give its finitely many extreme points. A first necessary condition on 
Ext(S) is given by the notion of feasibility. 
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Неге, a set Fi χ J^ С Δ2 х Δ
η
 is called feasible if the foUowing four assertions hold: 
(F. l ) | F i | e { l , 2 } 
(F.2) F2 φ 0 
(F.3) | C ( ? ) | < 2 for all q e Fi 
(F.4) C{q) φ C(q') for аД ç , 9 ' G F2 with q / q'. 
It readily follows that each feasible set consists of finitely many elements. Further, 
if Г is a maximal Nash subset for a 2 χ η bimatrix game (A, B), then Ext(T) is feasible: 
( F . l ) is a consequence of theorem 11.3, (F.2) is trivial and (F.3) and (F.4) follow from 
theorem 11.2/11.3. 
Having these definitions one can reformulate the construction problem (18.2): 
What are necessary and sufficient conditions on a feasible set (18.3) 
-Fi x F? С Аг х Δ
η
 for the existence of a game (A,B) € BG(2,n) 
such that E(A,B) is convex and Ext(E(A,B)) = Fi χ Fi? 
The construction problem (18.3) will be solved by distinguishing between three cases: 
(a) | F i | = 1 and Fi С Δ2: the inner vertical case. 
(b) | F i | = 1 and Fi С {ei,e2}: the pure vertical case. 
(c) |Fi I = 2: the horizontal case. 
Here, the names 'vertical' and 'horizontal' indicate the position of the unique maximal 
Nash subset in geometric representations. 
First we introduce some further terminology on feasible sets. Let Fi χ Fi С Δ2 х Δ „ 
be feasible. Then Fi can be partitioned in the following way (cf. (F.3)). 
Let Ρ := {q E Fi \ \C(q)\ = 1} be the set of pure extremals in Fi and let 
M : = {q € Fi I \C(q)\ = 2} be the set of mixed extremals in Fi. Let i e C ( M ) . 
Then the set D{i) С C ( M ) is defined by 
D{i) : = {j e C{M) I there is a g e M such that C(q) = {i,j}} (18.4) 
Note that (F.4) implies that, for each j G D(i), there is a unique mixed extremal q G M 
such that C(q) = {i,j}. This unique mixed extremal will be denoted by m({i,j}). 
It readily follows that 
M = IJ {m({i,j})\j&D(i)} (18.5) 
iec(M) 
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An important relationship between mixed extremals is provided in lemma 18.1. 
Here, for i 6 C(M) and j Ç D(i) the pure strategy ratio Χ,} corresponding to m({¿, j}) 
is defined by 
λ,, := τηΛίΜΪΧτη,αΜ'}))- 1 (18-6) 
LEMMA is.i. Let (A, B) e BG(2, n). Let Τ be a maximal Nash subset for (A, B) with 
Ext(r) = Fi χ F 2 and F2 = Ρ U M. Then the following two assertions hold: 
(G.l) There exists a set D С C(M) such that 
(i) D(Jfc) e {D,C(M)\D} for all Jfc e C(M) 
(ii) there is an ¿0 G D such that for all t G 2? there exists a constant c(i,io) G R 
with 
АЛА,.,)"1 =<:(*, io) (18.7) 
for all j G C(JW)\D. 
(G.2) If l ^ l = 1 and Fi С {еьег}, then 
D(k) e {C(M) Π C(P), C*(M)\C(P)} for all it G C(M). 
Proof. (G.l) and (G.2) trivially hold if Μ = β. So let M / 0. 
We first prove (G.l). Theorem 11.3 implies that there is a strategy ρ G Δ2 such that 
F 2 = Ext(5(p)) = PS(p) U CS(p). 
Since Fi χ F2 is feasible, we have 
M = CS(p) = {q(i,j) G Δ
η
 I i G Pß2(p, [1]), j G PB2(p, [2])}. 
Let Jfc G C(M). Then, either Jfc G PB2(p, [1]) or Jfe G Pfl2(p, [2]). If ifc G PS2(p, [1]), then 
U(Jfc) = {/ G C(M) I there is a q G M with C(q) = {Jfc, /}} = PB2(p, [2]). 
Similarly, if Jfc G PB2(p,[2]), then D(Jfc) = PB2(p, [1]). So, choosing D = PB2(p,[l]), 
(i) results. Further, for all i G D and j G C(M)\Z?, it is clear that the mixed extremal 
m({i,j}) is equal to the coordination strategy q(i,j). So 
еіЛт({г,і}) = е2Лт({г',і}) for all i G D, j G С (M )\D (18.8) 
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Let A = [ a
r j ] J = 1 " = 1 . If, for all ι e D and j € C(M)\D, we substitute αϊ, - аг· > О 
by α,, 02; — aij(> 0) by α^ and »п ;({г,І})(т,({г, і7}) - 1 by the pure strategy ratio A.j, 
then (18.8) can be reformulated as 
a, = λ , ,α, for all t G D, j £ C(M)\D (18.9) 
Having «Ό € I? fixed, another transformation of (18.9) leads to 
a} = ( λ , , , ) - 1 « , , for all j £ C(M)\D 
a, = λ , ^ λ , , , ) - 1 ^ , , for all t Ç D and j 6 C(M)\Z> (18.10) 
This implies that 
^АКзТ
1
 = «.(α,,,)- 1 for all i e D and j € C(M)\D (18.11) 
Defining 
c(¿,¿o) = a 1 ( t t l o ) - 1 (18.12) 
for all г € D, (ii) results. 
Now we prove (G.2). Without loss of generality, we assume Ρχ — {ej}. Clearly, 
M = CS(e2) = M i , j ) e Δ „ I i e PB2(e2, [1]), j € Р В 2 ( е 2 , [2])}, 
Ρ = PS(e2) = {e, e Δ„ I / £ P B 2 ( e 2 , [12]) U РВ2(е2, [2])}. 
Let A; e C(Af ). If λ e P S 2 ( e 2 , [1]), then D(ifc) = P B 2 ( e 2 , [2]) = C ( M ) Π С(Р). 
Else, if к e Р Я 2 ( е 2 , [2]), then D(k) = P 5 2 ( e 2 , [1]) = C(M)\C(P). D 
Remark to the proof. It is easy to verify that one just as well can choose D = PB2(p, [2]) 
in stead of D = РВ2(р, [1]). So in particular, we can arbitrarily choose D = D(k) for 
some к 6 C(M). 
Further, with respect to (G.l)(ii), we in fact proved that for all i0 £ D and all i £ D 
there exists etc. 
E X A M P L E ie.1. Let (A, B) be a 2 χ 4 bimatrix game. Let Γ be a maximal Nash subset 
for (A, B) with Ext(T) = Pi x P 2 and F2 = Ρ U M. 
Is it possible that M = {fei + fез, | e i + ìe,», f e2 + f ез, \е2 + ^е*} С Δ4? 
The answer is negative. Although (G.l)(i) is satisfied because 
23(1) = D{2) = {3,4} and Z>(3) = D(4) = {1,2}, 
95 
(G.l)(ii) does not hold. Without loss of generality we may assume that D = {1,2} and 
¿o = 1. Then, however, Xl3 = | , A14 = 1, Агз = f, λ24 = j and 
ι _ ^23 , ^ 2 4 _ ι 
2 — \ Τ \ — 3 ' 
First we concentrate on the construction problem (18.3) for the inner vertical case. 
L E M M A 18.2. Let {A,B) e BG(2,n) be such that E(A,B) is convex and 
Ext(£?(A, B)) = F1x F2, where \Fi\ = 1, Pi С Аг and F2 = P U M. 
Then the following two assertions hold. 
(IV.l) Μ φ 0 
(IV.2) C ( M ) Π С ( Р ) = 0. 
Ртоо/. Let Fx = {ρ} С Аг. Theorem 11.3 implies that Ε(Α,Β) = {ρ} χ 5(ρ). 
Consequently, F2 = Ext(S(p)) = Ρ 5 ( ρ ) U CS{p), Ρ = Ρ 5 ( ρ ) and Μ = CS(p). 
Hence, C ( M ) Π С ( Р ) = 0. 
Suppose M = 0. By theorem 11.3 we can choose к € { 1 , 2 , . . . , i/ — 1} such that 
ρ = p(Jfc). Since CS(p(fc)) = 0 and S V ) = 0 for all p ' € Δ2 with p ' ^ p(Ä;), it is found 
that either P B 2 ( p ' ) С /([!]) or PB2(p') С /([2]) for aU p ' e (p(fc - l),p(fc + 1)) with 
ρ' φ p(k). Without loss of generality, we assume the first. Clearly, if p(k + 1) = ei, 
then P S ( e i ) φ 0. Sop(Ä; + l ) φ e
x
 and Р Б 2 ( р ' ) С /([1]) for all ρ' e (p(Jfe + l),p(fc + 2)). 
Repeating this procedure, it is found that PBi(e.\, [1]) / 0. However, this would imply 
that P S ( e i ) ^ 0. D 
T H E O R E M 18.3. Let Fi Χ P2 С Δ2 Χ Δ
η
 be a feasible set with | P i | = 1, Pi С A2 and 
P2 = P U M . Then there exists a 2 χ η bimatrix game (A, B ) such that E(A, B) is 
convex and Ext(E(A, B)) = Pi χ P 2 if and only if (G. l ) , (IV.l) and (IV.2) are satisfied. 
Proof. Let P i = {p} С Аг. Because of lemma 18.1 and lemma 18.2 we only have to 
prove the 'if'-part. Let ( G . l ) , (IV.l) and (Г .2) be satisfied. We explicitly construct 
a matching 2 χ η bimatrix game in case Ρ φ 0. In case Ρ = 0, a similar construction 
holds. 
Without loss of generality, we assume (else renumber) that C(M) = {1,2, . . . ,3} and 
C ( P ) = {t,t + 1 , . . . ,n} for some s,t 6 N with 1 < s < t < n. Moreover, having 
D С C(M) and ¿0 € D as in (G. l ) we assume that D = { 1 , 2 . . . , r} for some г € N with 
1 < г < s, and that ¿0 = 1. For i € D and j € C ( M ) \ D , let λι ;· be the pure strategy 
ratio of m ( { l , j } ) and let c ( i , l ) be as in (18.7). 
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Consider the 2 χ η bimatrix game (A, B) with 
A= ¡c(l,l) c(2,l) 
0 0 
г r + 1 
c(r,l) 0 
and 
B = 
( l - P i ) " 1 1 
О АГ
Г
] 
г г + 1 
1 1 
1 1 
+ι 
s — 1 s s + 1 
0 0 0 
λΓ.-ι Af/ 0 
з - l 
1 
1 
s s + 1 
РГ
1
 О 
о о 
FIGURE 18.1 
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t - l t 
О 1 
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η 
О 
О , 
η 
1> 
It is clear that there is no equilibrium (p',q) £ Δ2 x Δ„ with ρ φ ρ'. If p'j < pi, 
then PB2(j>') = {1} while PBi(ci) = {1} and, if p'j > pi, then PBiip') = {s} while 
РВгЫ = {2}. 
So it remains to prove that J^ = Έχί{5{ρ)) = PS{p) U C5(p). Clearly, 
PS{p) = {ei e Δ
η
 I / e P5 2 (p, [12])} = {e, e Δ η | / e {t,t + 1,.. ., η}} = Ρ 
Further, 
СS{p) = {q{i, j) G Δ„ J i € PB2(p, [1]), j e РВ2(Р, [2])} 
= { î ( i , j ) e A „ | t E { l , 2 , . . . , r } , j € {г+ 1,г+ 2,...,s} 
= {q(i,j)&An\ieD,jeC(M)\D) 
and 
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M = {m({i,i}) e Δ
η
 I i e D, j e C{M)\D}. 
Consequently, it suffices to show that q(i,}) = m({i,j}) for all t € D and j € C(M)\D, 
or, equivalently, that q,(i,j) = rn,({i, j}). 
Let t € D and j ' e C(M)\D. Then 
?і(*.І) = (a2] - <Ч))((аг] - aij) + (αϊ, - аг · ) ) - 1 
^л-Члг/н-Ф,!))-1 
έλΓ/ίλΓΖ+λ.Λλ,,)-1)-1 
= ( ι + λ
υ
) - 1 
^("».({¿.iD-^-^m.í^i}), 
where = follows from lemma 11.1, = from the definition of A, = from (18.7) and = from 
the definition of λ^. D 
EXAMPLE 18.2. Let Fi χ Fi С Дг x Δγ be defined by 
F1xF2 = {§6! + |е 2 } χ { f e i + fea, ^ + ¿64, ^  + fes, ^ e j + ^ е в , 
7^2 + fes, fej + f 64, f e2 + f es, Ще2 + ^ее,е7} 
Does there exist a game (A,B) e BG(2,7) such that E(A,B) is convex and 
Ext(.E(yl, B)) = Fi X F2? It is easily checked that Fi χ Fi is feasible. Further, Ρ = {e7} 
and M = ί2\{«7}. Clearly, Μ φ 0 and C*(AÍ) Π C(P) = 0. So (Г .1) and (IV.2) are 
satisfied. Checking (G.l) it is found that 
Ζ>(1) = Z>(2) = {3,4,5,6} and .0(3) = 17(4) = .0(5) = £»(6) = {1,2}. 
Since 
^із = 2' ^і* =:: l ' ^is :=: 3, Aie = g, Агз = j , λ24 = £, Азе = ^ and ^гв = jg, 
we have that \i¡^i)~X = 2 f o r ^ 1 3 e {3,4,5,6}. So, with D = {1,2}, ¿0 = 1, 
c(l, 1) = 1 and c(2,1) = 5·, (G.l) is satisfied. According to the proof of theorem 18.3 
(we do not have to renumber) with г = 2, s = 6 and t = 7 we can take 
A = 1 £ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f 1 f 9 0 andB = 
0 1 1 1 1 2 1 
2 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Secondly, we consider the construction problem (18.3) for the pure vertical case. 
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Obviously, ( G . l ) and (G.2) have to be satisfied (cf. lemma 18.1). For the construction 
of a matching game, these two conditions are also sufficient. This is seen in 
T H E O R E M ie.4. Let Fi χ F2 С Aj χ A„ be a feasible set with | F i | = 1, Fi С {е^ег} 
and F2 = Ρ U M. Then there exists a 2 χ η bimatrix game (A, B) such that E(A, B) is 
convex and Ext(E(A, B)) = Fi χ Fz if and only if (G. l ) and (G.2) are satisfied. 
Proof. Let ( G . l ) and (G.2) be satisfied. Without loss of generality, we assume Fi = {βχ}. 
If M = 0, we may assume (else renumber) that C(P) = {1,2,...,»·} with 1 < г < п. 
Then, defining 
1 ·•· г r + 1 · · · η 1 · · · г r + 1 · · · η 
A= ί1 •• 1 0 - 0 Υ B= f1 - 1 0 - Л 
\o ··· o o ··· o/ Vi ··· 1 o ··· oj 
it is clear that Ε(Α,Β) = {ei} χ Conv{ei,. . . , е
г
} = {ei} x Conv(P). 
If Μ φ 0, we have that C{M) Π C ( P ) φ 0 by (G.2). So we may assume that 
C(Af) = {1,2,. . . ,3} and C ( P ) = {r,r + !,...,*} with l < r < 3 < i < n . More­
over, we may assume that Ό — C(M) Π C(P) and that ¿0 = r. 
Let (A,B) e BG(2,n) be defined by 
A = 
and 
1 2 · · • r - 1 г r + 1 
в= Л 1 - 1 1 1 
\0 0 · ·• 0 1 1 
Using similar arguments as in the proof of theorem 18.3 and the results of section 
11, it is found that E(A,B) is convex and Ext(E(A, B)) = {e^} χ ( Ρ U M). D 
E X A M P L E 18.3. Let Fi χ Рг С Aj х Δ7 be defined by 
Pi χ P 2 = {ej} χ {f ej + fea, fa + fa, fa + fa, ^ + ^ е 6 , 
^ej + 763, | e 2 + fe*, §62 + f e 5 , {fej + ^¡-ee, e7, ej} 
1 
0 
Kt 
2 · 
0 · 
K21 • 
·· r - l r r + 1 
0 c(r,r) c ( r + l , r ) ·• 
• λ"
1
., 0 0 
s s + 1 • 
• c(á,r) 0 
• 0 0 · 
· · i t + 1 • 
• 0 0 · 
•· 0 0 · 
· · η 
• 0 
· · 0 
s 
1 
1 
s + 1 • 
1 · 
0 · 
· · t t + 1 • 
• • 1 0 · 
• 0 0 · 
•• η 
· · 0 
• 0 
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It is not difficult to verify that Fi χ Fj is feasible, and that (G. l ) is satisfied with 
D = {1,2} and ¿o = l (cf. example 18.2). However, (G.2) is not satisfied because 
C(M) Π C ( P ) = {1} and 2?(1) = {3,4,5,6}. 
So one can not construct a 2 x 7 bimatrix game (A,B) wit E(A, B) = Conv(.Fi χ Fi). 
Finally, we consider the construction problem (18.3) for the horizontal case. 
L E M M A is.e. Let (A,B) g BG{2, ή) be such that E{A, B) is convex and 
Ext{E{A, B)) = Fi χ Fi with |Fi | = 2 and F2 = Ρ U M . 
Then the following two assertions hold: 
(H.l) M = 0 
(H.2) | C ( F 2 ) | - | F i n { e i , e 2 } | < n - 2 
Proof. Let Fi = {ρ 1 ,ρ 2 } С Δ ι with p\ < p\. By theorem 11.3, there exists a 
к e {0,1,...,!/—1} such that p 1 = p{k) a n d p 2 = p ( i + l ) , and, with ρ := \pl + \p2, we 
have F2 = Ext(S(p)) = P S ( p ) U C5(p) . Clearly, Ρ = PS(p) and M = CS(p). Suppose 
M , ¿0 . Then we can find г,j € { l , . . . , n } with г e/([1]), j € / ( [2 ] ) and q(i,j) Ε M. 
If ρ 1 = ег, then Cj e PSip1) but Cj & S(p). However, this contradicts the fact that 
E(A,B) = [ p 1 ^ 2 ] x S(p). So ρ 1 φ ег. Then there exists an / 6 {1 , . . . ,n} such that 
/ G PBiip1) and / 0 PB2(p). If / e /([12]), then e, e P ^ p 1 ) but e, 0 S(p). If/ € /([1]), 
then î ( / , i ) € CSip1) but
 9 ( / , j ) ^ S(p). And, if / e I([2]), then q(i,l) £ CSfr1) but 
q(i, I) £ S(p). All three cases lead to a contradiction, so we may conclude that M — 0. 
It is clear that |C(F2) | < n. However, if ρ 1 φ e j , then there exists an / G {1, . . . ,n} 
with / G PB2(p 1 ) and / ^ РВ2ІР), so in particular / £ C ( F 2 ) . Similarly, if p 2 ^ ei, there 
exists an / G {1,2, . . . ,η} with / G P i ^ p 2 ) and Í £ ^ ( Р г ) . Combining these arguments 
together with the fact that ( P B Ï Î P 1 ) П PB2(p 2 )) С PBiip), we obtain (H.2). D 
The conditions (H. l ) and (H.2) of lemma 18.5 are also sufficient. This is seen in 
T H E O R E M ιβ.β. Let F i x F2 С Δ2 x Δ
η
 be a feasible set with | F i | = 2 and 
F2 = P U M. Then there exists a 2 χ η bimatrix game (A, B) with E(A, B) is con­
vex and Ext(E(A,B)) = Fi x F2 if and only if (H.l) and (H.2) are satisfied. 
Proof. Let F 1 = {p 1 ,? 2 } С Δ2 with ρ} < ρ]. Let (H.l) and (H.2) be satisfied. We 
explicitly construct a matching game (A, B) G BG(2, n) in case 0 < p\ < p\ < 1. Similar 
constructions hold if p 1 = 62 or p 2 = e i . Because of (H.l) we have F2 = P , and, using 
(H.2), we may assume that F2 = {бі.ег,.. .,et} with t < η — 2. Let (A,B) G BG(2,n) 
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be defined by 
1 •·· t t + l -•· n - 2 n - 1 η 
A = fo •·• 0 0 0 1 (Λ 
\0 ••• 0 0 · · · 0 0 1 / 
and 
1 · · · ί i + 1 · · · n - 2 T i - l η 
в= i1 - 1 0 0 2--k 2 Ì 
\1 ··· 1 0 0 2 2-jjJ 
Then, E{A,B) = [ p \ p 2 ] x Conv ie j , . . . ,е ( } = Conv(Fi χ F2). D 
10. THE GENERAL 2 Χ Π CONSTRUCTION PROBLEM 
This section sketches an algorithm to decide whether, for a given set S С Аз x Δ
η
, 
there exists a 2 χ η bimatrix game with equilibrium set S. 
Let (Α,Β) € 5 G ( 2 , n ) and E(A,B) = U ' = 1 T r where, for all г 6 { !, . . ., t}, 
Tr = T[ χ T2 r is a maximal Nash subset for (A, B). Defining F{ = Ext(T{) and 
F 2
r
 = E x ^ T J ) , the equilibrium set E(A, B) is completely determined by the collection 
Г := {F[ χ ГПгеЦ t}· 
Clearly, a first necessary condition on !F is 
(A.l) F{ χ F 2 r is feasible for all г G { 1 , . . . , <}· 
By theorem 11.3, we may assume that ƒ" is ordered in such a way that 
(A.2) maxfp! | ρ e F{} < m i n f o | ρ € F^+1} for all г € { 1 , . . . , t - 1}. 
Having this ordering, theorem 11.2 and theorem 11.3 imply the following condition on 
the overlap between the maximal Nash subsets. 
(A.3) Ftr^F' for all » € {1,2} and r,s e {!, . . . ,<} with г ^ s 
Ff Π F , r + 1 e {V,FÏ,F;+1} for all » e {1,2} and r E { 1 , . . . , t - 1}· 
By lemma 11.1 and theorem 11.2, it holds 
(A.4) 91 e U'=i *3", 92 e Ur=i V, Ci*1) = С(з2) => я1 = q2. 
Further, since theorem 11.3 implies that (Α,Β) can have at most 2n — 1 maximal Nash 
subsets, it follows that 
(A.5) t < 2n - 1. 
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A collection Τ = {F[ χ F 2 r } r e { l i i f ) with F[ С Δ2 and ¥$ С Δ η for all 
r 6 { ! , . . . ,<}, is called admissible if (A.1)-(A.5) are satisfied. Obviously, each col­
lection F that consists of only one feasible set (the situation discussed in section 18) is 
admissable. 
The construction problem for 2 χ η bimatrix games can now be (re)formulated as: 
What are necessary and sufficient conditions on an admissible collection 
ƒ• = {Fi χ -FHreJi, ,t} for the existence of a 2 χ η bimatrix game (A,B) 
t 
with t maximal Nash subsets T 1 , T 2 , . . . , Γ ' , such that E(A, B) = [j Tr 
r=l 
and E x t ( T r ) = F[ x F J for all г e {1,2, ...,<}? (19.1) 
Let f = {Fi x Ρξ}
Γ
ξμ
ι ι(} be admissible and taJse к e { 1 , . . . ,t}. 
As in section 18, we define the set Pk : = {q € F * | |C(g)| = 1} of pure extremals and 
the set Mk := {q ε Ff | |C(g) | = 2} of mixed extremals, implying that F2* = P * U Mk. 
Further, let Dk(i) := {j e C(Mk) \ there is a q e M* such that C(q) = {i,j}} for all 
г e C(Mk). Having г e C(Mk) and j € Dk(i), (A.4) implies that the unique mixed 
extremal q g Mk with C(q) = {ι,}} does not depend on k. This unique mixed extremal 
is denoted by Tn({i,j}) and the pure strategy ratio λ
υ
 : = ^ ( { î , j } ) ( m i ( { î , j } ) ) _ 1 is 
defined accordingly. 
Necessary conditions on an admissible collection ƒ" in order to correspond to a 
bimatrix game in the sense of (19 1), are provided in 
P R O P O S I T I O N 19.1.Let (Α,Β) ζ BG(2,n) &αάΕ(Α,Β) = ( J Î ^ Tr, where Tr = T[xT{ 
is a maximal Nash subset with Ext(T1r) = F{ and Ext(r2 r) = F2r for all г € { 1 , . . . , <}· 
Let k, l G { 1 , . . . , t } . Then the following eight assertions hold. 
(C. l ) There exists a set Dk С C(Mk) such that 
(i) Dk(i) € {Dk, C(Mk)\Dk} for all г £ C(Mk). 
(ii) there is an го Ç Dk such that for all t G D there exists a constant 
с(г,го) such that λ , ^ λ , , , , ) - 1 = с(г,іо) for all j € C(Mk)\Dk. 
(C.2) If IFÍI = 1 and Ff С {ei ,e 2 } , then 
Dk(i) e {C(Mk) Π C(Pk), C(Mk)\C(Pk)} for all t e C(M). 
(C.3) If \F}\ = 2, or, IF*] = 1 and F * С A 2 , then 
С(Мк)ПС(Рк) = 9. 
(C.4) If IFfl = 2 and Mk + 0, then 
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1 < ifc < t and Ff = Ff'1 U Fi* + 1 . 
(C.5) If \Ff\ = 2 and |J^ | = 1, then 
(i) F' t Ff => C{Ff) Π C(F2') = 0. 
(ii) F[ с Ff =» ί ί ξ F2'. 
(iii) F{ С ί1!*, i j С {е^ег} =• С(Р*) П С(М') = 0. 
(C.6) If \Ff\ = 2, l^'l = 2 and Jfc < Í, then 
(i)C(F2*)nC(F2 ' ) = 0. 
(ii) F i η Fi φ 0 =*• / = Jfc + 2. 
(C.7) If \Ff\ = 1, Ι^ Ί'Ι = 1 and Jfc < /, then 
(i) F2* Π Рхг φ 0 => i = к + 2, ί,1*+1 = Ff U F/, F 2 * + I = Ff Π F2'. 
(ii) F2* Π Fi = 0, C*(F2fc) Π C(F2') φ 0 => / = Jfc + 1. 
(C.8) η > ICdJUi F2r)l + « + ^ , where 
i 2 if e2 ^ F i , M
1
 = 0, and, d g F ' , M ' = 0 
α := ^ 0 if e2 6 F^ or M
1
 ^ 0, and, ej G Fi or M* φ 0 
^ 1 otherwise 
0:=¿l(r\.Fr+1) 
г=1 
_ 1 if Ff Π F ; + 1 = 0, F[ φ {e2}, F ^ 1 ^ {e i}, 
l ( F r , F r + 1 ) := j M r = 0 and M ^ 1 = 0 
( 0 otherwise 
for all г e { ! , . . . ,<-1}. 
A formal proof of this proposition is not difficult, but would be rather lengthy and 
technical. We restrict ourselves to the following comments. 
The conditions (C.l) and (C.2) are immediate consequences of (G.l) and (G.2) 
in lemma 18.1. Condition (C.3) is obvious, and (C.4) expresses the fact that each 
horizontal maximal Nash subset in which coordination solutions are involved, induces 
two vertical maximal Nash subsets at its 'end points'. For this last part, one can use a 
similar line of argument as in the proof of (H.l) in lemma 18.5. 
The conditions (C.5)-(C.8) can best be understood by keeping in mind the geometric 
representation of the GC-approach, using theorem 11.2 and theorem 11.3. 
(C.5)-(C.7) deal with a possible overlap between the different types of maximal Nash 
subsets: horizontal versus vertical in (C.5), horizontal versus horizontal in (C.6) and 
and 
with 
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vertical versus vertical in (C.7). In condition (C.8), α and β measure how many 
'extra' pure strategies of player 2 are needed to make the connections with the axis 
ρ = e^/p = ej and between the various maximal Nash subsets, respectively. 
The conditions (C.1)-(C.8) are not sufficient for an admissible collection to corre­
spond to a 2 χ η bimatrix game in the sense of (19.1). This is illustrated in example 
19.2. However, the conditions (C.1)-(C.8) are 'almost' sufficient. As is seen in example 
19.1, it just depends on whether the labels [1] and [2] can fit. In a rather informal way, 
this example sketches an algorithm to construct, if possible, a matching game to each 
admissible collection that satisfies (C.l)-(C-8). 
E X A M P L E 19.1. Let Τ = {Fl χ ^2Г}ге{1,...,5} with Fl С Аг and FC С Дд for all 
к £ { 1 , . . . , 5} be given by 
FÌ χ Fi = {e2} χ {ex, ее}, 
-F? x * ? = {7«ι + ! ε 2 } x {fa +fa,fa + fa,fa + fa,fa + fa,e!,}, 
F? x ί ? = {fa + fa, fa + fa} x {fa + fa), 
F*xF* = {fa + fa} χ {fa + fa, fa + fa), 
F? χ Fi = {fa + fa} x{fa + fa}. 
One can verify that .F is admissible, and that (C.1)-(C.8) are satisfied with a = β = 0 
in (C.8). If possible, how to construct a matching game? 
Step 1. Fix the location of the maximal Nash subsets that correspond to ƒ" geomet­
rically. 
The five maximal Nash subsets Γ 1 , . . . , T 5 corresponding to F are represented in figure 
19.1(a). As before, (p, 1 — p) € Δ2 is identified with ρ e [0,1]. 
Step 2. Make connections with the axis ρ = ег/р = ei , and between the various (suc­
cessive) maximal Nash subsets. Thus, a piecewise linear maximum function is 
constructed. For each facet (i.e. for each linear part) indicate all necessarily 
contributing pure strategies of player 2. 
For the maximal Nash subsets Г 1 , . . . , T 5 we have to make three connections. Since 
1 G C(M1) Π C(M2), ei has to contribute to the connection between T 1 and T 2 . 
Since C ( M 4 ) Π C ( M 5 ) = 0, the connection between T* and T 5 will have to consist 
of two lineax parts, one corresponding to ее (because {6} = C ( M 4 ) \ C ( M 3 ) ) and the 
other t o 67 or ее. Choosing e^ here, ее is needed to make the connection between T 5 
and the axis ρ = e j . Further, it is clear that 62 and 63 have to contribute to the facet 
corresponding to T 3 . Step 2 results into figure 19.1(b). 
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Step S. For each vertical maximal Nash subset, add the remaining pure strategies of 
player 2 in such a way that they do not contribute to any facet. 
For T 1 we have to add the pure strategy eg, for T 2 the pure strategies 64 and 65 (cf. 
figure 19.1(c)). 
Step 4- Allocate a label [12] to a pure strategy, whereever this is possible. 
A label [12] can be allocated only to ej and eg: all other pure strategies of player 2 are 
used in mixed extremals (cf. figure 19.1(d)). 
Step 5. Allocate the labels [1] and [2] from the 'left side' (p = ег) to the 'right side' 
(p = e 1 ) . 
• К this procedure provides all (remaining) pure strategies with an obligatory 
label, then check whether one would get the same result by allocating the 
labels [1] and [2] starting out from the right. If not, one can not construct a 
matching game. 
• As soon as this procedure allows a free choice between a label [1] or [2], start 
allocating labels from the right. Whenever a free choice between a label [1] or 
[2] occurs, choose arbitrarily and continue. 
Starting out from the left, it must be the case that 1 € /([2]) because ei S Ρ5(β2). 
Hence, 3 € /([1]), 4 e /([1]) and 2 6 /([2]). Consequently, 6 e /([1]), 7 e /([1]) and 
8 G /([2]). Starting out from the right, one obtains the same result. This leads to figure 
19.1(e). 
Step 6. Construct matching payoff matrices A and B. 
In fact, figure 19.1(e) directly represents a possible payoff matrix B. Choose e.g. 
„ [ - 8 1 1 - 2 - 2 3 6 8 - 4 0 ' 
[ 8 5 5 6 6 3 - 2 - 8 8 
To construct A = [a™]2-! ' _ j , we can proceed in the following way. Define a u := 0 if 
/ G /([12]) U /([2]), and c^j = 0 if Í G /([12]) U /([!]) . To fill in the other entries, put 
021 = 1. Then, using lemma 11.1, it follows that 013 = 1 and 014 = 5. Having 013, it is 
found that 022 = f • Note that 022 can also be determined from 014 : (C. l ) guarantees 
the same result. By continuining this procedure, one obtains 
4 _ [ 0 0 1 Ì 0 | 1 0 0" 
[l f o o o o o i o 
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FIGURE ID.l 
Τ 
Ρ figure 19.1(a) 
figure 19.1(b) 
figure 19.1(c) 
figure 19.1(d) 
figure 19.1(e) 
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E X A M P L E і .2. Let Τ = \F[ x í^lreí i , . . .^} be as in example 19.1, with one exception: 
F*xF* = {fa + fa) x {fa + fa, fa + fa]. 
Then, ƒ" is admissible and (C.1)-(C.8) are satisfied. Proceeding as in example 19.1, step 
4 leads to figure 19.1(d). Then, starting out from the left in step 5, one obtains the 
obligatory labeling of figure 19.2. So, in particular, 8 Ç Д[1]). However, starting out 
from the right, one would find that 8 G í([2]). This implies that one can not construct 
a matching 2 x 9 bimatrix game for this collection ƒ". 
F I G U R E 1Θ.2 
It is not difficult to verify that the labeling procedure in step 5 of the algorithm 
will fit if the underlying admissible collection ƒ" = {F[ χ -FOrefi,...,«} satisfies 
(C.9) There exists а к £ { 1 , . . . ,<} such that | і ^ | = 2, F2* = P2* and, 
either Jfc e { M } , or, к € {2 , . . . ,t - 1} and ( С ^ * - 1 ) Π С ( ^ 2 * + 1 ) ) С C(F£). 
This leads to 
P R O P O S I T I O N ie.2. Let ƒ• = { . Ρ Ί Γ Χ . Ρ Π Ρ €{ Ι , . . . , 0 be admissible, with F{ С Δ2 and F{ С 
Δ „ for аЛ г g {I , . · · ,t}· If ¿F satisfies (C.1)-(C.9), then there exists a 2 χ η bimatrix 
game (А, В) with t maximal Nash subsets T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T* such that 
E(A, B) = Uj.
=
i T r and Ext(T r ) = F f χ F 2 r for all г e { 1 , . . . , t}. 
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IV. M U L T I O B J E C T I V E G A M E S A N D T H E R O L E O F I N F O R M A T I O N 
The first part of this chapter (section 20) discusses a model for multiobjective 
games. Why should one aim for a multiobjective approach? 
A first reason is that many 'real-world' decisions involve several possibly conflicting ob­
jectives. For example, consider a facility location problem in which a firm has to decide 
upon the location of a new settlement. This decision will involve various objectives: 
building costs, costs of labour, reachability (with respect to consumers and suppliers), 
public interests (labour, pollution), etc. Further, if we assume there is competing sec­
ond firm with similar intentions, some of these objectives will be correlated with the 
location of the new settlement of this other firm. Clearly, this situation corresponds to 
a game in which it will be difficult to find a unifying payoff function that serves as a 
'trade-off' between the various objectives. 
This links up to a second reason to consider multiobjective models: one does not 
have to make a trade-off between objectives in advance. Taking into account each 
objective seperately, one can explore the full range of possibilities. Only at that moment, 
having an overall picture, one can make a trade-off and find a conflict resolution. 
As a third reason, the rich field of multiobjective programming in decision theory seems a 
promising start for an extension towards competetive situations ЕЮ modelled in game the­
ory. Some references on multiobjective programming are Cochrane and Zeleny (1973), 
Cohon (1978) and Zeleny (1974). 
In section 20 we concentrate on a model for two-person non zero-sum multiobjective 
games using vector payoffs (cf. Вотт, Tijs ana van den Aansen (1989)). As a possible 
solution concept we introduce Pareto equilibria. Existence is shown and, in particular, 
Pareto equilibria are linked to Nash equiUbria of corresponding (uniobjective) 'trade-off' 
games. Shapley (1959) derived similar results for the zero-sum case, and indicated that 
these results could be extended to the non zero-sum case. 
So far we only discussed games with complete information. It was implicitly as­
sumed that all players have full information about the various actions each player can 
take, about the actual payoffs (for all players) generated by each specific choice of ac­
tions, and about the precise information available to each player. However, not for all 
situations these assumptions seem reasonable. Think about competing firms that lack 
information about their opponents ' financial means, capacity of production, internal 
structure etc. 
108 
For this kind of situations that involve incomplete information, Натзапуі (1967-
1968) developed a model which was only recently formalized by Mertens and Zamir 
(1985). This model has been widely explored in the context of two-person repeated 
games (the same game is being played repeatedly) to investigate issues as information 
disclosure, learning processes, threats, punishments etc. (cf. Aumann and МазсМет 
(1966, 1967, 1968), Мегіепз and Zamir (1971-1972, 1980) and Ηατί (1985)). A survey 
on repeated games with incomplete information together with further references can be 
found in Borm (1987b). 
Section 21 addresses somewhat different aspects of information. Let (X, F, AT, L) 
and (X, Y, K',L') be two-person games in strategic form. Consider the following sit­
uation. An arbitrator tosses a (fair) coin. Without knowing the outcome of the toss, 
player 1 and player 2 have to choose strategies χ € X and у 6 Y. If the outcome of 
the toss is head, then the payoff for player 1 is K(x,y)·, if it isltail, player I's payoff is 
K'(x,y). For player 2, the payoffs are L(x,y) and L'(x,y), resfectively. 
Section 21 investigates the consequences on the players' payoffs | f one of them gets (full) 
information on the outcome of the toss. Leading questions a r e | 
• What types of information can be distinguished? 
• Are some information types more valuable than others? 
• Can information benefit the uninformed player too? 
Three types of information will be distinguished: secret, pr ivat i and public information. 
For evaluating these types, we follow Levine and Ponssard (1B77). In particular, this 
implies that the strategic behaviour of an information h o l d e r ! a 'maven'), who stands 
outside the conflict situation, is not taken into account. The antroduction of a maven 
would lead to a different definition of the value of information as can be found in Kamien, 
Tauman and Zamir (1988). At present, we assume that information disclosure is a 
costless and 'inside' affair. These assumptions can be justified in modelling situations 
where private research and spying play a crucial role. 
Section 21 is based on Borm (1988). 
20. PARETO EQUILIBRIA FOR MULTIOBJECTIVE GAMES 
This section describes a model for two-person multiobjective games. As a solution 
concept we consider Pareto equilibria. It is shown that Pareto equilibria exactly corre­
spond to Nash equilibria for uniobjective games that are derived from a strictly positive 
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weighting of the various objective fimctions. Further, a geometric solution method for 
'small' multiobjective games is illustrated. 
We consider two-person multiobjective games in which player 1 and player 2 can 
choose between m and η possible actions, while taking into account г and s objectives, 
respectively. 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let τπ,η,Γ,θ e N. Let A = (A1,...,Ar) and В = (В1,...,В') be two 
vectors of real m χ η matrices. The г χ s multiobjective τη χ η bimatrix game (A, B) 
is defined as the game ( Д
т
, Д
п
, . К \ L), where the vector-payoff functions К and L are 
given by 
K(p,q):=(pA1q,...,pArq) and L(p,q) := (pB^,... ,pB'q) 
for all (p, q) 6 A
m
 χ ΔΕ. To shorten descriptions, let 
pAq:=lpA1q,...,pArq) and pBq : = (pB1q,... ,pB'q) 
forali (ρ, q) £ A
m
xA„. By MG ( r x s , m x n ) we denote the set of all г χ a multiobjective 
m χ η bimatrix games. 
Note that, if г = 1 I n d s = 1, or, if A1 = ... = Ar and B1 = . . . = B', we are back 
in the 'old' setting of ΤΤΊΧ гг bimatrix games. 
The idea behind Paretcl equilibria is the following. Fixing a certain strategy of player 
2, one can look at the lolytope of possible vector-payoffs to player 1, and determine 
its undominated elements together with the corresponding strategies of player 1. These 
strategies will be called Pareto-best replies. Similarly one defines Paxeto-best replies 
for player 2. Pairs of strategies that are Pareto-best replies to one another axe called 
Pareto equilibria. 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let (A, B) € MG{T x s, m χ η) and (ρ, q) e Д
т
 χ Δ
η
. 
The polytopes Рд(в) С R r and Рв{р) С R" axe defined by 
PA{<Ï) ·•= CoTix{{eiAq,..., emAq}) and Рв(р) : = C o n v ( { p ß e i , . . . , pSc„}) . 
The sets PAR\{q) and РАЛгСр) 0 ^ Pareto-best replies axe defined by 
PARi(q) : = {p € Д
т
 I pAq is undominated in Pji(q)}, 
PAR2(p) := {q € Δ
η
 I pBq is undominated in Р
в
( р ) } . 
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The pair (ρ, q) is called a Pareto equilibrium for (A, B) if ρ G PAR].(q) and q G PAR2(p). 
By PAR(A, B) we denote the set of all Pareto equilibria for (A,B). 
Clearly, for (uniobjective) τη χ η bimatrix games (A, B) we have that the set 
PAR(A, B) of Pareto equilibria is equal to the set E(A, B) of Nash equilibria. 
The concepts and definitions above are illustrated in 
EXAMPLE 20.1. Let the 2 x 2 multiobjective 2 x 2 bimatrix game (A, B) be given by 
A = (A1,A2) = (0,3) (8,1) (6,0) (2,5) and B = (B
1
,B2) (1,-1) (2,1) (6,3) (5,2) 
Let (p,g) G Δ2 x Δ2. Then, 
fe 1 A ? = ( 8 - 8 j i , l + 2i 1) , f pBa = (6-Ьр^З - 4Pl) 
\ e 2 ^ g = (2 + 4 î l , 5 - 5 î l ) ^ \ p B e 2 = (5 - 3 ^ , 2 - ^ ) 
Hence, 
РАРгід) ΓΔ2 
•r i 1 Í {ei} if Pi < τ 
î V > ; Jr f < ï and PAR2(p) = Δ2 if 1 < P\ < 1 
l f
^ -
î 1
-
7
 íe2} i f P j > ì 
and (cf. figure 20.1), 
PAR(A, B) =[e2, l e ! + \e2) χ {ej} U 
(lei + f e 2 ) ìe j + §е2) χ (e2, ìej + §62) U 
(I e l + fe2>Ìel + èe2) X (l^ + f e2, e l ) υ 
( ìe1 + | e 2 , e 1 ] x { e 2 } . 
FIGURE 20.1 
1 Φ 
РЛЙ! 
We now show that the set of Pareto equilibria is non-empty by considering bimatrix 
games that arise from a multiobjective game by a strictly positive weighting of all 
objectives for each player. It is shown that Nash equilibria for these games correspond 
to Pareto equilibria for the original multiobjective game, so the existence of Pareto 
equilibria is guaranteed by the existence of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games. 
D E F I N I T I O N . Let (A, B) G MG(r χ a, m χ η). For λ G Δ
Γ
 and μ G Δ , the trade-off 
bimatrix game (Α(Χ),Β(μ)) G BG(m, η) corresponding to (A, B) is defined by 
г в 
A(X):=J2XkAk ^ £(μ) = Σ>*Β*. 
T H E O R E M 20.1. Let (A, B) G MG{r χ a, m χ η). Let λ G Δ
Γ
 and μ G Δ,. Then 
Ε{Α{\),Β{μ))<ζΡΑΚ{Α
ί
Β). 
Proof. Let (ρ, 5) G Ε(Α{\),Β(μ)). We prove that ρ G PAR^q), i.e. 
{x G Rr I X > pAq) Π PA{q) = {pAq}. 
Let χ G R r be such that χ > pAq and χ G -PAÎÇ)· Since ζ G Рл(я), there is a strategy 
ρ G Δ,,, such that χ = pAq. Consequently, pAq > pAq. 
Further, using the equihbrium condition, 
г 
Л(рЛд) = ρ ( Σ bkAh)q = pA(\)q < pA(\)q = X(PAq). 
Combining these two facts with λ > 0, we find that χ = pAq = pAq. Similarly one 
shows that q G Р-АДгСр)· О 
EXAMPLE 20.2. Consider the multiobjective game (A, B) G MG(2 χ 2,2 χ 2) of example 
20.1. For λ G A2 and μ G Δ2, the trade-off bimatrix game (Α(λ),Β(μ)) G Β<?(2,2) is 
given by 
(Α(λ),Β(μ)) = 
Then, e.g. 
E(A(i, I ) , 5 ( ì , Ì)) = {(e,, e2), (e2,ej), (fex + | e 2 , |
ε ι
 + fe2)} С РАЩА, В). 
( 3 - 3 λ 1 , - 1 + 2 μ 1 ) (1-1-7λ1,1 + μ1) 
(6Α1,3 + 3μι) (5-3Α 1,2-|-3μι) 
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The converse of theorem 20.1 also holds: each Pareto equilibrium can be found as a 
Nash equilibrium for some trade-off game. This result is stated in theorem 20.3 below. 
For its proof we need 
L E M M A 20.2. Let Ρ С R' be a polytope and ζ £ P. Then ζ is undominated in Ρ if and 
only if there exists a vector u € R' such that 
u > 0 and их < uz for all χ (=. P. 
Proof. Let ζ be undominated in P. Since Ρ is a polytope we can find vectors 
η ' , . , . , η * β R' and scalars α ϊ , . . . , α , € H,s e Ν, such that 
a 
P= P | { x e R f \nkx<ak}. 
h=i 
Let I(z) := {k G { Ι , . , . ,θ} | nkz = a t } . Clearly, I(z) / 0 because, otherwise, one 
could find a small ε > 0 such that (zi + ε , . . . , zt + e) £ P , dominating z. 
Let M be the t χ (/(ζ)[-matrix with columns {n* | к £ I{z)}. Note that there can be 
no vector χ £ R' such that xM < 0, χ > 0 and χ φ 0. For, this would imply that 
ζ + εχ £ Ρ for small ε > 0 while ζ + εχ > ζ, and ζ + εχ ^ ζ. 
Then, by the duality theorem of linear inequalities (cf. Galt (1960), p. 60), there is a 
vector ¡/ £ R / ( î ) such that My > 0 and y > 0. Define u := My £ R' and let χ £ P. 
Since xnk < a* = zn* for all Jk £ I(z), we have xM < zM. Consequently, 
xu = xMy < zMy = zu. 
To prove the converse, let и £ R', u > 0, be such that xu < zu for all χ € P . Suppose 
ζ € Ρ is such that ζ > ζ and ζ φ ζ. Then, (ζ — z)u > 0 or, equivalently, zu > zu. D 
T H E O R E M 20.3. Let (A,B) £ MG(r χ s ,m χ η) and (p,q) £ PAR(A,B). 
Then there exist λ £ Δ
Γ
 and μ £ Δ, such that (ρ, g) £ Ε(Α(\),Β(μ)). 
Proof. By definition pAq is undominated in Рлід) and pBq is undominated in Рв(р) · 
So, by lemma 20.2, there exist vectors u £ R r and ν £ R s such that u > 0, ν > 0 and 
xu < (pA5)u for all χ € РА(Я) and У ^ (P-Bg)u for all y 6 Рв(р)· 
Defining A : = (53^
=
ι Ufc)- 1u € A r and μ := ( Σ ^ _ ι υ * ) - 1 υ e A s , we have 
pA(\)q = X(pAq) > X(p'Aq)=p,(A(X))q for all p ' € Д
т 
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and, similarly, ρΒ(μ)ς > ρΒ(μ)ς' for all q' £ A
n
. Hence, (p,g) e Ε(Α(Χ),Β(μ)). D 
21. INFORMATION TYPESi AN EVALUATION FOR SPECIAL CLASSES OF GAMES 
Before formally describing the model of Levine and Ponsaard (1977) and Borm 
(1988) to evaluate various information types, the underlying ideas are illustrated in the 
following example. 
Consider two firms Fi and J^, producing the same good G. Suppose a new market 
opens for G. Both firms have to decide whether or not to enter this market. However, 
the new market is totally unknown and it can be either good or bad. 
Suppose Fi has ал infallible method to detect whether a market is good or bad. Such 
a method is not known to F2, and Fj does not even know (or suspect) that Fi has this 
kind of method. Assume Fi knows all this. Then, strictly speaking, this situation does 
not correspond to a game: the rules of the game are not known to both players; one 
could say that they face a different game. Therefore, we shall speak of a game-situation 
with secret information. For the secret information case, it seems reasonable to assume 
that F2 will act just as in the case Fi has no extra information. 
Let us go one step further. We still have Fi with its infallible detection method, but 
now a spy from F2 has discovered that Fi bas such a method. However, the spy has 
not been able to copy the method. If we further assume that Ρχ has detected the 
spy and exactly knows what information has been passed on to J^ , and, if these facts 
are common knowledge (i.e. F2 knows that Fi knows that the spy has ..., Fx knows 
that F2 knows that ..., etc.), then this situation corresponds to a game, a game with 
private information. If Fx has not detected the spy and this is known by F2, then the 
situation can not be viewed upon as a game anymore and will be referred to as a game-
situation with semi-private information. For the semi-private information case, it seems 
reasonable to assume that Fx will act just as in the case F2 has no extra information, 
so just as in the secret information case. 
Finally, consider the extension of the private information case where the spy has been 
able to copy the method. This situation corresponds to a game: a game with public 
information. 
One could think of other types of information too, but we restrict attention to the types 
illustrated above. Now we come to formally describe the model. 
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In the following, let (A1, B1),..., (Ar, BT) be г m χ η bimatrix games with 
Ak = [a?,]» , ;
= 1 and B
k
 = [ δ * · ] ^ ;
= J 
for all к e { 1 , . . . , г}. Further, let 
J : = { ! , . . . , m } , J : = { ! , . . . , η } and К := {I,... , r } 
For each ρ G Δ
Γ
, we consider the two person game G(p) that is played according to 
following rules: 
(i) A chance move selects an element к ξ. К according to the probability vector p. 
(ii) Player 1 and player 2 simultaneously choose elements i Ç. I and j ε J, respectively. 
(iii) If i € I,j € J and к ξ. К are chosen, then player 1 receives a payoff of a^ and 
player 2 a payoff of 6*·. 
(iv) Both players know the probability vector ρ and the payoff matrices Ak and Bk for 
all к e К. Moreover, all description so far is common knowledge. 
(v) The players have to decide upon their actions having no (extra) information about 
the actual choice of the chance move. This fact is common knowledge. 
Our analysis will be restricted to different types of full information on one side. 
By this we mean that, in terms of the model above, player 1 gets to know which к ζ К 
is chosen by the chance move. As illustrated in the example of the two firms, some 
of these information types will lead to game, others to a game-situation. Information 
types of the last category will be indicated by " . We distinguish between 
• â-information (secret information): Player 1 is the only player who gets to know 
the outcome of the chance move. Moreover, player 2 is ignorant of the fact that 
player 1 has this information and player 1 knows this. 
• /^-information (private information): Player 1 is the only player who gets to know 
the outcome of the chance move, but player 2 knows that player 1 has this infor-
mation. These facts are common knowledge. 
• /^-information (semi-private information): Player 1 is the only player who gets to 
know the outcome of the chance move, but player 2 knows that player 1 has this 
information. Moreover, player 1 is ignorant of the fact that player 2 has this kind 
of information and player 2 knows this. 
• 7-information (public information): Both players get to know the outcome of the 
chance move and this fact is common knowledge. 
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For ρ G Δ
Γ
 and t € {ά,β,β,Ύ}, let G(p,t) denote the game (-situation) that is 
played according to the same rules as G(p) with one exception: (v) is replaced by (v, t) 
given below. 
(v, t) The players have to decide upon their actions having t-information. 
G(p, t) will be referred to as a game (situation) with t-information. To shorten 
descriptions, the game G(p) will be denoted by G(p, S) and is referred to as a game with 
¿-information. 
In order to evaluate <-infonnation, one would like to talk about the expected payoff 
for a player in G(p,t). However, in the games with β-, у- от ¿-information there in 
general will be several Nash equilibria, not necessarily leading to the same payoff vector. 
This problem is tackled in the special classes of games we discuss later on, since, for 
all information types under consideration, it will be possible to track both players' 
behaviour using dominance considerations. Further, we make the following 
Assumptions, (a) In G(p,ä) player 2 chooses the same strategy as in G(p,6). 
(b) In G(p, β) player 1 chooses the same strategy as in G(p, ά ) . 
Having these special situations in mind, we denote by u 1 (p, i ) the expected payoff 
of player г € {1,2} in G(p, t). Fbrther, the value t>i(p, t) and the antivalue V2(p,t) of 
^-information are defined by 
vi(p,t) := ui(p,t)-ui(p,6) and V2(p,t) := U2(p,t) - ^(ρ,δ) (21.1) 
for a l H e { ά , β , β , η , δ ) . 
Obviously, Vi (ρ, ¿) = г>2(р, S) = 0 and it is easily verified that the expected payoffs 
u 1 ( p , ¿) and U2(p, ¿) depend upon the expected bimatrix game (A, B) corresponding to 
G(p), where 
Г Г 
А:=^р
к
А
к
 and В:=^р
к
В
к
. 
t = l Jt=l 
At first sight one might expect the value of secret information to be always greater 
than the value of (semi-) private information, which in turn, would always be greater 
than the value of public information. Moreover, for the antivalue one might expect it 
to be the other way around. It will be shown that this is not the case. 
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In principle, fixing on four information types (evaluating either β- or ^-information), 
there could be 24 possible ways of ranking both values and antivalues. However, the 
number of possible rankings is restricted to 12 because of 
L E M M A 21.1. Let ρ e Δ
Γ
. Then 
(i) υ ι ( ρ , ά ) > υ ι ( ρ , 5 ) 
(ii) V2(p,ß) > V 2 ( P , Q ) . 
Proof. By ignoring his information player 1 in G(p, a ) can guarantee the same expected 
payoff as in (7(р, 6) because player 2, by assumption, uses the same strategy in both 
G{p,a) and G(p, 6). 
Using a similar argument, one obtains part (ii). D 
Before discussing three special classes of games, we want to illustrate that it can be 
difficult to analyze and evaluate private information because of an infinite interaction 
of information. 
E X A M P L E 21.1. Consider the game G(p) given by г = 2, ρ = ( j , \) and 
{A\B') = (2,4) (0,0) (0,8) (10,0) , ( A
2
, B 2 ) ; 
(0,0) (4,2) 
(2,-4) (-2,2) J 
What should the players do in case of private information? 
The following observations can be made: 
(a) If there is no (extra) information, player 2 will choose ej, because the expected 
bimatrix game (.A, i?) is given by 
{A,B) = (1,2) (1,2) 
(2,1) 
(4,1) 
(b) Having full information on the outcome of the chance move and assuming that 
player 2 will choose e i , player 1 will choose ei if ( A1, B 1 ) is being played and 63 if 
( J 4 2 , B 2 ) is being played. 
(c) In case of private information player 2 realizes that player 1 can reason as in (b) 
and, therefore, will adjust his strategy and choose ез {\ • 4 + \ · —4 < ^ · 0 + 5· · 2). 
(d) Realizing that player 2 can reason as in (c), player 1 will adjust his strategy and 
choose 62 if (A1.,B1) is being played and ei if (A2,B2) is being played. 
(e) In reaction to (d) player 2 again will adjust his strategy and choose ei because 
5 · 8 + 5 · 0 > 5 · 0 + 5 · · 2 . However, this implies that we are back at the conclusion 
of (b). So the adjustment of strategies can start all over again! 
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The first special class of games we consider, is due to Levine and Ponssard (1977). 
D E F I N I T I O N . A game G(p) is said to be an element of the XP-class i fr = 2, ρ = ( ί , | ) 
and 
( A 1 , B 1 ) = 
with 
and 
( a n , o n ) (αΐ2,θ2ΐ)1 <ÁiB2) = 
(021,012) (022,022)] ' l ' 
(021.021) (022,011) 
(011.022) (012,012) 
On > 021,012 > O22 (¿ominonce requiremenU) 
O12 + 021 > Оц + a22 {switch requirement) 
On + 021 > ai2 + 022 {coordination requirement) 
(21.2) 
(21.3) 
(21.4) 
For an element of the LP-class the expected bimatrix game has the form 
(χ Xl It/ Xi 
, ' ( / ( with 1, у € R. Following the line of argument of Levine and (s,y) (y,y)J 
Ponssard (1977), such a game can be viewed upon as a coordination game in which 
both players will try for a payoff equal to max{x,y}. Further, there is no problem in 
evaluating private information because of the dominance requirements (21.2). In the 
notation we will omit p, since ρ is fixed to ( Ì , | ) . 
T H E O R E M 21.3. Let G(p) be an element of the LP-class. Then 
(i) υι(ά) = | ( о п - огі), «2(а) = |(α22 - огі). 
(іі) ν^β) = ν1{β) = α 1 2 - !(«!„ + 02!), гО?) = Ы/Э) = ¿ ( а ^ - оц) . 
(ііі) і (7) = г М = è(oi2 - 021). 
Proof. Using the coordination requirement (21.4), we have « i ( i ) = »2(6) = %{au +021). 
By the dominance requirements (21.2), 
" ι ( ά ) = e i 0 " + α " ) = 0ιΐ' " 2 ( ά ) = 2 ( α " + α22)· 
By (21.2) and the switch requirement (21.3), 
u i (0) = «i(|0) = §(012 + аіг) = аіг, U2{ß) = U20) = §(021 + 012). 
Finally, (21.2) implies 
«1(7) = «2(7) = И 0 1 1 + а і 2 ) · D 
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It readily follows from theorem 21.2 that the LP-class only allows for four differ-
ent rankings of the values of the various information types. These rankings can be 
schematically represented by 
äSyß, ajSß, 07/35 and ß~fa6. 
With respect to antivalues there are only three possible rankings: 
Sfßä, "fSßä and jßeä. 
E X A M P L E 21.2. Consider the subset of games G(p) in the LP-class that are given by 
3 χ 
2 0 with 1 < χ < 5. Then 
vi(&) = è , «i(0) = wiG9) = x - f, «1(7) = è* - 1 
t* (á ) = - 1 , «2(0) = гф> = \x - f, «2(7) = \x - 1 
Varying я , it is easily checked that within this subclass all possible rankings with respect 
to values/antivalues occur. 
The second class of games we consider is the V-class. This class allows for all twelve 
possible rankings with respect to the values of the various types of information. 
D E F I N I T I O N . A game G(p) is said to be an element of the V-class i f r = 2, ν =• (\,\) 
and 
{A\B^ = ( a l i t a l i ) (αΐ2,ί>ΐ2) (021,621 ) (122,622) , (A
2
,P 2 ) = ( C i b a l i ) (Ci2,dl2) 
. (C2i, í í2l) (C22,d22). 
with 
and 
О ц > 021, 012 > 022, C21 > C u , C22 > C12 
Ьц > Ьі2, ¿22 > аг\ (dominance requirements) 
Ьі2 + ¿22 > Ьц + ¿21 (switch requirement) 
Oll + Сц > 021 + C21, 012 + Ci2 > 022 + ¿22 
bu + ¿ и > 6i2 + ¿12 (expectational dominance requirements) 
(21.5) 
(21.6) 
(21.7) 
Similarly to theorem 21.2 one can show 
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THEOREM 21.3. Let G(p) be an dement of the V-class. Then 
(i) υι(ά) = | ( c 2i - d i ) ,V2(ñ) = 5(^21 -du) 
(ii) vi(ß) = "Aß) = è(«i2 + C22) - 5(011 + сц), 
ν2(β) = vtfß) = ì(bia + dn) - К Ь и + d i i ) 
(ІІІ) υι(7) = |(С22 - Сц) ,«2(7) = 1(^22 - dn) 
(2,3) (1,4) 
(3,1) (У, 6) 
EXAMPLE 21.3. Consider the subset of games G(p) in the V-class that are given by 
(лі д Ь - Г С 1 ' 5 ) i 4 ' 2 ) ! and (A2 B2i = (
 '
B )
~ [(0,7) (1,0)J a n d ( Α ' ΰ > 
with χ > 1 and у e (1,4). Then 
νι(ά) = ì , *!(£) = ія(Д) = 1 + ìy - | х and »,(7) = %У - 1 
Figure 21.1 shows that within this subclass all twelve rankings of these values occur. 
FIGURE 21.1. 
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For a game G(p) in the V-class only four rankings with respect to antivalues axe 
possible, since «2(7) > ^(ß) by theorem 21.3 and (21.5). In example 21.3, replacing 
¿21 = 1 and ¿22 = 6 by ¿21 = я and ¿22 = t, with t > з + 3, these four rankings occur 
as a function of s and t. 
The third class of games we consider, is the j4-class. For this class, we have to 
restrict to semi-private information in stead of private information because of the prob­
lem illustrated in example 21.1. Within this class all twelve rankings with respect to 
the antivalues of the various information types occur. 
D E F I N I T I O N . A game G(p) is said to be an element of the A-class i f r = 2, ρ = ( 5 , f ) 
and 
(A\B1) = ( α π , δ ι ι ) (ві2,Ьі2) (021,621) (α22,ί>22) , (А
2
,Я
2) = (Cll .dl l) (Ci2,dl2) (C21,<¿2l) (C22,¿22) 
with 
and 
hi > Ьі2, hi > 6227 ¿12 > ¿11» ¿22 > ¿21 
o n > 021, C21 > с ц , Ci2 > C22 (dominance requirements) 
Í>12 + ¿22 > Ьц + (¿21 (switch requirement) 
021 + C21 > о ц + e n , 022 + C22 > 012 + C12 
621 + ¿21 > 2^2 + ¿22 (expectational dominance requirements) 
(21.8) 
(21.9) 
(21.10) 
T H E O R E M 21.3. Let G(p) be an element of the A-class. Then 
(i) υ^α) = 1(αιι - 021) ,«2(0) = ¿(Ьц - Ьгі) 
(ii) νι(β) = i ( a 1 2 + C22 - 021 - C21) ,V20) = 5(612 + ¿22 - 621 - ¿21) 
(iii) ^1(7) = | ( a i i + C 1 2 - 0 2 1 - C 2 1 ) ,«2(7) = è(6ii +di2 -621 - ¿ 2 1 ) 
E X A M P L E 21.S. Consider the subset of games G(p) in the Л-class that are given by 
(4,x) (3,y) 
L(0,5) (7,0) J and (A
2
,B2) = ( 0 , - 3 ) (6,2) 
L (8,0) (5,4) J (A\B
1) = 
with ζ > — 3 and χ > y > χ — 4. Then, 
»2(a) = | ι - f, V20) = ì y - I and 1)2(7) = ίχ + ì z - f. 
Deñning 
Χ : = {(х,у,г) e R 3 \z > - 3 , χ >y > a; - 4}, 
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a partition {Χχ,Хгі · · · , Х п ) of X results with respect to the diiferent rankings of the 
antivalues of the various types of information: 
)£X \z <0,x + z>5} 
) eX \x> 5,x + z < 5 } 
)eX \y > l,x <5,z < 0 } 
) EX I y > l,x + z <5,z > 0 } 
)eX\z<y-x + A,x + z>b1x<5} 
)eX \z <y-x + i,z>0,x>5} 
)eX\z>y-x + 4,x>5} 
)eX\z>y-x + 4,y>l,x<5} 
)eX\x + z>5,y<l} 
(x, y, z) 6 X | χ + ζ < 5, ζ > y - χ + 4} 
(x,y,z)eX\y<l,z<y-x+4,z>0} 
(x,y,z)eX\y<l,z<0} 
'•— { 
:= { 
:= { 
:
= { 
:= { 
:
= { 
:= { 
:
= { 
:= \ 
(z,y,z) 
(x, У,г  
(x,y,z) 
(x,y,z) 
(x,y,z) 
(*. У, г) 
(x, У.«  
{x, У, г) 
(*,y,z) 
/?àT5 
ßäSj 
ßSäf 
β6
Ί
ά 
βηδά 
β-γάδ 
ηβάδ 
ηβδα 
j6ßa 
6jßä 
δβ-γά 
δβα
Ί 
(7,4,-1)6X1 
(6,3,-2) e Xa 
(4,2,-1)6X3 
(3,2,1)6X4 
(4,3,2) 6 Хь 
(6,5,2)6X6 
(6,3,2) 6 Х-, 
(4,3,4) 6 Хь 
(3,0,3)6X9 
(3,0, | ) 6 Хю 
( 3 , 0 , ì ) 6 X n 
(1,0,-1) 6 Хі 2 
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S A M E N V A T T I N G 
Speltheorie houdt zich bezig met het modelleren en oplossen van conflictsituaties. 
Van oudsher wordt er onderscheid gemaakt tussen twee takken binnen de speltheorie: de 
coöperatieve speltheorie bestudeert situaties waarin de betrokken partijen (spelers) tot 
bindende afspraken kunnen komen, de niet-coöperatieve speltheorie bestudeert situaties 
waarin dit niet het geval is. Dit proefschrift richt zich op beide takken en bestudeert 
speltheoretische oplossingsconcepten die, op basis van een wiskundige formulering van 
rationeel gedrag, een handelwijze voor elk der spelers bepalen. 
Hoofdstuk I is inleidend. Hoofdstuk II beschrijft een speltheoretische aanpak voor 
situaties waarin de communicatiemogelijkheden tussen de spelers beperkt zijn. Verder 
worden relaties tussen coöperatieve en niet-coöperatieve modellen/oplossingsconcepten 
aangegeven. 
Exogene communicatiesituaties worden geïntroduceerd in § 4. Hierbij liggen de eco-
nomische mogelijkheden voor de spelers (een TU-spél) en de communicatiemogelijkhe-
den tussen de spelers (een graaf) vast. Voor communicatiesituaties worden de 
Myerson waarde en de positiewaarde gedefinieerd met behulp van de Shapley waarde 
voor corresponderende puntspelen en lijnspelen. In § 5 wordt een axiomatische 
karakterisering gegeven voor beide waarden op de deelklasse van communicatiesitu-
aties waarvoor de communicatiegraph geen cykels bevat. Met behulp van een relatie 
tussen dividenden wordt in § 6 de positiewaarde bepaald voor enkele specifieke voor-
beelden. § 7 bestudeert een niet-coöperatief model voor de endogene opbouw van com-
municatiestructuren. Tussen welke spelers zal communicatie tot stand komen als de 
economische mogelijkheden voor elke deelgroep bekend zijn? Er wordt een vergelijking 
gemaakt tussen de Myerson waarde en de positiewaarde als criterium voor de ontstane 
communicatiestructuren. 
Bij elk coöperatief (standaard) JVTf7-spel wordt in § 8 een niet-coöperatief strategisch 
'claimspel' gedefinieerd. Door de (gecoördineerde) Aumann procedure toe te passen op 
dit claimspel, wordt het oorspronkelijke JVTI7-spel geassocieerd met een nieuw NTU-
spel. Aangetoond wordt dat dit nieuwe spel het kleinste superadditieve spel is dat 
het oorspronkelijke bevat. In § 9 worden oplossingsconcepten voor een superadditief 
NTU-spe\ gekoppeld aan speciale types Nash evenwichten voor het corresponderende 
strategische claimspel. Aanpassingen van de definitie van een claimspel met betrekking 
tot correlatie en eindigheid worden besproken in § 10. 
Hoofdstuk III bestudeert verfijningen van Nash evenwichten voor bimatrixspelen. 
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Voor de deelklasse van 2 χ η bimatrixspelen, waarin een van de spelers slechts twee 
(zuivere) strategieën tot zijn beschikking heeft, wordt een geometrisch-combinatorische 
methode beschreven om verfijningen te bepalen: Nash evenwichten in § 11, quasi-sterke 
evenwichten in § 12, perfecte en propere evenwichten in § 13, stabiele verzamelingen in 
§ 14 en persistente evenwichten/retracts in § 15. 
Voor 2 χ η bimatrixspelen wordt hier o.a. bewezen: quasi-sterke evenwichten bestaan, 
elke strikt perfect evenwicht is proper, elk persistent evenwicht is perfect, elke stabiele 
verzameling bestaat uit een of twee elementen en elk persistent retract bevat een sta­
biele verzameling. Mogelijke generalisaties van deze resultaten naar algemene m χ η 
bimatrixspelen worden aangegeven. 
§ 16 herhaalt enkele bekende resultaten over de structuur van de verzameling van Nash 
evenwichten voor bimatrixspelen: een opsplitsing in eindig veel maximale Nash verza-
mehngen en een dimensie relatie voor elk van deze verzamelingen. Met de introductie 
van maximale Selten verzamelingen in § 17 kunnen deze resultaten worden doorver­
taald naar de verzameling van perfecte evenwichten. Voorbeelden tonen aan dat een 
dergelijke analogie niet geldt met betrekking tot de verzamelingen van propere en per­
sistente evenwichten. 
Het constructieprobleem voor 2 χ η bimatrixspelen met een unieke maximale Nash verza­
meling wordt opgelost in § 18. Er worden nodige en voldoende voorwaarden gegeven 
waaronder een (convexe) verzameling optreedt als de unieke maximale Nash verzameling 
voor een 2 χ η bimatrix spel. § 19 bestudeert het algemene 2 χ η constructieprobleem. 
Op een informele manier wordt een algorithme beschreven om te bepalen of een gegeven 
verzameling wel of niet kan optreden als de verzameling van evenwichtspunten voor een 
2 χ η bimatrix spel. 
Hoofdstuk IV bekijkt twee mogelijke uitbreidingen van het model van niet-
coöperatieve twee-persoons strategische spelen: multi-criteria spelen en (eenstaps) spe-
len met onvolledige informatie. 
Pareto evenwichten voor multi-criteria spelen worden gedefinieerd in § 20; relaties met 
Nash evenwichten worden aangegeven. 
§ 21 beschrijft enkele soorten (volledige) informatie die een speler kan hebben over de 
werkelijke (spel) situatie waarin hij/zij zich bevindt. Deze soorten informatie worden 
vergeleken zowel vanuit het standpunt van de geïnformeerde speler als vanuit het stand-
punt van de niet-geïnformeerde speler. 
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S T E L L I N G E N 
by het proefschrift 'On game theoretic models and solution concepts' 
van P.E.M. Borm 
1. Voor een eindig bimatrixspel geldt: 
(i) elke stabiele verzameling bevat eindig veel elementen. 
(ii) elk persistent retract bevat een stabiele verzameling. 
Jansen, M.J.M., Jurg, A.P. and P.E.M. Borm (1990): On the finiteness of 
stable sets. Report 9012, Dept. of Math., Univ. of Nijmegen. 
2. Laat (A, B) een m χ η bimatrix spel zijn. Een strategieënpaar (p, q) 6 Д
т
 χ Δ „ 
heet e-proper als (p, q) proper is èn 
Γ e, А = eTA = > p , = p r (t, г e {1,2, . . . , m}) 
\ Be, = Be, = > 7j = q, (j,s € { 1 , 2 , . . . ,n}) 
Dan geldt: er is een persistent retract dat een e-proper evenwicht bevat. 
Jurg, A.P., García Jurado, I. and P.E.M. Borm (1989): On modifications 
of the concepts of perfect and proper equilibria. Report 8929, Dept. of 
Math. , Univ. of Nijmegen. 
3. Een Nash evenwicht heet efficiënt als de corresponderende uitbetalingsvector een 
ongedomineerd element is binnen de verzameling van alle evenwichtsuitbetalingen. 
Voor elk eindig bimatrix spel geldt dat de verzameling van efficiënte evenwichten 
de eindige vereniging is van zijden van maximale Nash verzamelingen. 
Borm, P.E.M., Jansen, M.J.M., Potters, J.A.M, and S.H. Tijs (1990). 
Pareto equilibria for bimatrix games. To appear in: 2nd Special Issue on 
Global Optimization, Control and Games (Guest Editor E. Galperin) of the 
Int. J. on Computers and Mathematics with Applications. 
4. Laat {Ν,ν,Α) een communicatiesituatie zijn (zie hoofdstuk II). Als (Ν,v) een con­
vex spel is (d.w.z. v(S) + v(T) < v(SUT) + v{SnT) voor alle S,T С N) en (Ν, A) 
een boom, dan geldt: 
(i) het puntspel (N, г^) en het linkspel (A, r^) zijn convex. 
(ii) de Myerson waarde μ(Ν, ν, A) en de positiewaarde π(./ν, υ, Α) liggen in de core 
van het puntspel (Ν, г^) . 
5. Gegeven een goederenverzameling { 1 , 2 , . . . , m } en een spelersverzameling 
N = { 1 , 2 , . . . , n} wordt een goederenspel (N, F) bepaald door de functie F die aan 
elke coalitie S € 2 een (comprehensive en compact) deel van de goederenruimte 
R4· := {α e R r o | α > 0} toewijst, waarbij .F(0) = {0}. 
Een goederenspel (N,F) heet gebalanceerd als voor elke afbeelding λ : 2N —• R+, 
waarvoor Es€2"\<«} A ( 5 ) e S = e * S e l d t d a t Eseï^Xf«) * ( 5 ) f ( 5 ) С F(N). 
Dan geldt: voor elk gebalanceerd goederenspel (JV, F) bestaat er een allocatie 
χ € ( R ^ ) N zó, dat 
« Σ . - e J v Z . e W ) 
(ii) - · 3 5 € 2 Ν 3
ί 6 ί . ( 5 ) : У > E . e s ^ i · . У Φ E i e s 1 · · 
Van den Nouweland, Α., Aarts, Η. and Ρ. Dorm (1989). Multi-commodity 
games. Report 8925, Dept. of Math., Univ. of Nijmegen. 
6. 'In submitting to your consideration the idea that the human mind is at its best 
when playing, I am myself playing, and that malees me feel that what I am saying 
may have in it an element of t ruth ' . 
J.L. Synge (1958). Hermathena, 19, p. 40. (As quoted in H.S.M. Coxeter 
(1961). Introduction t o geometry. New York/Wiley, p. 77.) 
7. Voor ieder die leeft om te spelen en die van mening is dat het leven een spel is, 
verliest de uitdrukking 'spelen met je leven' zijn betekenis. 
8. Het verdient aanbeveling een voetbalwedstrijd een ztdvere speeltijd te geven van 
twee keer 35 minuten. 


